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The National Development Office of the Hungarian government contracted the international 
consortium coordinated by the Center for Research in Economic Policy for the development 
of a complex macro-regional economic model. This model system will be used for ex-ante 
evaluations of different policy scenarios according to the following specifications: 
 
1.  The model is the extension of EcoRET – a macroeconomic model used for ex-ante 
impact analyses during the design of the 1
st National Development Plan for Hungary – 
into the regional and the sectoral directions. For the regional extension EcoRET will 
be integrated with RAEM-Light – a spatial computable general equilibrium (SCGE) 
model that have already been used for policy evaluations in the Netherlands, Japan 
and South Korea.  
2.  The sectoral detail of the complex model is as follows: industry, agriculture, services 
and government. 
3.  The spatial detail of the model: 
-  for the macroeconomic sub-model: national level 
-  for  the  regional  TFP  and  SCGE  sub-models:  Hungarian  counties  (NUTS  3 
level) 
4.  Data need:  
-  for  the  macroeconomic  sub-model:  time  series  data  from  1990  (for  several 
variables only from 1995); 
-  for the TFP sub-model: panel space-time data for 1997-2003 
-  for the SCGE sub-model: cross sectional data for 2003 (short run) and time 
series data for selected variables (long run) 
5.  The  model  system  is  supported  by  a  user-friendly  Windows  interface  that  makes 
policy simulations easy to perform without being familiar with the softwares (Eviews, 
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The complex model exhibits the following most important unique features as compared to 
more traditional approaches in policy modeling: 
 
1.  The  model  has  a  strong  supply  side  orientation  besides  having  a  well  developed 
demand side block.  
2.  Modeling technological change is at the heart of the supply side block. The reason for 
this is that most of the development policy instruments (R&D support, infrastructure 
investment,  education/tranining  promotion)  aim  towards  improving  firms’ 
productivity.  
3.  The effect of static and dynamic agglomeration externalities in technological change 
are  directly  modeled  in  the  complex  system.  This  feature  is  perhaps  the  one  that 
distinguishes our approach from others the most. As a result our model is capable of 
estimating the likely effects of policy scenarios with different spatial distribution of 
development support both in the short run as well as in the longer run. 
4.  The complex model provides rich information for policy analysis on the likely effects 
of interventions not only at the macro but also at the regional levels. This information 
is communicated via tables, figures and maps.  
5.  Finally,  despite  its  highly  complex  structure  the  system  is  “packaged”  in  a  user 
friendly  Windows  interface  that  makes  policy  simulations  extremely  easy  even  for 
those who are not familiar with any of the softwares running in the background. 
 
Since the most distinguishing feature of our modeling approach is that it directly incorporates 
the geographic dimension of development policy interventions we call this model Geographic 
Macro and Regional model for Hungary and refer to it as the GMR-Hungary model. 
 
The Consortium that has built this model consists of the following institutes: 
 
•  Center  for  Research  in  Economic  Policy  (GKK,  University  of  Pécs,  Faculty  of 
Business and Economics) – project coordination, TFP sub-model-building, planning, 
integrating and executing the complex model system. (Attila Varga, Péter Járosi, Zsolt 
Uderszky) 
•  Center for Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM, University of Münster) – 
macroeconomic  sub-model  building,  planning  the  complex  model  system.  (Hans 
Joachim Schalk, Onno Hoffmeister)   4 
•  TNO  (Delft)  –  provision  of  RAEM-Light  for  adaptation  it  to  Hungarian 
circumstances,  expert  help  during  calculations  of  transportation  cost  matrices, 
consultancy during the adaptation of RAEM-Light (Lory Tavasszy) 
•  TRANSMAN Ltd. – calculation of transportation cost matrices (János Monigl, Zoltán 
Újhelyi) 
•  Department  of  Education  Management  (University  of  Pécs)  –  designing  and 
developing Windows interface (Balázs Marján) 
 
 
Scientific advisors on the project: 
 
•  Atsushi Koike (Tottori University, Japan) – adaptation of RAEM-Light to Hungarian 
circumstances (developing RAEM-Light Hungary), expert help during the integration 
of RAEM-Light into the complex model system 
•  Tamás Révész (Budapest Corvinus University) – consultancy during the integration of 
RAEM-Light Hungary into the complex model system. 
 
This report provides the theoretical background for the complex model, a detailed description 
of the whole system and also an application to assess the likely economic impacts of the 
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2.  A  key  issue  in  development  policy  analysis:  Appropriately  modeling  technological 
change and macroeconomic performance 
 
 
2.1 Development policy and technological change: An empirical modeling framework 
 
Beginning in the early 1980’s first in the USA then in Europe and in other parts of the Word 
new  types  of  development  policy  instruments  emerged  both  at  central  and  regional 
government levels. These policies are commonly called “technology-based” (or “knowledge-
based”)  economic  development  policies.  The  common  aim  of  these  interventions  is  to 
improve firm’s technological opportunities (Isserman 1994, Cohen, Florida and Goe 1994, 
Coburn 1995, Reamer, Icerman and Youtie 2003). These policies are clearly related to the fact 
first  proven  by  Robert  Solow  (1957)  that  technological  change  is  the  most  important 
component of long-run economic growth. The new set of policies is also influenced by the 
experience of some highly successful regions (such as the Silicon Valley and Route 168 in the 
USA, or the Cambridge Phenomenon in the UK) where indigenously developed technologies 
constituted the principal drive of economic growth (Varga 1998).  
 
Instruments  promoting  technology-based  development  can  be  classified  into  two  sets. 
Interventions in the first class directly promote firm’s technological potential by start-up and 
investment supports, tax credits, low interest rate loans or venture capital. The second set of 
instruments  affects  firms  indirectly  by  supporting  the  technological  (or  knowledge) 
environment  by  means  of  R&D  promotion  both  at  universities  and  private  firms,  human 
capital  improvement,  support  of  public-private  interactions  in  innovation  (e.g.,  university-
industry  technology  centers,  government-industry  consortia,  university-industry  research 
collaboration) or by financing  physical infrastructure building
1.  
 
Theoretical  foundation  of  the  two  sets  of  policies  has  been  developed  in  the  so-called 
“innovation  systems”  literature  (Lundval  1992,  Nelson  1993,  Braczyk,  Cooke  and 
Heidenreich). According to this approach innovation is an outcome of a systemic process 
where interactions among the actors lead to the change of technologies. Actors of the system 
are  innovating  firms,  their  suppliers  and  buyers,  private  and  public  research  laboratories, 
universities, business services active in innovation (such as software, design, marketing or 
                                                 
1 For a systematic overview of the subject see Reamer, Icerman and Youtie 2003   6 
patent law firms) and different levels of governments. Since innovation is not any more a 
result  of  lonely  inventors’  independent  efforts  (such  as  of  the  Edison-type  inventors  one 
hundred  years  ago)  the  intensity  of  interactions  among  the  actors  in  a  system  is  crucial. 
Interactions can either be formally or informally organized that is they might be regulated by 
market forces (and as such these interactions are governed by written contracts) or they could 
follow the web of personal relations (i.e., interactions are coordinated by the principle of 
reciprocity). Also, some of the interactions result in knowledge spillovers where the cost to 
obtain knowledge is zero or less than the value of that knowledge. Innovation systems are 
classified  by  industrial  sectors  (e.g.,  biotechnology,  electronics  or  software  innovation 
systems)  and  by  spatial  units  (global,  national,  regional  or  local  systems  of  innovation).  
 
The  geographical  dimension  can  become  crucial  in  technological  change  and  economic 
growth for three main reasons. First, because the role of space might be essential in accessing 
knowledge,  second,  since  agglomeration  can  be  determinant  in  the  accumulation  of 
technological  knowledge  and  third,  because  of  the  cumulative  growth  mechanisms  these 
agglomeration economies initiate.   
 
Spatial pattern of knowledge-related interactions has become a central research issue in the 
last decade. A series of papers (e.g., Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993, Audretsch and 
Feldman 1996, Anselin, Varga and Acs 1997, Varga 2000, Keller 2002) demonstrates that a 
significant  fraction  of  knowledge  flows  is  bounded  spatially.  A  specific  characteristic  of 
knowledge  communication  explains  this  observation.  The  effectiveness  of  knowledge 
transmission in space seems to be directly related to the degree of codification. While codified 
knowledge can easily be transported over large distances in written forms (e.g., in scientific 
papers,  patent  documentations)  transmission  of  tacit  knowledge  (non-codified,  practical 
knowledge  essential  in  innovation)  relies  on  more  complex,  non-written  types  of 
communication that require personal interactions. Thus, access to this knowledge might be 
limited to those only who locate in the proximity of the knowledge source and as such spatial 
proximity of the actors in innovation could increase the effectiveness of technological change. 
Geographical proximity may also ease maintaining connections between firms, private and 
public research institutions and also with business services as it speeds up information flows 
or helps build trust and the common language of communication (Koschatzky 2000).  
   7 
Agglomeration is the second geographical aspect of innovation. As an increasing body of 
literature  (e.g.,  Feldman  1994,  Fujita  and  Thisse  2002,  Varga  2000)  indicates  there  is  a 
positive  relationship  between  agglomeration  and  technological  development.  Various 
agglomeration  effects  such  as  the  positive  impact  of  increasing  spatial  concentration  of 
researchers on tacit knowledge flows or the positive influence of the size of the local economy 
(number  of  related  firms,  producer  services)  on  localized  knowledge  interactions  are 
identified in this literature. Thus the larger the concentration of the actors of the innovation 
system in space the higher the opportunity of forming interactions and the higher the level of 
innovation. As a result of this agglomeration effect, innovation activities follow a definite 
tendency to concentrate in space as was demonstrated by Varga (1999) for the US and by 
Caniels (2000) for the EU.  
 
If spatial proximity is essential in the change of technology and agglomeration forces decrease 
the  costs  of  innovation  these  could  possibly  release  a  cumulative  process  of  spatial 
concentration of the system. As such lover costs of innovation attracts firms into the region 
that  further  decreases the costs of innovation (at least until positive agglomeration effects 
dominate) and this effect is strengthened by further firm re-locations. Thus agglomeration 
forces are crucial in technological change and as such in economic growth explanation.  
 
It  directly  follows  from  the  above  paragraphs  that  adequate  modeling  of  the  impact  of 
development policies on the economy should consider the geographical aspect directly and as 
such, correct analysis of the effects of various development policy instruments has to be done 
in the spatial context. What could be the theoretical basis for such an empirical modeling? 
 
Unfortunately it is a very complex task to integrate spatial structure into economic growth 
explanation. At this point no unified theory is available. As far as I understand the state of the 
art given the extreme complexity of the problem formal modeling might no even be possible 
at least with the instruments currently available. Even for empirical treatment research should 
use  a  mixture  of  tools  and  as  such  the  suggested  set  of  methodologies  is  eclectic. 
Consequently, it is important to emphasize that I do not aim to develop a formal theoretical 
model here. The aim of the proceeding paragraphs is to outline a framework that can guide 
empirical modeling
2. 
                                                 
2 For more details see Varga (2006)   8 
 
Essential elements of this “geographical growth explanation” are rooted in three separately 
developed recent literatures (Acs and Varga 2002): the endogenous growth theory (Romer 
1990, Aghion and Howitt 1998), the systems of innovation school (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 
1993),  and  the  new  economic  geography  literature  (Krugman  1991,  Fujita,  Krugman  and 
Venables  1999,  Fujita  and  Thisse  2002).  This  section  provides  a  framework  to  integrate 
elements of these three approaches in a consistent manner to guide empirical research in the 
field of geographical innovation and growth.  
 
The three approaches focus on different aspects but at the same time are also complements of 
each  other.  The  “new”  theories  of  growth  endogenize  technological  change  and  as  such 
interlink technological change with macroeconomic growth. However, the way technological 
change is described is strongly simplistic and the economy investigated gets formulated in an 
a-spatial model. On the other hand, systems of innovation frameworks are very detailed with 
respect to the innovation process but say nothing about macroeconomic growth. However, the 
spatial dimension has been introduced into the framework in the recently developed “regional 
innovation systems” studies (e.g., Braczyk, Cooke, Hedenreich 1998, Fischer 2001).  
 
New economic geography models investigate general equilibrium in a spatial setting. This 
means that they provide explanations not only for the determination of equilibrium prices, 
incomes and quantities in each market but also the development of the particular geographical 
structure of the economy. In other words, new economic geography derives economic and 
spatial equilibrium simultaneously (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999, Fujita and Thisse 
2002). Spatial equilibrium arises as an outcome of the balance between centripetal forces 
working  towards  agglomeration  (such  as  increasing  returns  to  scale,  industrial  demand, 
localized  knowledge  spillovers)  and  centrifugal  forces  promoting  dispersion  (such  as 
transportation costs). Until the latest developments in recent years new economic geography 
models did not consider the spatial aspects of economic growth. However even in the recent 
models explanation of technological change follows the same pattern as endogenous growth 
models and as such fail to reach the complexity inherent in innovation systems studies.  
 
As was detailed above the idea behind the innovation systems approach is quite simple but as 
such extremely appealing. According to this in most cases innovation is a result of a collective 
process  and  this  process  gets  shaped  in  a  systemic  manner.  The  effectiveness  (i.e.,   9 
productivity in terms of number of innovations) of the system is determined by both the 
knowledge already accumulated by the actors and the level of their interconnectedness (i.e., 
the intensity of knowledge flows). Ability and motivations for interactions are shaped largely 
by traditions, social norms, values and the countries’ legal systems.  
 
To develop an empirical modeling framework of geographical growth explanation I extend 
the endogenous growth model in Romer (1990) to the spatial dimension by accounting for 
insights from the innovation systems literature and then dynamize it by incorporating features 
of the new economic geography. For a bit more formal treatment I apply the generalized 
version  of  the  Romer  (1990)  equation  of  macroeconomic  level  knowledge  production 
developed in Jones (1995)
3: 
 




where HA stands for human capital in the research sector working on knowledge production 
(operationalized  by  the  number  of  researchers),  A  is  the  total  stock  of  technological 
knowledge available at a certain point in time whereas dA is the change in technological 
knowledge resulted from private efforts to invest in research and development. δ, λ and φ are 
parameters. 
 
Technological  change  is  generated  by  research  and  its  extent  depends  on  the  number  of 
researchers involved in knowledge creation (HA). However, their efficiency is directly related 
to the total stock of already available knowledge (A). Knowledge spillovers are central to the 
growth  process:  the  higher  A  the  larger  the  change  in  technology  produced  by  the  same 
number  of  researchers.  Thus  macroeconomic  growth  is  strongly  related  to  knowledge 
spillovers.  
 
Parameters  in  the  Romer  knowledge  production  function  play  a  decisive  role  in  the 
effectiveness of macro level knowledge production. The same number of researchers with a 
similar  value  of  A  can  raise  the  level  of  already  existing  technological  knowledge  with 
significant differences depending on the size of the parameters.  First, consider  δ (0<δ<1) 
                                                 
3 The functional form corresponds to the Jones (1995) version, however, the interpretation of λ and φ is different 
in this paper.    10 
which  is  the  research  productivity  parameter.  The  larger  δ  the  more  efficient  HA  is  in 
producing economically useful new knowledge.  
 
The size of φ reflects the extent to which the total stock of already established knowledge 
impacts  knowledge  production.  Given  that  A  stands  for  the  level  of  codified  knowledge 
(available in books, scientific papers or patent documentations) I call φ as the parameter of 
codified knowledge spillovers. The size of φ reflects the portion of A that spills over and as 
such its value largely influences the effectiveness of research in generating new technologies. 
 
λ is the research spillover parameter. The larger λ the stronger the impact the same number of 
researchers plays in technological change. In contrast to φ and δ that are determined primarily 
in the research sector and as such their values are exogenous to the economy λ is endogenous. 
Its value reflects the diffusion of (codified and tacit) knowledge accumulated by researchers. 
Diffusion depends first on the intensity of interactions among researchers (HA), second the 
quality of public research and the extent to which the private research sector is connected to it 
(especially to universities) by formal and informal linkages and third the development level of 
supporting/connected industries and business services and the integration of innovating firms 
into the system via links to them. The extensive innovation systems literature evidences that 
the  same  number  of  researchers  contribute  to  different  efficiencies  depending  on  the 
development of the system. In the Romer equation this is reflected in the size of λ. 
 
λ is also sensitive to the spatial structure of HA. Insights from the new economic geography 
can help understand the dynamic effects of the spatial structure of R&D on macroeconomic 
growth. If spatial proximity to other research labs, universities, firms and business services 
matter  in  innovation  firms  are  motivated  to  locate  R&D  laboratories  where  actors  of  the 
system of innovation are already agglomerated in order to decrease their costs to innovate. 
Thus spatial concentration of the system of innovation is a source of positive externalities and 
as such these externalities are centrifugal forces in R&D location. However, agglomeration 
effects could be negative as well. Increasing housing costs and travel time make innovation 
more expensive and might motivate labs to move out from the region. The actual balance 
between centrifugal and centripetal forces shapes the geographical structure of the system of 
innovation. Through determining the size of λ this also influences the rate of technological 
progress (dA/A) and eventually the macroeconomic growth rate (dy/y).   11 
 
Equations (1) to (6) summarize the empirical modeling framework of geographical growth 
explanation.  Equation  (1)  describes  the  relationship  between  innovation  output  (K)  and 
regional inputs to innovation in region r: private research (RD), public/university research 
(URD)  and  the  additional  actors  of  the  regional  system  of  innovation  such  as  business 
services, related/connected firms as summarized in variable Z: 
 
(2.1)    Kr = K (RDr, URDr, Zr). 
 
A  significant  relationship  between  RD  and  K  reflects  the  importance  of  geography  in 
innovation  and  eventually  in  economic  growth.  Equations  (2)  to  (6)  actually  model  this 
relationship. 
 
The regional effect of an increase in private R&D on innovation depends on research already 
in  the  region  as  well  as  on  the  presence  of  additional  innovation  inputs,  URD  and  Z 
(agglomeration forces in innovation): 
 
(2.2)    ∂Kr/∂RDr = F (RDr, URDr, Zr). 
 
Parameters of RD, URD and Z are determined by several factors exogenous to the economy 
such as the willingness to cooperate in innovation, the structure of research expenditures at 
universities, local regulations and so on. The marginal effect of R&D on innovation reflects 
agglomeration economies/diseconomies in innovation and as such affects R&D location: 
 
(2.3)    dRDr = R(∂Kr/∂RDr). 
 
Positive effects (agglomeration economies) act as centripetal forces whereas negative effects 
(agglomeration diseconomies) are centrifugal forces in R&D location. The spatial distribution 
of  R&D  is  determined  by  regional  differences  in  the  marginal  effect  of  research  on 
innovation. In spatial equilibrium ∂Kr/∂RDr is the same for all the regions and dRDr=0. 
 
Geographical structure of research (GSTR(HA)) determines λ: 
 
(2.4)    λ= λ (GSTR(HA)),   12 
 
where HA=  Σr RD. 
 
The rest of the equations are from the Romer-Jones model are as follows: 
 




(2.6)  dy/y = H(dA, ZN), 
 
where dy/y is macro level per-capita growth rate and ZN is additional variables of the model 
(not detailed here).  
 
Equations 1-6 appropriately situate different economic development policies in the system of 
causal  relations  ranging  from  geographically  mediated  knowledge  production  to 
macroeconomic  performance.  Some  of  the  policy  measures  affect  the  level  of  knowledge 
present in the system of innovations such as R&D support at private and public institutions 
education promotion at all levels (represented in equation 1). Other policies affect the strength 
of centripetal and centrifugal forces determining the dynamism described in equations 2-3. 
Such policies include infrastructure financing (rail and road connections, telecommunication 
networks) that diminishes transport costs and increases accessibility of the region and as such 
decrease centrifugal forces. Other policies such as supporting interactions among the actors of 
a system of innovations, promoting entrepreneurship, changing the legal systems (patenting, 
intellectual  property  law,  licensing  technologies  from  public  institutions  etc)  are  also 
instrumental in strengthening the centripetal forces in the system. 
 
The above set of equations can drive empirical research in development policy modeling. 
Such a model should explicitly treat the geography of technological change in a dynamic 
manner  to  account  for  various  cumulative  processes  inherent  in  macroeconomic  growth 
explanation.  Based  on  the  above  equations  the  following  sub-modeling  tasks  should  be 
involved: 
 
1. Explicit modeling of the geographical aspect of technological change (equation 2.1); 
2.  Modeling  of  agglomeration  economies  and  the  resulting  cumulative  spatial  processes 
(equations 2.2 to 2.4) in knowledge generation;   13 
3.  Modeling  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  geographically  explained  technological  change 
(equations 2.5 and 2.6). 
 
Current  econometric  models  widely  used  in  development  policy  analysis  such  as  the 
HERMIN model in Europe (Bradley, Whelan and Wright 1995, ESRI 2002) or the REMI 
model in the United States (Treyz 1993, Fan, Treyz and Treyz 2000) have moved into the 
direction of incorporating geography and technological change into their basically demand-
driven systems, however, they are not  yet fully developed according to the criteria listed 
under points 1 to 3 above. On the other hand EcoRET (Schalk and Varga 2004) directly 
incorporates the geographic dimension via a version of equation 2.1, but the dynamic manner 
space contributes to macroeconomic performance is not modeled there. 
 
In our complex macro and regional model we account for all the above three aspects in three 
interconnected  sub-models.  Modeling  the  geographical  aspect  of  technological  change  is 
accomplished  via  the  regional  TFP  sub-model  (chapter  3),  modeling  agglomeration 
economies  and  the  resulting  cumulative  spatial  processes  is  incorporated  by  a  spatial 
computable  general  equilibrium  (SCGE)  sub-model  and  the  macroeconomic  effects  are 
modeled by a macroeconometric sub-model. 
 
 
2.2 Macro and regional impacts of CSF development policy instruments
4 
 
The main purpose of the complex macro and regional model is to serve as a tool for ex-ante 
evaluating  the  likely  economic  effects  of  different  scenarios  for  spending  Structural  and 
Cohesion Funds resources as part of the Hungarian National Development Plan II. In this 
section the mechanisms by which the different CSF policy measures affect the economy in 
our modeling framework is outlined.  
According to their different effects on relevant economic variables the instruments of CSF 
policy can best be classified into three broad categories: 
 
•  CSF support for infrastructure 
•  CSF support for human resources (education/training and R&D) 
                                                 
4 This section draws on section 2.3 in Schalk and Varga (2004)   14 
•  CSF support for productive structures (private investments) 
 
These instruments are intended to influence the supply side of an economic system primarily, 
but, intended or not, they also have effects on the demand side. A classical example is the 
support for private investments that stimulate the productive capacity and investment demand 
simultaneously. Thus, in order to catch mutual and feedback effects between both sides of the 
economy a complete analysis of the effects of CSF has to consider their impacts both on the 
supply and the demand side and their interdependencies  as well. The  distinction between 
demand  side  and  supply  side  effects  is  also  important,  because  the  former  impacts  are 
normally transitory while impacts of the latter are enduring. This will be of great interest 
when testing the impacts of the different policy instruments of CSF. 
Because the main objective of EU regional policy is to stimulate growth in the less developed 
regions to achieve convergence (in output or income per capita), special efforts have to be 
made to associate CSF interventions to their long-run impacts on output and productivity 
respectively. Another important goal of EU regional policy is to increase employment and 
reduce unemployment. It is a priori uncertain whether this target can be achieved with the 
investment programs of CSF even if they are successful with regard to the growth goal. If 
technology (efficiency of production) is improved by the CSFs, a desired effect, less labor 
will be employed at any given level of output. Therefore, it depends on the magnitude of the 
growth effect of output whether the employment target can also be reached or not. However if 
labor costs are low relative to the cost of capital (as it is still the case in Hungary), such 
growth effects could be labor intensive and create plenty of employment. To evaluate CSF 
impacts correctly, therefore, it is necessary to take care of these effects properly with our 
analytical methods.  
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 intend to give some additional help to describe our method in evaluating 
the CSF interventions in some more details. First we look at aid that is to stimulate private 
investment  and  second  at  the  impacts  of  infrastructure  improvements,  R&D  and  human 
capital formation. Figure 2.1 illustrates the way the EU aid for private investments can be 
evaluated within our analytical framework. To keep things clear, the flowchart describes the 
economic logic and mechanisms of some core relationships of the more complex analytical 







Fig. 2.1: Impacts of CSF support for productive structures 
this is that only primary supply side effects on employment, investment and output growth 
can be outlined here. 
Based on theoretical considerations it is the factor price ratio (i.e., the user costs of capital 
relative to the labor costs), which affects factor demands. Because CSF support for productive 
structures decreases this ratio, it affects investment positively but labor demand negatively: 
when labor becomes relatively more expensive than capital, a certain increase in output is 
produced more capital intensively, that is with less labor. 
This undesirable substitution effect of private investment support may be compensated for by 
an output effect, which is also shown in Figure 2.1. An output effect arises because of two 
reasons. First, the CSF investment support reduces total production costs for all firms already 
located in the assisted region (Hungary) inducing them to expand production and purchase 
more of all inputs. Second, the location of new production capacities in Hungary depends 
upon an international comparison of the input prices by investors. Those countries, whose 
comparative cost advantages prevail, attract them. Therefore, the capital user cost differentials 
between  assisted  Hungary  and  non-  (or  less-)  assisted  regions  in  Europe  will  stimulate 
investors in the latter regions to shift production into Hungary (foreign direct investments), 
giving rise to an additional increase in capital and labor demand. Thus the output effect leads 
to  more  employment.  Therefore,  the  fact  whether  CSF  private  investment  incentives 
eventually increases or decreases labor demand depends on the sizes of the substitution and 
output  effects.  Employment  will  rise  only  if  the  output  effect  outweighs  the  substitution 
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productive 
structures 
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effect. A reliable assessment of the impacts of the investment support requires a macro-model, 
therefore, in which these mechanisms are properly specified.  
In Figure 2.1 also the effects of labor costs on factor demand and growth can be illustrated. As 
can  be  seen,  the  positive  impact  of  CSF  support  for  productive  structures  on  investment 
explained by the substitution effect is higher, if wages are increased at the same time. But the 
overall effect on investment can still be lower, because the higher wages go against the output 
effect.  That  is,  despite  lower  user  costs,  otherwise  possible  investments  from  abroad  are 
deterred.  Thus,  the  positive  employment  and  growth  effects  of  CSF  may  be  destroyed 
completely  by  wage  increases.  With  our  framework  it  is  possible  to  isolate  these  effects 
caused by different policies and to ascribe them to the factor that is responsible for them.  
For analyzing the impacts of CSF support for infrastructure and human resources we draw on 
insights  in  growth  accounting  (Barro  1998).  This  breaks  down  economic  growth  into 
components  associated  with  changes  in  factor  inputs  and  improvement  of  technology  or 
„Total Factor Productivity” (TFP) growth.  TFP is the channel by which the CSF investments 
in human capital and public infrastructure can be incorporated and their impacts on growth 
and other variables analyzed within our model framework.  
TFP reflects technological progress and other elements. Recent econometric research for West 
German and USA  regions show that the industrial structure, the age of the capital stock, 
agglomeration  effects,  innovation  potential  and  also  infrastructure  and  human  resources 
(qualification of the labor force) are all related to TFP (Schalk, Untiedt 1996, Varga 2000). As 
depicted  in  Figure  2.2,  improvements  to  basic  infrastructure  increases  the  productivity  of 
capital, and an increase in the quality of labor force by human resource investment improves 
the efficiency of this factor. Thus, the CSF policies act as if firms used more productive 
capital at no cost or, alternatively, as the factor inputs actually used were available at lower 
production  costs.  Combined  together,  these  effects  improve  competitive  advantage,  which 
lead  to  higher  attractiveness  of  Hungary,  more  inward  investment  in  production  capacity 
(foreign direct investment) and growth. Again, the impact on employment is inconclusive. 
However, the output and income effects (not shown in Figure 2.2) should be sufficiently large 
to offset the labor shedding effects. The effect on growth is unambiguously positive. 








Fig. 2.2:  Impacts of CSF support for infrastructure and human resources 
The advantage of our approach is that it captures the channels through which even temporary 
CSF supply-side oriented programs have the intended permanent effects in a proper way. A 
temporary financial support rise TFP and increases productivity and income per capita to a 
permanently  higher  level,  while  the  Keynesian  demand-side  effect  on  output  and  income 
tapers off (this effect is not considered here). 
The two sets of policies (i.e., investment support and infrastructure and human resources 
targeting)  exhibit  different  geographical  features.  Investment  support  (formulated  in  our 
model as tax credit) displays no specific spatial characteristics assuming that those measures 
are  applied  with  no  geographic  restrictions.  However  for  modeling  the  second  set  of 
interventions the effects of geography should explicitly be accounted for as these measures 
influence  technological  change.  As  such,  in  the  complex  model  support  for  productive 
structures appears in the macro sub-model only whereas support for infrastructure and human 
resources is modeled in the TFP and SCGE sub-models before they enter the macroeconomic 
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3. Regional impacts of CSF development policy interventions on productivity: The TFP 
sub-model 
 
The supply side effects of infrastructure investment and expenditures on education/training 
and  R&D  work  via  increasing  Total  Factor  Productivity  (Figure  2.2).  Thus  finding  an 
appropriate solution for modeling the effects of these CSF instruments on TFP and linking the 
changes  in  TFP  into  the  macro-econometric  model  to  study  the  impact  on  several 
macroeconomic  variables  is  crucial  in  evaluating  the  effects  of  the  Hungarian  National 
Development Plan. One of the central aims of this research project was to establish the TFP 
block that can suitably serve these aims.  
 
However, previous empirical research provides little help in this respect. Studies in this area 
focus either on the effect of human capital on economic growth (e.g., Tallman and Wang 
1992, Fukuda and Toya 1994, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1995, Lee and Lee 1995, Gemmell 
1996, Fernandez and Mauro 2000, Fuenta and Donenech 2000, Bassanini and Scarpetta 2001) 
and productivity (e.g., Engelbrecht 1997, Kaufman, Luzio, Dunaway 2001) or on the growth 
effects  of  public  infrastructure  (e.g.,  Barro  1990,  Christodoulakis  1993,  Bajo-Rubio  and 
Sosvilla-Rivero 1994, Leigthart 2001) within a single equation framework but not in a macro-
econometric model . On the other hand, in traditional macro-econometric models the change 
in TFP induced by infrastructure investments and human capital expenditures is either not 
accounted for or if it is of any interest the relevant elasticities are not estimated but calibrated 
(e.g., Bradley and Untied 2000) . 
 
The solution applied in this study originates in the problem formulation of Acs and Varga 
(2002)  and  Varga  (2006)  as  changes  in  TFP  are  addressed  here  in  a  spatialized  macro-
modeling  framework  in  which  technological  progress  and  economic  growth  depends  to  a 
considerable extent on localized factors. The conceptual basis of this approach is in the new 
economic  geography  literature,  in  the  innovation  systems  literature  and  in  the  “new”, 





   19 
3.1  Empirical implementation 
 
The starting point in empirically modeling changes in Total Factor Productivity is equation 
(2.5) as originally developed in Romer (1990). Constructing a variable to measure the change 
in technology is a crucial element in the development and practical implementation of the 
model. In this respect we followed the solution common in the growth accounting literature 
(Barro 1998, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). In this literature where the focus is to empirically 
separate the effects of the changes in capital, labor and technology on economic growth the 
level of technology is measured as the residual after the contribution of the other two factors 
of production is accounted for. This residual is called Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Our 
choice of a regionalized technological change model implies that TFP levels are calculated for 
each of the spatial units. Thus the empirical counterpart of dA in equation (2.5) is a measure 
of the change in TFP.  
 
The effectiveness of research in creating new technologies is influenced to a large extent by 
knowledge  spillovers.  Romer  (1990)  assumes  that  the  total  stock  of  knowledge  (A)  is 
accessible  with  no  geographical  restrictions.  However,  the  recent  empirical  literature  on 
knowledge spillovers provided sufficient counter-evidence of the Romerian assumption of 
equal accessibility of knowledge in space. A significant portion of knowledge flows is indeed 
spatially bounded mainly due to the high level of tacitness in new scientific-technological 
knowledge.  The  two  types  of  knowledge  are  transported  by  different  mechanisms.  The 
perfectly accessible part consists of already established knowledge elements in codified forms 
and as such it is transmitted via scientific publications or patent documentations. On the other 
hand the tacit element is accessible most effectively by face-to-face interactions. Additional to 
the  perfectly  accessible  and  the  primarily  locally  available  knowledge  elements  much  of 
knowledge  spillovers  originate  internationally  and  transmitted  by  imported  products  or 
production processes. 
 
Given that the TFP function is used in CSF policy analyses it is important to accomodate it to 
such  a  purpose.  As  indicated  above  and  illustrated  in  Fig  2.2  we  followed  the  EC 
categorization of CSF expentitures. According to this TFP-related expenditures are classified 
as  human  capital  promotion  (education/training  and  R&D)  and  infrastructure  investment 
support. In this respect we draw on an extensive empirical literature that studies the extent to 
which  human  capital  and  basic  infrastructure  effect  economic  growth  (e.g.,  Barro  1990,   20 
Christodoulakis  1993,  Bajo-Rubio  and  Sosvilla-Rivero  1993,  Mulligan  and  Sala-i-Martin 
1995, Lee and Lee 1995, Engelbrecht 1997). In our modeling framework this growth effect is 
channeled via changes in Total Factor Productivity (Schalk and Untiedt 2000). 
 
An important issue to be resolved is determining the exact data coverage of the human capital 
and  infrastructure  variables  according  to  the  types  of  expenditures  CSF  interventions 
commonly  associated  with.  For  the  human  capital  variable  it  seems  quite  plausible  that 
expenditures on education and training and R&D should be accounted for there. On the other 
hand  for  some  types  of  infrastructure  investments  (such  as  transportation,  utilities  or 
telecommunications) it is quite natural that they need to be part of the infrastructure variable. 
However,  finding  the  way  expenditures  supporting  health  care  is  being  plugged  into  the 
equation needed some considerations. Our solution is based on both theoretical arguments as 
well as empirical experience. With respect to theoretical base we argue that the health care 
system works in many ways similar to the infrastructural sector as its service (i.e., workforce 
in a better shape to be employed) decreases costs of the same size of output very much similar 
to  the  way  infrastructure  investments  increase  productivity  such  as  constructing  new 
highways. Regarding empirical experience classifying health care in the infrastructural sector 
is  supported  first  by  the  fact  that  most  of  the  support  in  health  care  are  in  the  form  of 
investments (contrary to the human capital sector where most of them are expenditures) and 
second by the fact that health care investment enters the equation significantly only if it is part 
of infrastructure and not in cases when it is included in the human capital variable in any of 
the  forms  we  experimented  with.  Other  types  of  CSF  supports  most  importantly 
environmental support is decided not to enter the TFP function as these types of expenditures 
do not seem to be clearly related to the supply side (at least not in the medium run) as their 
effects are mainly appear on the demand side.  
 
The empirical TFP model has the following form: 
 
(3.1)  TFPGRi,t = α0 + α1KNATt + α2RDi,t + α3KIMPi,t + α4INFRAi,t  
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where 
 
•  TFPGR is the annual rate of growth of Total Factor Productivity at the county level, 
•  KNAT  is  domestically  available  technological  knowledge  accessible  with  no 
geographical restrictions (A in equation (2.5)), 
•  RD stands for private and public regional R&D (H in equation (2.5)),  
•  KIMP is imported technologies, 
•  INFRA is investment in physical infrastructure, 
•  EDU is investment in human capital (education and training), 
•  ε is the stochastic error term. 
 
In the  empirical analyses below we also applied the variable HUMRES which stands for 
expenditures in education, training and R&D called human resources in the categorization of 
the  EC.  According  to  the  theoretical  framework  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter, 
technological change depends to a large extent on local/regional factors of innovation. Thus 
the  unit  of  empirical  investigation  applying  equation  (3.1)  should  be  some  sub-national 
geographical entity. Since the lowest level of spatial aggregation of the type of data we need 
for analysis is the county the selected unit of analysis is Hungarian counties. The spatial unit 
is denoted by i while t stands for time in equation (3.1).  
 
To implement equation (3.1) in an empirical analysis we relied on different data sources. 
KNAT  is  measured  by  the  number  of  patents  available  in  Hungary  obtained  from  the 
Hungarian Patent Office. In empirical estimations we measured RD alternatively either by 
R&D  employment  or  by  R&D  expenditures  aggregated  from  data  at  private,  public  and 
university research institutes. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office provides these data. 
The measure of KIMP is the share of foreign direct investments in total private investments. 
To measure foreign direct investments we used data on the number of firms in different size 
groups  and  percentage  of  firms  in  manufacturing.  Data  come  from  regional  and  county 
statistical yearbooks published by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. Investments in 
infrastructure  measure  INFRA.  Data  on  infrastructure  investments  include  investments  in 
transportation,  telecommunication,  health  care  and  utilities.  Data  sources  are  regional 
statistical  yearbooks.  HUMCAP  is  measured  by  all  (private  and  public)  expenditures  on 
education  and  training.  Data  sources  are  Hungarian  National  Accounts  by  the  Central   22 
Statistical  Office.  All  the  variables  measured  in  monetary  terms  are  in  1995  Hungarian 
Million Forints.  
 
To empirically generate a variable measuring the growth in TFP we followed the solution 
developed in the growth accounting literature (Barro 1998). TFP levels for each county are 
calculated from a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function as the residual 
after the contribution of capital and labor is subtracted from the output
5.  
 
The  effects  of  the  different  instruments  applied  in  development  policy  intervention 
(infrastructure investment, education/training or R&D support) might not stay in the targeted 
region  only  but  could  perhaps  spill  over  to  neighboring  territories  as  well.  In  order  to 
understand if the effects spill over to other regions at all we run tests of spatial dependence in 
the forms of spatial error and lag on each estimated versions of the TFP equation. 
 
 
3.2 Estimation results  
 
Estimation results of equation (3.1) are presented in Table 3.1. KNAT (stock of knowledge, 
measured  as  the  number  of  available  patents  in  Hungary)  and  RD  (R&D  expenditures 
measuring research input in technological development) are the two variables representing the 
original Romer-approach. While KNAT is significant in all the variants of the equation RD is 
not when included separately from other human capital expenditures (Models 1 and 3). Out of 
the potentially important alternative variables measuring the regional innovation environment, 
KIMP, the share of FDI in total investments turns out to be the most influential for regional 




                                                 
5  The  production  function  has  the  following  form:  Y  =  AK
αL
1-α,  where  Y  is  regional  output  measured  by 
regional GDP at 1995 prices, A is total factor productivity, K is capital, L is labor. The value of K is calculated 
from investment data following the perpetual inventory method (Hall and Jones 1999). The starting value of K in 
1995 is calculated using the formula of I95/(g + δ) where I95 is investment in 1995, g is calculated as the average 
growth rate from 1995 to 2000 of the investment series and δ is the depreciation rate for which (as it is in the 
macro-econometric model) we assumed the value of 0.10 which is in line with international standards and also 
used by the OECD in estimation of potential output growth for Hungary (OECD 2000). The values of the 
parameters in the production function are assumed to be equal to the income shares of K and L (with α is 0.33). 
To determine the values of TFP we followed the formula of A = Y/Y’, where Y’=K
αL
1-α.    23 
Tab. 3.1:  Pooled FGLS estimation results for TFP growth rates (TFPGR)  
and for 20 Hungarian  counties, 1996 – 2003 
 
Note: estimated standard errors are in parentheses 
 
 





Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Final 
Model 
C  -2.5434  -2.4740  -2.4797  -2.4965 -2.2423 -1.8243 -1.0389 
  (0.2989)  (0.2910)  (0.2919)  (0.2735) (0.2728) (0.2372) (0.3408) 
TFPGR(-2)        -0.2587 
        (0.0749) 
0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 8.84E-5  KNAT (-2) 
(2.68E-05)  (2.59E-05)  (2.60E-05)  (2.45E-05) (2.44E-05) (2.10E-05) (3.04E-05) 
  0.1582  0.1526  0.1455 0.0892 0.1219 0.0826  KIMP (-3) 
  (0.0449)  (0.0456)  (0.043) (0.0430) (0.0393) (0.0392) 
    1.29E-06    RD (-2) 
    (1.77E-06)   
      3.79E-06 1.46E-06 1.56E-06 2.11E-06  d(INFRA(-1)) 
        (9.60E-07) (1.34E-06) (9.41E-07) (8.44E-07) 
      6.95E-06 4.74E-06 5.63E-06  d(HUMRES(-2)) 
      (2.84E-06) (2.47E-06) (2.41E-06) 
      -0.0601 -0.0610 
      (0.0081) (0.0080) 
DUM99 
       
Weighted Statistics         
R
2-adj  0.31  0.37  0.37  0.42 0.42 0.59 0.62 
F-statistic  54.02  35.71  23.83  31.15 18.44 29.27 28.36 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.90  2.06  2.07  2.02 1.68 2.22 2.42 
N 
Unweighted Statistics 
120  120  120  120 100 100 100 
R
2-adj  0.14  0.19  0.20  0.21 0.23 0.35 0.42 
ML Spatial error 
Neighb 
       
1.25 
ML Spatial lag 
Neighb 
       
3.78*   24 
it is highly significant and quite stable through all the empirical models presented in Table 
3.1. The knowledge stock KNAT affects TFP growth with a two-year time lag. Changes in 
public  infrastructure  investments,  d(INFRA),  and  changes  of  expenditures  in  education, 
training and R&D, d(HUMRES), represent the CSF instruments in the empirical model. After 
structural changes on the time domain is taken care of, the parameters enter the equation with 
the expected signs as well as with high significances. To increase in-sample forecasting power 
of the TFP equation we included the lagged dependent variable as well on the right hand side 
which enters the function with high significance. DUM99 is a year dummy to account for a 
structural brake in the TFP data.  
 
The  size  order  of  the  parameters  is  also  in  accordance  with  expectations.  The  highest 
coefficient  value  is  given  for  technology  import,  KIMP  that  is  not  surprising  taken  into 
consideration that the crucial role of multinationals in Hungarian technology development is 
well recognized in professional circles. It might be taken as a good sign that TFP growth rate 
is affected by the knowledge stock with a relatively high coefficient suggesting an increasing 
importance  of  indigenous  technological  development.  Turning  to  the  role  of  the  CSF 
instruments in TFP growth, spending on education, training and R&D, HUMRES seems to be 
a  more  effective  instrument  (at  least  in  a  short  and  medium  run)  to  influence  firms’ 
productivity than infrastructure investments, INFRA. It should be emphasized here that our 
model (at least at this stage of development that is determined dominantly by data constraints) 
can capture only short and medium run effects and the inevitable long run impacts of R&D, 
infrastructure investments as well as education developments are only suggestive here.  
 
Regression fit is good (the adjusted R-square has the value of 0.62 in the final model) taken 
into account the presence of cross sectional data for a relatively short time period. The overall 
performance  of  the  equation  is  also  impressive  as  suggested  by  the  highly  significant  F-
statistics. Given the wide variety in TFP growth rates across counties it is not surprising, that 
heteroscedasticity is a major issue in estimation. Different econometric modeling approaches 
have been  applied (such as fixed effect model,  random effect model, SUR) but the most 
effective estimation technique (in the sense of regression fit, parameter stability and parameter 
significances) was Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) with cross-section weighting 
and White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors and variance. The magnitude of the   25 
problem of heteroscedasticity in the data is indicated by the significant differences between 
respective regression fits with and without weighting
6.  
 
Spatial dependence in the final model is non-significant in the form of spatial error and only 
marginally  significant  for  spatial  lag  that  suggest  that  the  out-of  region  impact  of  a 
development policy intervention is only negligible
7.  
 
Given that the estimated equation in Table 3.1 does serve a highly practical aim of impact 
analysis  it  is  necessary  to  relate  the  size  of  the  estimated  parameters  of  the  two  policy 
variables to findings in the related literature in order not to calculate unrealistic policy effects. 
Since no similar geographical knowledge production function study has been carried out to 
the best of our knowledge it is not possible to relate the estimated parameters directly to other 
estimations. However, it is possible to calculate infrastructure and human capital investment 
elasticities in GMR. We compare those values to findings in the literature. In the followings 
we  rely  on  the  survey  made  by  Bradley,  Morgenroth  and  Untiedt  (2000).  Our  calculated 
elasticity values are situated well in the range of the surveyed studies
8. For infrastructure the 
estimated  elasticities  in  the  literature  range  between  0.1  and  0.8  whereas  our  calculated 
elasticity is 0.40. With respect to human capital (education and training) the range in the 
studies is 0.15-0.40 whereas the GMR elasticity for human resources is 0.30.  
 
The  historical  forecasting  power  of  the  estimated  final  equation  in  Table  3.1  is  also 
appropriate  considering  the  aim  it  serves  in  the  complex  model:  MAPE  (mean  absolute 
percentage  error)  of  forecasting  TFP
9  at  the  national  level  is  1,87
10  and  the  correalation 
                                                 
6 This  heteroscedasticity  is  caused  to  a  large  extent  by  the  determining  role  of  Budapest  in  the  Hungarian 
economy.  We  also  tried  to  capture  the  „Budapest  effect”  by  a  dummy  variable.  This  variable  remained 
insignificant suggesting that the applied regression technique sufficiently takes care of the heteroscedasticity 
problem of the data. Fur further discussions on the heteroscedasticity problem caused by the „Budapest effect” 
and  its  treatment  in  knowledge  production  function-type  regression  analyses  see  Varga  (2007).  Note  that 
according to the Hungarian National Development Plan (2007-2013) the main focus of government support will 
not be Budapest. As such the funds targeting the capital are relatively small in size and their effects are also not 
expected to be decisive.  
7 Since the data have both space and time dimensions we also tested for cointegration. The D-W test refused 
non-cointegration of the data at the 1% significance. The short length of the time series does not allow us to run 
the Dickey-Fuller test.  
8 For the calculations we used the scenario data provided by the National Development Agency and presented in 
details in Chapter 7. Elasticities were calculated for each year and then averaged over the planning period.  
9 As will be detailed below the regional TFP equation is used to predict TFP levels at the national level. These 
TFP levels enter the macro sub-model to produce simulated values of several macro level variables. Macro level 
TFP is calculated as weighted averages of regional TFP levels (where regional TFP level is the sum of the TFP 
level at the previous period and the change of TFP predicted by the TFP function). Regional employment is used 
to weight regional TFP levels. The aim behind weighted averaging regional TFP was to account for the effects of   26 
between observed and predicted TFP levels is 92 percent.  Fig. 3.1 depicts observed and 
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Fig. 3.1: Observed and predicted levels of national TFP 
 
In policy simulations the estimated TFP equation plays a crucial role in the complex model 
system. Regional values of the policy variables (INFRA, HUMPAC) are plugged into the 
equation to calculate the likely change in the TFP growth rate. This estimated change in the 
TFP growth rate enters the SCGE sub-model to generate regional values of TFP levels as a 
result of agglomeration effects as well as employment, wages, investment and output. TFP 
levels generated by the SCGE sub-model will then enter the macroeconomic model to account 








                                                                                                                                                         
agglomeration  in  the  change  of  technology  (Schalk  and  Varga  2004).  This  procedure  provides  very  close 
estimates of the national TFP level as the MAPE of observed national and calculaetd  national TFP levels via 
weighting regional TFPs is 1.23 percent.  
10 A rule of thumb in practice is that MAPE below 5 percent is considered as the sign of a very good fit.    27 
4.  Modeling  dynamic  agglomeration  effects  and  the  resulting  cumulative  spatial 
processes: The Spatial Computable General Equilibrium (SCGE) sub-model
11 
 
To model dynamic agglomeration effects of CSF interventions in the complex macro and 
regional model a spatial computable general equilibrium (SCGE) model is integrated. CGE 
models are numerical and empirical applications of Walrasian general equilibrium models in 
real  world  circumstances  (Hosoe  1999).  These  models  build  on  usual  assumptions  in 
microeconomics (i.e., utility and profit maximization/cost minimization, perfect competition 
and  most  recently  monopolistic  competition).  CGE  models  are  especially  well  suited  to 
simulate the short- and long run impacts of shocks to the system. A particularly attracting 
feature of these models is that they do not need as many observations and details in the data as 
more traditional econometric techniques do.  
 
Spatial  CGE  modeling  is  a  very  recent  development  in  empirical  research.  A  couple  of 
examples include Oosterhaven et. al (2001), Thissen (2003), Koike and Thissen (2005). These 
models are the empirical counterparts of new economic geography systems. Short run SCGE 
models  involve  equilibrium  in  each  region  whereas  in  the  long  run  not  only  each  of  the 
regions but also the whole spatial system is in equilibrium as there is no inclination by firms 
or  households  to  relocate  since  differences  across  regions  with  respect  to  real  incomes 
disappear resulting from a continuous change in the spatial distribution of economic activities. 
SCGE  models  have  successfully  been  applied  to  simulate  regional  effects  of  certain 
development policies such as highway investment policies both in the short run and in the 
long run. 
 
The particular SCGE model integrated into our framework is RAEM-Light. This model is a 
simplified version of RAEM the model for the Netherlands (Thissen 2003). RAEM-Light is 
particularly suitable in situations when regional data are only scarcely available for several 
variables  necessary  in  RAEM.  Data  availability  problems  constrained  the  application  of 
RAEM in Hungarian circumstances as well. This explains the decision towards RAEM-Light. 
This chapter draws on the description of the model in Koike and Thissen (2005). However, 
the particular form of RAEM-Light incorporated into the complex model system is somewhat 
different  from  the  one  recently  applied  in  the  Netherlands  and  South  Korea  for  policy 
simulations. It was necessary to adapt the model to Hungarian circumstances on the one hand 
                                                 
11 This chapter draws on the description of the RAEM-Light model in Koike and Thissen (2005).   28 
and to the requirements of the complex model system on the other. (For details consult the 
Appendix.) Regarding the second issue especially adaptation to the TFP sub-model required 
some important changes in the technology part of RAEM-Light.  
 
 
4.1 Main model assumptions 
 
a. The model considers several regions and also different industrial sectors (20 regions and 4 
sectors for Hungary); 
b. The model distinguishes between short run (i.e., a period of one year with the assumption 
that equilibrium at each region is reached at both goods and factor markets) and long run 
(several years through which the system is attracted towards a spatial equilibrium as a result 
of factor movements across regions); 
c. The total number of households is assumed fixed; 
d. Total housing supply is fixed or exogenously determined in each region; 
e. Capital and labor are used in production; 
f. Iceberg-type transportation cost (i.e., transportation cost is measured as a portion of the 
good needed to transport the commodity for a given distance); 
g. Capital stock is owned by households (national dividend); 
h. The model considers both centripetal and centrifugal forces that form the geographical 
structure of the economy. Centrifugal forces weaken spatial concentration while centripetal 
forces  work  towards  further  agglomeration.  In  the  model  the  centrifugal  forces  are 
transportation  costs  and  congestion.  The  level  of  congestion  is  measured  by  per  capita 
housing. As indicated above housing supply is considered fixed in the model consequently 
increasing population decreases per-capita housing which works against agglomeration. The 
centripetal force in the model is a positive agglomeration economy measured by the level of 
Total  Factor  Productivity  in  the  region.  Increasing  concentration  of  economic  activities 
(measured by the level of employment in the model) increases the probability of interactions 
among the actors of innovation in the region that results in a higher technological level. Thus 
increasing concentration works towards further agglomeration. The actual balance between 
centripetal and centrifugal forces in the model determines the migration of labor and capital. 
As  such  the  spatial  distribution  of  production,  TFP  and  inputs  are  all  determined  by  the 
interplay of centrifugal and centripetal forces.    
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4.2 Data requirement and data sources 
 
RAEM-Light does not need extensive data inputs. The basic information comes from the 
National  Accounts  statistics  of  the  Hungarian  Central  Statistical  Office.  Value  added  by 
sectors is applied to get output values and also (using income shares for calculation) capital 
and labor inputs. As such, the measure of production inputs is value added. In addition to 
these  population  data  (Central  Statistical  Office),  stock  of  housing  (number  of  flats  from 
Central Statistical Office) and transportation costs information are needed. For transportation 
costs a matrix is required with the iceberg-type values (provided by Transman Kft). Details 
regarding these matrices are provided in the Appendix. All data are required for one particular 
year, 2003. Capital rent is set to 1 and equilibrium wages are calibrated.  
 
 
4.3 The main equations 
 
The production function has a Cobb-Douglas form with capital, labor and technology inputs. 
To make RAEM-Light suitable for policy simulations in the complex model the following 
formulation of technology with the regional (i) and sectoral (m) dimensions is introduced 
 
(4.1)  ( )
γ ζ t i t m i t i t m i L A L A , , , , , , ' =  
 
where A is the level of technology, A’ is national “average” level of technology L is regional 
employment at time t.  
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where TFPSHARE is the average share of each industry at the county level according to 
empirical  data  for  the  period  of  1996-2003.  TFPGROWTH  is  the  annual  growth  rate  of 
technology which is the same as in the macro model, 1.49 percent per year according to the 
calculations from aggregated regional TFP levels
12.  
 
                                                 
12 A very similar value, 1.6 percent was reported for Hungary for the 1990s in Campos and Coricelli (2002). 
However, in Darvas and Simon (1999) a higher average value, 3.7 percent was calculated for the 1990s whereas 
Révész ended up with a much lower value, 0.3 percent for the 1999-2003 period.    30 
Development policy interventions (i.e., infrastructure investment, human resources support) 
resulting in TFP growth changes estimated in the TFP sub-model affect the SCGE model by 
the variable TFPSCHOCK as depicted in equation 4.2. TFPSHOCK is a change in the annual 
TFP growth rate resulting from policy interventions. Equations 4.1 and 4.2 formulate the level 
of  technology  in  a  given  region/sector  at  a  given  time  period  resulting  from  policy 
interventions. This level of technology constitutes the “national average” element (A’), the 
effect of agglomeration at the particular region (measured by L
γ where L is employment and γ 
is  estimated  econometrically)  and  the  sectoral  element  (TFPSHARE).    A’ζ  measures  the 
policy  effect  without  considering  agglomeration  differences  across  regions.  The 
agglomeration effect is accounted for by multiplying A’ζ  with the term L
γ13.  
 
Interregional demand for goods determines output of the firm and following the principle of 
cost minimization capital and labor demand is formulated: 
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where a stands for partial production elasticity of labor, y is output and q is price with no 
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where w and r are wage and capital rent and the rest of the notations is as before. 
 
Utility is formulated as a Cobb-Douglas-type function with goods and housing consumption. 
Utility maximization results in goods demand at sector m: 
                                                 
13 Both A’ and γ are estimated econometrically from the equation: A = A’L
γ. Estimated parameter values are 
presented in Tab. 4.1. The logic behind this equation is that the level of technology at a given region is partly 
determined by an “average” (national) component measured by A’. Regional differences are captured by L via 
the estimated parameter of γ.    31 





























where  N  and  K  are  population  and  capital  at  the  national  level,  p  is  price  including 
transportation costs (C.I.F price). βm is the share of expenditures spent on good m in the total 
budget of a consumer. 
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Interregional trade volume is 
 
4.8  t m ij t m j t j t m ij s x N z , , , , , , , =  
 
Supply is derived from interregional demand 
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4.4 Solution algorithm for short run 
 
a. Set r=1 and initial wage w for each region 
b. Calculate average cost (q) 
c. Calculate the probability of interregional trade (S) and C.I.F price (p) 
d. Calculate demand (x) and interregional trade volume(z) 
e. Calculate production (y) by 4.9 
f. Calculate factor demands (K and L) 
g. Check whether labor is in equilibrium if yes, short run equilibrium is reached if not 
f. Change w and start from a.   32 
4.5 Long run: the main equations 
 
After a short run (regional level) equilibrium is reached labor starts migrating to places where 
utility levels are higher according to the following equation: 
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where  I is number of regions G is annual percentage change in labor. Capital movement 
follows  labor  migration  (according  to  the  assumption  of  national  dividend).  Full  spatial 
equilibrium is reached when no inclination for migration arises. 
 
4.6 Parameters: calibration, estimation and application from earlier results 
 
To adapt RAEM-Light to Hungarian circumstances a particular care should have been given 
to  setting  parameter  values.  Some  of  the  parameters  are  taken  from  earlier 
studies/experiences,  some  of  them  are  estimated  econometrically  and  some  of  them  are 
calibrated. Table 4.1 provides further details in this respect. Calibration is governed by the 
principle  of  getting  the  best  values  for  several  statistics  describing  the  spatial-temporal 
behavior of the SCGE model (as compared to data of the average values of the variables over 
the  period  of  1996-2003).  Table  4.2  exhibits  these  values  for  the  parameter  combination 
chosen.  As  shown  in  the  table  the  model  is  capable  of  reproducing  the  spatial-sectoral 
distribution of the main variables with high precision especially output, labor, investment and 
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Tab 4.1: Setting parameter values in the SCGE model (RAEM-Light Hungary) 
parameter  description  type  value 
delta  depreciation rate 
Taken the same as in the 
macro model  0.10 
alpha  utility function parameter (housing)  based on statistical data  0.2 
beta1  utility function par. (sector 1 goods) 
Calibrated based on 
consumption shares  0,355095 
beta2  utility function par. (sector 2 goods) 
Calibrated based on 
consumption shares  0,026118 
beta3  utility function par. (sector 3 goods) 
Calibrated based on 
consumption shares  0,229658 
beta4  utility function par. (sector 4 goods) 
Calibrated based on 
consumption shares  0,189128 
fi  migration parameter  calibrated  0,05 
theta  migration parameter  calibrated  1 
G  labor growth 
Annual values are taken 
from the macro model   
a1  Cobb-Douglas production function (sector 1) 
Calibrated based on labor 
income share  0,4555 
a2  Cobb-Douglas production function (sector 2) 
Calibrated based on labor 
income share  0,885274 
a3  Cobb-Douglas production function (sector 3) 
Calibrated based on labor 
income share  0,442312 
a4  Cobb-Douglas production function (sector 4) 
Calibrated based on labor 
income share  0,683298 
lambda1  Transportation parameter (sector 1) 
econometrically 
estimated  23,5 
lambda2  Transportation parameter (sector 2) 
econometrically 
estimated  24,3 
sigma1  Share of investment (sector 1)  National Accounts data  0,55122 
sigma2  Share of investment (sector 2)  National Accounts data  0,13162 
sigma3  Share of investment (sector 3)  National Accounts data  0,16956 
sigma4  Share of investment (sector 4)  National Accounts data  0,00446 
A'  Efficiency parameter TFP 
econometrically 
estimated  0,296959 
gamma  Efficiency parameter TFP 
econometrically 
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Tab. 4.2: Indicator values to evaluate model performance: The final model 
indicator  description  value 
Li correlation (spatial)  Labor correlation (regions in country)  0,99666 
Lm correlation (sectorial)  Labor correlation (sectors in country)  0,97077 
mean Σm Lim=1 correlation  Labor correlation (sectors in region)  0,93257 
mean Σm Lim=1 MAPPD  Labor MAPPD (sectors in region)  3,305% 
mean Σi Lim=1 correlation  Labor correlation (regions in sector)  0,92202 
mean Σi Lim=1 MAPPD  Labor MAPPD (regions in sector)  1,131% 
Yi correlation (spatial)  Output correlation (regions in country)  0,99695 
Ym correlation (sectorial)  Output correlation (sectors in country)  0,98901 
mean Σm Yim=1 correlation  Output correlation (sectors in region)  0,95923 
mean Σm Yim=1 MAPPD  Output MAPPD (sectors in region)  3,928% 
mean Σi Yim=1 correlation  Output correlation (regions in sector)  0,98320 
mean Σi Yim=1 MAPPD  Output MAPPD (regions in sector)  0,837% 
INVi correlation (spatial)  Investment correlation (regions in country)  0,92026 
INVm correlation (sectorial)  Investment correlation (sectors in country)  0,98512 
mean Σm INVim=1 correl.  Investment correlation (sectors in region)  0,91836 
mean Σm INVim=1 MAPPD  Investment MAPPD (sectors in region)  5,432% 
mean Σi INVim=1 correl.  Investment correlation (regions in sector)  0,79969 
mean Σi NVim=1 MAPPD  Investment MAPPD (regions in sector)  1,723% 
wi correlation (spatial)  Wages correlation (regions in country)  -0,24169 
wi MAPPD  Wages MAPPD (regions in country)  14,624% 
Ni correlation (spatial)  Population correlation (regions in country)  0,99679 
Ni MAPPD  Population MAPPD (regions in country)  0,105% 
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5.1 Data, estimation and calibration 
 
The Appendix contains the full equation system of the model. In this section we confine 
ourselves to the presentation of the characteristic features of the model in the light of its main 
economic and technical relationships. A brief discussion of background theory is given, the 
specification of the mathematical forms of the model equations derived, the estimation of the 
coefficients  performed  and  finally  the  forecasting  ability  of  each  calibrated  function 
illustrated. Data sources are the Eurostat AMECO database as well as the Hungarian Central 
Statistical  Office  (National  Accounts).  For  details  consult  the  Appendix.  Because  of  the 
strong structural breaks and changes in the first years of the transformation process, for some 
variables data prior to 1995 have not been very reliable for econometric estimation. Besides, 
due  to  the  small  number  of  observations  available,  sophisticated  methods  and  techniques 
commonly used for econometric estimation and hypothesis testing were either inappropriate 
or  not  feasible.  Therefore,  the  parameterization  of  some  behavioral  equations  has  to  be 
performed by way of indirect calibration. How we proceeded in these cases is explained in 
more detail in the following at the respective places. 
 
 
5.2  Employment and investment 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of the factor demand equations (labor and capital demand) for 
the business sector, which belong to the supply block of the model, follow the neoclassical 
theory  of  the  firm.  This  is  an  entirely  conventional  specification  also  used,  i.e.,  in  the 
modeling of the supply side of the seven major OECD economies in the INTERLINK model 
(see  Turner,  Richardson,  Rauffet  1996)  and  in  Schalk,  Untiedt  (2000).  According  to  this 
theory, factor demands are determined above all by factor costs for labor and capital and the 
technology of the underlying production function. Despite of similar theoretical frameworks 
adopted,  however,  varying  factor  demand  relationships  are  obtained,  depending  on  two 
                                                 
14 This section updates section 3 in Schalk and Varga 2004.   36 
different  key  assumptions  made  in  both  model  types.  The  first  concerns  the  form  of  the 
underlying production function and the second the economic behavior of the firms (profit 
maximization or cost minimization). 
 
In our approach it has been assumed that the firm’s choice of production techniques can be 
represented by a vintage capital production function in which capital is viewed putty-clay, i.e. 
ex-ante substitutability between capital and labor is assumed but fixed ex post proportions 
after capital installation. If IPV represents machines respective private gross investment that 
are combined with labor employed on these machines, ∆ETB, to produce the desired increase 
in  gross  output  of  the  business  sector,  ∆GDPBV,  the  ex-ante  production  function  can  be 
written in its general form as (see Schalk, Untiedt 2000 for details): 
 
5.1      ∆GDPBV = f1(∆ETB ⋅ ELEFFU, IPV) 
 
ELEFFU is a technology parameter, which reflects the efficiency of labor. Firms in a country 
may be less efficient than in others due to a lack of infrastructure and human capital, lower 
private capital formation which incorporates the newest technology, a shortage of innovative 
firms,  low  competitiveness,  unfavorable  industrial  structure,  etc.  Thus,  the  explicitly 
introduction of ELEFFU into the model creates one of the channels through which the long-
term supply side effects of CSF measures for enhancing infrastructure, human resources and 
private  investment  can  be  analyzed.  These  measures  bring  about  an  improvement  in  the 
efficiency of labor or technology of production in the broadest sense, thus increasing long-
term growth of productivity and output in the economy. 
 
Regarding  the  optimization  behavior  of  the  firm  cost  minimization  is  assumed,  that  is, 
considering the putty-clay production technology, firms decide on a certain output increase in 
each period and minimize the cost of producing this production increment. Combining this 
condition with the assumed production function leads to a joint factor demand system, which 
can be written in the following general form: 
 
(5.2)    IPV = f2(∆GDPBV, WSSE/UCC, ELEFFU)   37 
 
(5.3)    ∆ETB = f3(∆GDPBV, WSSE/UCC, ELEFFU) 
 
WSSE is the wage rate and UCC represents the user cost of capital. This factor demand model 
has some striking properties which differ considerably from that of the OECD-INTERLINK, 
where in contrast to our model profit maximization behavior and a putty-putty production 
technology have been assumed, i.e. the capital stock is malleable ex-ante and ex post:  
 
•  Investment and also changes of employment do not depend on changes in the capital-
labor  cost  ratio,  as  is  the  case  in  a  factor  demand  model  based  on  a  putty-putty 
production technology.  With a putty-clay production function it is the level of the 
input cost ratio, which produces a change in capital and employment. 
 
•  It is the relative factor prices (labor cost in relation to the user cost of capital) that 
determine factor demand in both equations and not the absolute factor costs as in the 
profit-maximizing model. In the investment function a positive sign for the influence 
of a relative factor price change is expected, in the labor demand function a negative 
sign. Therefore, a reduction in the user cost of capital relative to labor, i.e. evoked by 
the private capital supports of CSF policy, increases investment demand but decreases 
employment. This substitution effect of a change in the factor price ratio is accounted 
for in our approach but excluded by assumption in the OECD-INTERLINK model.  
 
•  By means of the underlying production function, the technology parameter ELEFFU 
has also been introduced into the factor demand functions. The impact of ELEFFU is 
expected to be negative in both factor demand equations: higher efficiency reduces 
capital and labor input needed to produce a given output. Therefore, if technology is 
improved by CSF policy, a desired effect, less labor will be employed, thus violating 
the employment target. But this is true only if production remains constant. Higher 
efficiency  also  lowers  factor  costs,  which  increases  competitiveness  and  leads  to 
higher  output  growth  and  this,  in  turn,  increases  factor  demands.  In  the  OECD 
modeling, only this latter effect of ELEFFU on the demand for capital and labor is 
captured. To capture it in our model an additional equation is needed which links 
efficiency to growth.   38 
 
Such an equation is also necessary to model the output effect of factor price changes properly, 
because equations (2) and (3) can only take account for their substitution effects. An output 
effect, i.e. caused by the reduction of the user cost of capital as a result of CSF investment 
subsidies, may arise for the reasons discussed in the preceding section. By means of an output 
equation, all these discussed impacts of the factor prices on output growth are captured.  
 
The  calibration  of  the  factor  demand  equation  system  (5.2)  and  (5.3)  is  performed  in 
following steps: 
 
•  In the first step, the interrelated factor demand system is derived consistently from a 
joint optimization process (cost minimization) under an explicit specified form of the 
production function. 
 
•  In a second step, the factor demand functions, whose coefficients can be constructed 
from the elasticities of the underlying production function, are “indirectly” calibrated 
by econometric estimates of the production function. 
 
•  In a third step, a lag structure is quantified in order to introduce some dynamics into 
what  up  to  this  point  has  been  basically  the  specification  of  a  static  model  in 
equilibrium. Thus the short-term dynamics and long-run behavior of the model system 
are taken into consideration simultaneously. Because of the data problem, only simple 
lag structures can be modeled. 
 
•  Finally, the remaining parameters are estimated with the available historical data. 
 
As for the production technology it is assumed that the business sector output is determined 
by  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with  constant  returns  to  scale.  In  the  putty-clay 
technology or vintage-capital version this function can be written as: 
 
5.4       ∆GDPBV = (∆ETB ⋅ ELEFFU)
XTAU  (IPV)
1-XTAU 
   39 
XTAU  is  the  elasticity  of  output  with  respect  to  labor  and  labor  efficiency,  ELEFFU, 
represents labor augmenting technical progress.
15 This production function type (but not in its 
vintage-capital version) has also been adopted in the OECD-INTERLINK sub-models for the 
seven major OECD member countries. It is also used in other empirical research works upon 
which  we  draw  in  the  following  for  calibrating  the  coefficients  of  the  factor  demand 
equations. Consistent with this production technology and assuming cost minimization, the 
desired investment and labor demands are given, in log-linear form and ignoring intercept 
terms (which is done throughout the following analysis), as: 
 
5.5      logIPV = XTAU log(WSSE/UCC) + log∆GDPBV – XTAU logELEFFU 
 
5.6   log∆ETB = (1 - XTAU) log(WSSE/UCC) + log∆GDPBV – XTAU logELEFFU 
 
Before calibrating these equations various methodical problems need to be solved and some 
approximations  have  to  be  made  to  obtain  manageable  equations.  First,  labor  efficiency, 
ELEFFU, which is not an observable variable, is substituted by the expression: 
 
logELEFFU = λ TIME 
 
TIME is a time variable and λ the rate of labor efficiency growth. Second, ∆GDPBV and 
∆ETB, which cannot be collected, are to be substituted by measurable variables. Generally, as 
a substitute for the variables we can write: 
 
  ∆Xt = Xt - (1 – dX) Xt-1 
 
The subscript t is for time and dX is a salvage rate. As the logarithmic approximation for this 
expression can be used: 
 
  log∆Xt = logdX + logXt-1 + (1/dX) ∆logXt 
 
                                                 
15 With production function (4) there is a clear relationship between Total Factor Productivity TFP and 
labor  efficiency  ELEFFU:  TFP  =  ELEFFU
α.  Thus  we  can  treat  both  technology  concepts  here 
synonymously, which is done throughout the text in the following.   40 
Third, to incorporate dynamics lagged investment is introduced in the investment function as 
an additional  explanatory  variable. This  can be justified if, i.e., delivery  of investment is 
distributed over time and it takes time to incorporate delivered capital into the production 
process. Finally, we have to check for structural breaks in our data set, which is supposed to 
having occurred around year 1995. 
 
All these taken into consideration in (5) and (6) and after some rearrangements, following 
factor demand equations are obtained as a basis for calibration (the intercept is now again 
included and the time index t ignored throughout the following analysis): 
 
5.7     logIPV – logIPV-1 = c7 + β/δ (logGDPBV - logGDPBV-1) - β [logIPV-1 
-logGDPBV-1  -  XTAU  (log(WSSE/XTAU)  -  log(UCC/(1- 
XTAU)))+XTAU λ TIME] + γ DUMMY 
 
5.8     logETB – logETB-1 = c8 + (logGDPBV - logGDPBV-1) - δ [logETB-1 
 - logGDPBV-1 + (1-XTAU) (log(WSSE/ XTAU)  
 - log(UCC/(1-XTAU))) + XTAU λ TIME] + ηDUMMY 
 
The  variable  DUMMY  has  been  introduced  into  both  equations  now  additionally  to  take 
account for a possible structural break in the data. The equations (5.7) and (5.8) are very 
similar to error-correction models (ECM), with the error terms in square brackets, though they 
have  not  been  formulated  as  ECM-models  explicitly.  One  feature  of  the  error-correction 
model is that the coefficients of the error terms have specific economic meanings: β in the 
investment  function  equals  the  adjustment  lag  in  investment  and  δ  in  the  employment 
equation is the depreciation rate of employment and output. Besides, our modeling technique 
allows  for  the  separation  of  short-run  dynamics  from  the  long-run  impacts  of  CSF 
interventions, the latter being of most interest of course for EU-policy. 
 
An econometric estimation of all coefficients in the factor demand equations (8 parameters) 
with the limited available data (10 observations) is infeasible and altogether doomed to fail. 
Therefore, we have in a first step reduced the number of the parameters to be estimated by 
inserting their values obtained from other investigations for Hungary. The elasticity of output   41 
with respect to labor can be approximated by the labor share in national income, which tends 
to  be  close  to  two  thirds  in  most  OECD  countries  (see  OECD  2000,  218).  We  set  the 
coefficient α to this level, though statistical data for Hungary indicates a slightly lower value 
(see Hviding 1999). Besides, from calculations of capital stock data for Hungary (see Darvas 
and Simon 1999) an average depreciation rate, δ, of 0.10 can be derived, which is in line with 
international standards and also used by the OECD in its estimation of potential output growth 
for Hungary (see OECD 2000, 218 f.). XTAU and δ are substituted by these assumptions in 
equation  (5.7)  and  the  remainder  of  the  coefficients  is  estimated  by  OLS  yielding  the 
following equations: 
 
5.9  ETB  = ETB(-1)  * EXP(  - 0.6462765982  + LOG(GDPBV  / GDPBV(-1))  - 
0.1  * (LOG(ETB(-1)  / GDPBV(-1))  + (1  - XTAU)  * LOG((WSSE  / 
XTAU)    /  (UCC    /  (1    -  XTAU)))    +  XTAU    *  LOG(ELEFFU))    + 
0.01838048857  * (DUMMY_95_96  + DUMMY_99_02)  - 0.0346201138  * 
DUMMY_92_94  - 0.01127018745  * DUMMY_93) 
 
5.10  IPV  = IPV(-1)  * EXP(-0.4640446414  - 0.1313832514  * (LOG(IPV(-1)  / 
GDPBV(-1))  - (1.  / 0.1)  * LOG(GDPBV  / GDPBV(-1))  - XTAU  * 
LOG((WSSE    /  XTAU)    /  (UCC    /  (1.    -  XTAU)))    +  XTAU    * 
LOG(ELEFFU))    +  0.0565779131    *  (DUMMY_94_96_98_99)    - 
0.03849758663    *  DUMMY_95_01_02    -  0.02338901205    * 
DUMMY_97_98) 
 
Interestingly, the growth rate of labor efficiency, λ, seems to be fairly high (2.2 percent). 
However, this value implies a growth rate for the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of 1.49 
ercent (XTAU*λ).
16 This value is in accordance with the values used in both the TFP as well 
as the SCGE sub-models.  
 
Before using the model for multiplier analyses and simulation respective evaluation of CSF 
policies it should be tested for its capability to describe the empirical facts that have been used 
for its calibration. That a model is able to reproduce the historical data is a necessary (though 
                                                 
16 Total Factor Productivity is given by: TFP = ELEFFU
α = e
α⋅λ TIME. Thus, the growth rate of TFP is 
the growth rate of labor efficiency multiplied by the partial production elasticity of labor.   42 
not sufficient) condition for it to be realistic. Besides, such a check on the model within 
sample properties may provide us with valuable information on the quality of our calibration 
process and point out where it has to be repeated. In the figures below plots of the forecasts 
with plus and minus two standard error bands are provided. These two standard error bands 
provide an approximate 95% forecast interval. 
 
To examine the ability of the calibrated equations to provide forecasts of investment and 
employment demand we perform simulations which use the historical values of the exogenous 
variables  in  each  equation  and  solve  for  the  endogenous  investment  and  employment 
variables.  The  resulting  ex-post  predictions  for  the  variables  are  then  compared  to  their 
historical  values.  The  mean  absolute  percentage  error  (MAPE)  of  the  simulated  from  the 
actual levels for the endogenous variables is then used as a measure for the forecasting ability 
of the model equations. According to a commonly applied rule of thumb in cases MAPE is 
less than 5 percent forecasting ability of the model is acceptable. Because on the right-hand 
side of the equations appear also the lagged endogenous variables as explanatory variables 
two types of simulations can be performed. If for the lagged endogenous variables the actual 
historical data are used, it is a question of a static simulation, and of a dynamic simulation 
when the values assigned to the lagged endogenous variables are the forecasts from previous 
periods.  Figures  5.1  and  5.2  exhibit  forecasted  values  and  the  respective  MAPEs  for  the 













Forecast sample: 1992 2003
Included observations: 12
Root Mean Squared Error  9.795858
Mean Absolute Error       8.102311
Mean Abs. Percent Error  0.273212
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.001636
     Bias Proportion          0.016865
     Variance Proportion   0.353946
     Covariance Proportion   0.629189
 











Forecast sample: 1992 2003
Included observations: 12
Root Mean Squared Error  11497.23
Mean Absolute Error       10039.12
Mean Abs. Percent Error  0.796254
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.004595
     Bias Proportion          0.195689
     Variance Proportion   0.131498
     Covariance Proportion   0.672812
 
Fig. 5.2:  Forecast of investment (IPV) 
 
5.3  Output 
 
The output equation for the business sector is, as the factor demand functions, also based on 
the theory of the firm and contains both demand side as well as supply side aspects. The 
decision of the firms about the level and location of production depends upon cost conditions 
and demand factors. In formulating the output equation we relied on the theoretical base of 
the OECD-INTERLINK model presented in Turner, Richardson and Rauffet (1996).  
 
The  demand  factors  affecting  the  capacity  output  are  represented  by  the  final  domestic 
demand variable FDDV and net export (the difference between export and import XGSV-
MGSV). FDDV captures the influence of national demand on output. It also serves to take 
into account the counteracting effects of wages on foreign direct investments: a high wage 
level might deter new plants from abroad because of high production costs but also attract 
them because of high demand potential. In addition, a high wage level can be viewed as an 
indicator for the availability of highly qualified labor and therefore may influence location 
decisions of firms abroad positively.  
   44 
Following  general  form  for  the  output  equation  the  following  summarizes  our  theoretical 
considerations: 
 
(5.11)    GDPBV = f9 (WSSE, ELEFFU, PGDPB, FDDV, XGSV, MGSV) 
 
In  addition  to  the  previously  discussed  variables  we  introduced  WSSE  to  represent  labor 
costs. This is in accordance with the suggested formulation of the production cost effect in the 
OECD-INTERLINK  model.  The  price  index  PGDPB  was  also  included  which  is  as  a 
determinant  of  output  self-explanatory.  To  estimate  parameter  values  for  each  variable  in 
(5.11) with OLS is, however, due to insufficient data (12 observations) an impossible task. In 
addition it turned out that some data prior to 1994 were too bad and couldn’t be used at all for 
estimation  of  the  output  equation.  Therefore,  the  parameters  to  be  estimated  had  to  be 
reduced. To accomplish that without giving up too much of the theoretical content of our 
approach, we came up with the following general form of the output equation:  
 
(5.12)     GDPV = f9(WSSE/PGDP/ELEFFU, (FDDV+XGSV-MGSV) 
 
Where the first variable is the efficiency real wage a major determinant of production costs 
while the second term captures aggregate (domestic and foreign) demand. 
 
The following is the calibrated equation: 
 
(5.13)  GDPBV    =  EXP(7.153939065    -  XTAU    *  LOG(WSSE    /  PGDPB    / 
ELEFFU)    +  0.8096641143    *  LOG(FDDV    +  XGSV    -  MGSV)    + 
0.02891037751  * DUMMY_98_00_01) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 5.3, also the forecasting ability of the output equation appears to 











Forecast sample: 1995 2003
Included observations: 9
Root Mean Squared Error  12401.57
Mean Absolute Error       9084.414
Mean Abs. Percent Error  0.211733
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.001357
     Bias Proportion          0.000010
     Variance Proportion   0.000118
     Covariance Proportion   0.999871
 
Fig. 5.3:  Forecast of output (GDPBV) 
 
5.4  Wages and prices 
 
The formulation of the wage equation relies on the theoretical base applied in the OECD-
INTERLINK model. The compensation rate of the business sector WSSE, defined as the total 
annual  wages  per  employee  in  this  sector,  is  assumed  to  be  determined  in  a  bargaining 
framework. According to the theory of bargaining, there are three factors at least, which play 
a dominant role in the wage setting process. The first factor, which affects nominal wages, is 
the price level. This is so, because both firms and workers do not care so much about nominal 
wages, but about real wages. Workers want to secure their living standard and will therefore 
try to receive a rise in wages at the inflation rate at least because this leaves their real wages 
unchanged. In the same way, employers will agree to pay higher wages, if the price of their 
products increases by the same amount. Therefore the consumption price index PCP is the 
first determinant of our wage equation for the business sector. 
 
The  second  explanatory  variable  affecting  wages  is  the  unemployment  rate  UNR,  which 
represents the bargaining power the workers have or the prevailing labor-market conditions. 
At low unemployment rates, workers are in a stronger bargaining position, thereby exerting 
higher pressure on nominal wages. In short, lower unemployment rates will lead to higher   46 
wages. Finally, evidence suggests that wages also depend on the trend of productivity. If 
productivity  increases,  workers  and  employers  will  reflect  this  in  the  bargained  wage 
according to their relative bargaining power. Thus, as third explanatory variable the trend of 
labor productivity in the business sector, PROD, is included in the wage equation, which now 
becomes: 
 
(5.14)    logWSSE = c1 + c2 logPCP + logPROD + c3 UNR-1 
 
The estimation results obtained with data for the period 1992-2003 are as follows: 
 
(5.15)    WSSE  = EXP(6.79515674  + XTAU  * LOG(ELEFFU)  + LOG(PCP)  - 
0.09506299279  * (DUMMY_99_00)) 
 
In the estimation we proxied labor productivity by Total Factor Productivity. As was derived 
earlier ELEFFU
XTAU is TFP. The message of the estimated equation is that in the long run 
TFP growth rate determines wage growth. The sensitivity of wages to the unemployment rate, 
the Phillips-curve effect, is very low, indicating only a minor role of labor market conditions 
in nominal wage bargaining. A relative low effect of the unemployment rate on wages is also 
obtained in other studies, e.g., by Cserháti and Varga (2000) for Hungary, Christodoulakis 
and Kalyvitis (1998) for Greece, and “imposed” by Bradley, Morgenroth and Untiedt (2001) 
in  their  wage  equation  of  the  manufacturing  sector  for  East  Germany  on  the  basis  of 
comparisons with Ireland. The unity coefficient of the consumer price index is completely in 
accordance with theoretical considerations.  
 
Historical data is explained quite satisfactorily by the calibrated wage equation, as can be seen 
from Figure 5.4.  













Forecast sample: 1991 2003
Included observations: 13
Root Mean Squared Error  27.77994
Mean Absolute Error       19.89832
Mean Abs. Percent Error  1.576011
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.009567
     Bias Proportion          0.028360
     Variance Proportion   0.130345
     Covariance Proportion   0.841295
 
Fig. 5.4:  Forecast of wages (WSSE) 
 
The derivation of an equation for the pricing behavior of the business sector draws on the 
corresponding  modeling  in  Turner,  Richardson,  Rauffet  (1996).  The  output  price  PGDPB 
depends on production costs and costs depend on the nature of the production function. When 
deriving the factor demand equations in section 5.2 we assumed, that firms produce output-
using capital and labor as factor inputs according to the production function in (5.4). This 
function takes also into account labor efficiency, ELEFFU, (or total factor productivity TFP) 
as  a  factor  of  production,  explicitly.  Theory  of  the  firms  tells  us,  that  marginal  cost  of 
production is equal to unit capital-labor costs CKL, as derived in section 5.3. And if there 
were perfect competition, this would be equal to the price of output, PGDPB. But because the 
goods markets are not competitive, a higher price than unit capital-labor costs is charged. To 
capture  this  fact  it  is  assumed  that  the  price  for  business  output  is  set  according  to  the 
equation: 
 
(5.16)    logPGDPB = c1 + c2 logCKL + c3 logPGDPB-1 
 
where the parameter c2 captures the strength of the effect of unit capital-labor costs on prices, 
which depends on the extent that the goods markets are competitive and the firms have market   48 
power. In (5.12), by the one period lagged endogenous variable sluggish adjustment of the 
price level to its equilibrium value shall be taken into account. 
 
This approach for price determination is in full accordance with supply side theory followed 
so far when deriving the factor demands and output equation. In contrast to other models also 
capital  costs  and  not  only  wages  are  considered  as  determinant  of  prices.  In  addition, 
ELEFFU or total factor productivity is included and in that way a further channel created, 
through which CSF measures can affect directly the supply side: an increase in ELEFFU due 
to investments in human resources, e.g., decreases production costs (see equation (5.12)), 
dampens price increases and improves competition. 
 
A major advantage of our approach is that, in comparison to the included variables, only a 
smaller number of coefficients have to be calibrated with the limited data. The estimation 
results are as follows: 
 
(5.17)  PGDPB  = EXP(-2.184324816  + 0.3752619755  * LOG(CKL)  +  
(1-0.3752619755)*LOG(PGDPB(-1))+0.05440570567* 












Forecast sample: 1992 2003
Included observations: 12
Root Mean Squared Error  0.022633
Mean Absolute Error       0.019305
Mean Abs. Percent Error  1.304364
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.007044
     Bias Proportion          0.003496
     Variance Proportion   0.027274
     Covariance Proportion   0.969230
 
Fig. 5.5:  Forecast of prices (PGDPB)   49 
 
The deflators for private consumption, PCP and private investment, PIT were modeled as the 
weighted average of the price for business output and import prices in the long run. See for 
the calibration results and the modeling of the remaining deflators the equation system listing 
in the appendix. 
 
 
5.5  Labor supply 
 
Labor force is estimated according to the following equation: 
 
(5.18)    LF  = POPT  * (0.1254955234  + 0.8184106563  * (LF(-1)  / POPT(-1))  + 
0.1884826701  * LOG(ETB  / ETB(-1))  - 0.00263766064  * UNR(-1)) 
As can be seen from Figure 5.6 the estimated LF equation, delivers an excellent forecast of 
















Forecast sample: 1992 2003
Included observations: 12
Root Mean Squared Error  20.29329
Mean Absolute Error       16.99619
Mean Abs. Percent Error  0.407575
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.002446
     Bias Proportion          0.028669
     Variance Proportion   0.007881
     Covariance Proportion   0.963450
 
Fig. 5.6:  Forecast of the labor force (LF)   50 
5.6  Final demand 
 
The  derivation  of  a  function  for  private  consumption  is  based  on  a  relationship  between 
consumption  CPV  and  household  real  disposable  income  YDRH  that  is  one  of 
proportionality: 
 
(5.19)    CPV = β YDRH 
 
In this relationship the elasticity of consumption with respect to income is unity and β the 
average propensity to consume. The latter might not be a constant and consumption is likely 
to  respond  less  than  one  for  one  to  fluctuations  in  current  income.  E.g.,  if  the  economy 
experiences a rapid increase in income, private consumption is unlikely to increase by as 
much. Hence β will fall as the growth rate in income rises. This relationship has, in fact, been 
observed empirically: countries with higher economic growth rates do tend to have lower 
average propensity to consume (Thomas 1997, 386). Therefore, one determinant of β is the 
growth rate of YDRH, where a negative sign for its effect on the propensity to consume is 
expected. 
 
Other decisive determinants suggested in recent research work are wealth and interest rates 
(see Mankiw 2003, Chapter 16). Because of lack of data, wealth cannot be taken into account. 
From interest rates, which can be represented by the variable IRL, two counteracting effects 
on the propensity to consume are expected (Franz, Göggelmann, Winker 1998): a negative 
substitution effect, because high interest rates favor consumption in the future in relation to 
present consumption, and a positive income effect, resulting from the interest returns from 
wealth. 
 
These theoretical considerations and after some experimentations with data and mathematical 
forms the equation for private consumption was formulated as follows: 
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(5.20)    logCPV = c1 + c2 logYDRH + c3 log(YDRH/YDRH-1) + c4 IRL 
  + c5 DUMMY94 + c6 log(CPV-1/YDRH-1)) 
 
In addition to the discussed variables the average propensity to consume of the pre- period has 
been  included,  to  allow  for  lagged  adjustment  in  consumption  behavior,  and  a  dummy 
variable as well to take into account a structural break in consumption expenditure observed 
in 1994. 
 
The  results  for  this  calibration  are  shown  in  equation  5.22.  All  coefficients  have  the 
theoretical  expected  signs,  where  the  parameter  value  connected  with  the  interest  rate 
indicates that the negative substitution effect on consumption outweighs the positive income 
effect. Not surprisingly and in accordance with other studies the overall effect is however 
rather low. 
 
(5.21)    CPV  = YDRH  * EXP(0.067187  + 0.745648  * LOG(CPV(-1)  / YDRH(-1))  
- 0.588445  * LOG(YDRH  / YDRH(-1))  - 0.005051  * IRL  + 0.02838  * 
DUMMY94) 
 
 Figure  5.7  demonstrates  the  nearly  perfect  performance  of  the  calibrated  consumption 
function against historical data.  











Forecast sample: 1992 2003
Included observations: 12
Root Mean Squared Error  28105.08
Mean Absolute Error       21673.22
Mean Abs. Percent Error  0.666983
Theil Inequality Coefficient   0.004134
     Bias Proportion          0.014247
     Variance Proportion   0.041846
     Covariance Proportion   0.943907
 
Fig. 5.7:  Forecast of private final consumption (CPV) 
 
With the consumption function about 50 percent of total final demand is explained. Another 
21 percent fall to business investment IPV, which was modeled jointly with the employment 
function  in  section  5.2.  Government  final  consumption  and  investment  are  treated  as 
exogenous in our model or follow developments in the business sector or the total economy. 
What remains to be explained from final demand are therefore exports and imports. They are 
not modeled separately here but their difference instead, the net exports of goods and services 
FBGSV, as follows: 
 
(5.22)    FBGSV = GDPV – TDDV 
 
GDPV denotes real gross domestic product and TDDV contains all components of real final 
domestic expenditure





                                                 
17 See the equation system in the appendix for further information.   53 
5.7  Income distribution and government 
 
In this block of the model the redistribution of factor incomes through transfers, taxes and the 
social security system between the private and government sectors is explained. We drew in 
the modeling of this block mainly on the OECD-INTERLINK models. 
 
Only the current transfers received by  households, TRRH, is modeled  econometrically  as 
follows: 
 
(5.23)    TRRH – TRRH-1 = 0.456 (WSSE ⋅ UN) 
 
where  WSSE  is  the  compensation  per  employee  in  the  business  sector  and  UN  total 
employment. Linking them by means of „rates“ to their appropriate base endogenizes other 
variables. E.g., direct taxes on households, TYH, and on business, TYB, are explained by: 
 




(5.25)    TYB = (TYB-1/PROF-1) ⋅ PROF 
 
YRH  and  PROF  denote  current  receipts  of  household’s  respective  business  profits.  In  a 
similar  way  social  security  payments  are  modeled,  e.g.  the  employees  and  self-employed 
contributions to social security as: 
 
(5.26)    TRPESH = (TRPESH-1/(WAGE-1 – WAGEG-1 + YSE-1)) 
 ⋅ (WAGE – WAGEG + YSE) 
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where  WAGE  and  WAGEG  denote  wages  of  the  total  economy  and  government  sector, 
respectively, and YSE, the self-employment income received by households, is itself indexed 
to the compensation rate of the business sector, WSSE, and the self-employed, ES, by way of 
 
(5.27)    YSE = (YSE-1/(ES-1 ⋅ WSSE-1)) (ES ⋅ WSSE) 
 
We hold on this kind of modeling later when performing forecasts and simulations with the 
model for future periods. By doing so the respective “rates” are set to their values of the last 
historical year, 2001, and held fixed over the forecasting period. 
 
 
5.8 Modelling sectoral values 
 
To simulate investment, employment and output at the level of the three business sectors 
(agriculture, industry, services) we followed a combined top-down-bottom-up approach. This 
means that annual change of aggregate employment and investment is generated at the macro 
model then the sectoral values are calculated in the SCGE sub-model for regions. Aggretion 
from the regional to the macro level provides the macro sectoral values of investment, labor 
and output. For sectoral wages (that are not calculated in the SCGE model and are available at 
the macro level.) we followed a different approach. A top-down approach was taken as in the 
sectoral wages equations values are driven by the aggregate wage.  
 
5.9 CSF Policy variables
18  
 
On  the  demand  side  CSF  expenditure  going  on  investment  in  basic  infrastructure  and 
expenditures not expected to exert supply side effects at least in the medium term (such as 
environmental investments) enter the model through an additive term BIV in the equation that 
describes government fixed capital formation: 
 
(5.28)  IGV  = IG  / PIT  + BIV 
                                                 
18 This section updates Schalk and Varga (2004) 7.2.2.    55 
 
Expenditure on education/training and research and development, HUMRES are treated as an 
income transfer to private households, exerting a demand shock through an additive factor in 
the equation for household disposable income: 
 
(5.29)  YDH = YRH – TYH - TRPH + (HUMRES) 
 
Regarding the aids for productive structures or investments, PEV, it is assumed that they are 
granted  as  an  investment  tax  credit  whose  rate  G1  is  expressed  as  percentage  of  private 
investment, IPV: 
 
(5.30)  G1 = PEV/IPV 
 
The investment tax credit reduces the user costs of capital, UCC, by G1 percent: 
 
(5.40)  UCC  = (UCC_ELEFFU  / PIT_ELEFFU)  * PIT  * (1  - G1) 
 
where PIT is deflator of gross total fixed capital formation. The user cost of capital variable is 
a main determinant of business investment demand. Thus, the supports for the productive 
environment are introduced into the model via the investment function: UCC is reduced by 
the financial supports, thus increasing investment demand in the business sector and output 
from the demand side. 
 
But the user cost of capital enters also several other equations on the supply side of the model. 
Besides wages it enters the labor demand function, thus affecting employment in the business 
sector.  In addition, it is amalgamated with wages into the unit capital-labor cost variable 
(CKL), one of the key variables in the model, which has important effects on the output 
supply in the business sector and enters also directly and indirectly all price equations of the 
model. Therefore it is difficult if not impossible to study with the model the supply side   56 
effects of the user costs of capital and thus of the CSF supports for productive structures 
separately from their demand side effects. We will come back to this point again when the 
scenario results are presented. 
 
The demand side impacts of a change in the policy variables can be quite different, depending 
on the multipliers associated with the payments of the various CSF investment programs. 
Besides, it must be taken into account that these multipliers are dynamic insofar as their 
values change in time.  
 
In contrast to financial supports going on investment in productive structures the supply side 
effects of all other CSF interventions are introduced into the model by way of a function 
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6. Integrating regional and macro levels in the complex model: Structure, mechanisms 
of CSF impacts and model properties 
 
 
6.1 Model structure 
 
The complex macro-regional model is designed for development policy analysis and not for 
forecasting. It is an extension of a macro model originally developed in Germany (Schalk and 
Untiedt 2000). The first step to make this model suitable for impact analysis of TFP-related 
CSF  instruments  was  done  while  EcoRET  was  developed  (Schalk  and  Varga  2004).  In 
EcoRET  these  effects  were  modeled  in  a  static  geographic  setting.  This  means  that  with 
EcoRET short run effects of CSF interventions on regional and macro TFP are estimated and 
then these are channeled to a macroeconomic framework. With the current extension (called 
GMR  –  Geographic  Macro  and  Regional  model)  it  is  possible  to  estimate  the  long  run 
dynamic geographic effects by way of integrating an SCGE model, RAEM-Light (Koike and 
Thissen 2005) into the framework. By dynamic effects we mean following the changes in the 
geographic structure of the economy initialized by CSF interventions. As such, migration of 
labor and capital is incorporated in the model. The previous sections outlined the sub-models 
in details. In this section the model structure is explained. To do this first the main sub-model 
characteristics are underlined again and then the complex system is introduced. Only CSF 
effects related to the geography of TFP are described in this chapter. Other effects such as the 
impact  of  investment  support  and  demand  side  influences  of  interventions  are  already 
described in previous sections.  
 
6.1.1 Main sub-model characteristics 
 
A. The TFP sub-model 
The TFP equation (equation 3.1) is placed to the center of this sub-model. This equation 
estimates the effects of geographically differently located knowledge sources (local, national, 
international) as well as the impact of specific CSF instruments (human capital, infrastructure) 
on TFP growth rate. The equation is estimated on a space-time data set. It is used to generate 
static agglomeration effects (direct short-run effects on TFP levels in each region) as a result 
of CSF interventions. Macro level static and dynamic TFP changes are also calculated in the 
TFP sub-model.   58 
B. The SCGE sub-model 
The reason this sub-model is integrated into the framework of GMR is to make it suitable for 
studying the longer run spatial effects of the schocks CSF intervention exerts on the economy. 
This  model  is  calibrated  in  a  way  that  without  interventions  it  represents  a  full  spatial 
equilibrium of the economy (both regionally and interregionally). This basically means that 
no migration of labor and capital is assumed as there are no differences across regions in 
utility levels. CSF-related schoks interrupt this state of equilibrium and the model describes 
the gradual process towards a new full spatial equilibrium. As such this model predicts the 
likely dynamic agglomeration effects. Compared to static effects (estimated by way of the 
TFP  equation)  dynamic  spatial  effects  incorporate  changes  in  the  spatial  structure  of  the 
economy resulting from CSF-interventions followed by labor and capital migration.  
 
Changes in the geographic structure are determined by the relative weights of centrifugal 
(changes in local knowledge measured by TFP) and centripetal (transport cost, congestion) 
forces. Agglomeration plays its role right in the beginning of the process as the change in TFP 
in any region depends both on the size of support and on employment (which is a crude 
measure of agglomeration externalities in technological change) already in the region (static 
agglomeration effects). Agglomeration forces are also present in later stages of the dynamic 
process.  This  happens  not  only  because  of  the  fact  that  interregional  differences  in  TFP 
determine  the  intensity  of  migration  but  also  because  the  intensity  of  migration  further 
reinforces  these  differences.  The  strength  of  this  cumulative  process  depends  first  on  the 
propensity  of  labor  to  migrate  and  second  on  the  importance  of  negative  agglomeration 
externalities. 
 
As a result the SCGE sub-model calculates dynamic regional TFP changes and values of 
output, employment, investment and wages at the level of counties. It might seem paradoxical 
but  despite  it  describes  the  dynamism  of  the  spatial  structure  this  sub-model  does  not 
incorporate all the forces necessary to build a full spatio-temporal system. Crucial elements of 
this dynamism such as changes in technology, employment and capital are exogenous in the 
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C. The MACRO sub-model 
Based  on  dynamic  TFP  effects  (calculated  by  the  TFP  and  the  SCGE  sub-models)  the 
MACRO sub-model estimates the likely macroeconomic effects on several variables such as 
the level and growth of output, investment, employment, wages, unemployment, inflation and 
so one. The MACRO sub-model provides a complete picture of the macro economy with 
supply, demand and income distribution blocks included. This model is estimated as an a-
spatial system. As such it incorporates agglomeration forces in estimation as they are present 
in macro data but studying the effects of their changes is out of its possibilities. The results 
bear spatial features only because of its extension with the TFP and SCGE sub-models. The 
MACRO baseline describes the economy assuming no CSF-interventions occur. As such it is 
built on the proposition that the spatial structure of the economy does not change compared to 
the period of estimation. With policy simulations the effects of TFP-related (infrastructure and 
human capital) and not directly TFP-related (investment support) instruments are estimated.  
 
 
6.1.2 The structure of the complex model 
 
Fig. 6.1 describes the way the different sub-models are interrelated in the complex system. 
Following this figure the current section explains the model structure in details. 
 
Step  1:  the  monetary  value  of  TFP-related  CSF  instruments  (human  capital  support, 
infrastructure investments) enter the TFP equation (eqution 3.1) to calculate static changes in 
TFP growth rates for each county and for each year.  
 
Step 2: Equations 4.1 and 4.2 channel the static changes in TFP growth rate into the SCGE 
model to estimate long run dynamic spatial effects. Determined by positive agglomeration 
effects  (regional  changes  in  TFP)  and  negative  agglomeration  forces  (transport  costs, 
congestion in the housing market) the SCGE sub-model calculates the values of TFP, output, 
investment, employment and wages for each county for the whole period of intervention.  
 
Step 3: Dynamic TFP levels for each year enter the TFP sub-model to calculate national TFP 
growth rate changes. The way to calculate these first include calculation of national TFP 
levels as weighted averages of regional TFP levels (where county employment is used for    60 
 
 
Fig 6.1: Regional and national level short run and long run effects of TFP changes induced by 
development policy scenarios 
 
weighting to incorporate agglomeration effects). As referred to earlier this procedure ends up 
with a precise estimate of national TFP. Then national TFP growth changes are calculetd from 
TFP levels and these values channel into the macro model with the help of the following 
equation: 
 







 is the national growth rate of TFP as estimated by the macro-model and DNTFPGR 
is its change resulting from CSF interventions. Thus, CSFTFP is the level of Total Factor 
Productivity  at  each  point  in  time  due  to  CSF  policies  and  other  factors.  6.1  is  the  key 
equation  in  linking  the  dynamic  regional  models  (TFP  and  SCGE  sub-models)  of 
technological change to the macroeconomic sub-model.  
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Step 4: The simulated new national TFP value in equation 6.1 channels productivity change 
induced by CSF interventions into the macroeconometric sub-model as the variable TFP feeds 
directly or indirectly into several equations of the system, as depicted in the Appendix.  
 
Step 5: As a result of CSF interventions channeled by dynamic TFP changes, demand side 
effects and investment support (the latters are not detailed here) employment and investment 
changes  are  estimated  in  the  macro  model.  As  underlined  earlier  the  SCGE  model  takes 
changes in technology, labor and capital exogenous. For consistency of the system changes in 
employment and investment generated in the MACRO sub-model enter the SCGE sub-model 
to calculate the final spatial distribution of labor, investment, wages and output. This was 
necessary as the SCGE model part does not provide an endogenous approach for employment 
and investment growth.  
 
Steps 6 and 7: The complex model system provides the effects of CSF interventions in the 
form of percentage differences to the baseline (i.e., the state of affairs without policy impacts) 
both at the regional level (output, investment, employment, wages) and at the macro level 
(output, employment, investment, wages, unemployment, inflation rate, productivity etc.).  
 
 
6.2 The mechanisms of the impacts of geographically modeled CSF interventions  
 
A.  Infrastructure, R&D and education support 
 
A.1 Regional effects 
 
Resulting  from  development  policy  interventions  changes  in  regional  TFP  affect  regional 
level equilibrium values (output, employment, investment etc.) both in the short run (in the 
same year) as well as in the longer run (during the coming years). As such one time changes 
could generate a cumulative long run process. This process is detailed more concretely in the 
following steps: 
 
i.  Assuming that the intervention occurs in any i
th region (where i can of course be 
more  than  one  region),  the  change  in  A’i
m  (i.e.,  regional  TFP  level  in  the  m
th 
sector) generates the following effects in the short run: f.o.b price of the good   62 
decreases that induces a decrease in the demand for both L and K (assuming y 
unchanged). At the same time the effect of price change on interregional trade 
(zi,j)is positive as well as the impact on output (yi
m) resulting in an increase in the 
demand for K and L (output effect) 
19.  Additionally, the decline in pi
m inducing an 
increase in regional demand (xi
m, hi) results in higher utility levels at location i.  
ii.  Interregional restructuring in utility levels is followed by labor migration in the 
next period (next year). There is also an effect on the interregional re-allocation of 
capital. Labor movement results in changes in regional productivity in the longer 
run (dynamic agglomeration effects).  
iii.  Changes of TFP levels induce a longer run cumulative causation process invoking 
changes in the geographical structure of the whole economy.  
 
A.2 Macroeconomic effects 
 
Following the process described under i and ii TFP growth rate changes are calculated for 




B.  Regional  and  macroeconomic  mechanisms  of  changing  transportation  costs  (resulting 
from highway and railway investments) 
 
Infrastructure support described under 6.1 decreases production costs through increasing TFP. 
This impact works via the TFP sub-model. However, infrastructure investment support has an 
effect on interregional trade of outputs and this effect is modeled by the SCGE sub-model. 
Consequently the modeling system describes both the input and the output side effects of 
infrastructure development. The output side effect is modeled by the transportation markup 





                                                 
19 Note that the mechanism of the impact of a change in TFP on output, K and L follows the same logic both at 
the macro level (Fig. 2.2) and at the regional level. In both models the impact on K and L depends on the relative 
strengths of the output and substitution effects.    63 
B.1 Regional effects 
 
Via decreasing prices a decline in ti,j increases interregional trade between regions i and j and 
also the demand for K and L. The increase in demand for L is followed by increasing utilities 
in  the  given  region.  Changing  labor  demand  paired  with  a  relative  restructuring  in 
interregional  utility  differences  induces  labor  migration  causing  changes  in  regional 
equilibrium  values  (production,  employment  etc)  as  well  as  regional  TFP  levels 
(agglomeration effect).  
 
B.2. Macroeconomic effects 
 
Regional changes in TFP growth rates are calculated for each time period and these changes 
feed into the macroeconomic sub-model by equation 6.1. 
 
 
6.3 Model properties 
 
The structure of the complex model was outlined in the previous section. Several questions 
can be raised as to the properties of the complex model. We classify these issues into two sets: 
the first one is related to the consistency of the complex model whereas the second one is to 




6.3.1 Model consistency 
 
Despite that the two main components of the complex model (EcoRET and RAEM-Light) are 
developed separately from each other, several features (such as the application of a Cobb-
Douglas production function, cost minimization by firms, a strong supply side orientation, 
modeling  technology  by  way  of  TFP,  the  realization  of  the  importance  of  agglomeration 
externalities) suggests that reaching internal consinstency in the complex model is a realistic 
possibility. The clear division of labor between the three sub-models outlined in the previous 
sections also suggests a consistent structure. However there are some important issues that are 
                                                 
20 Sensitivity analyses on demand and supply side schocks in the macromodel reported in Schalk and Varga 
(2004) are not repeated here.   64 
not automatically solved by model assumptions and need original solutions. These are related 
to those parts of the model where the main elements are being connected together. As such, 
the following areas emerge: 
 
1. Channeling TFP growth rate changes into the SCGE sub-model; 
2. Harmonizing national level employment and investment changes between the MACRO and 
the SCGE sub-models; 
3. Harmonizing changes of output between the MACRO and the SCGE sub-models. 
 
1. With respect to the first issue it is assumed that TFP grows exogenously both in the SCGE 
as well as in the MACRO sub-models by the average rate of growth experienced from the 
second half of the 1990’s and this growth rate is altered by CSF interventions. This is a 
suitable assumption as the interest of the modeling work is not in forecasting but in impact 
analysis. Change of TFP generated in equation 3.1 enters the SCGE sub-model as a schock 
via equation 4.2. This increases TFP for each individual region according to the extent of 
intervention and then channels into the MACRO sub-model by way of equation 6.1.  
 
2. For the second issue to be resolved we ended up with the solution that the SCGE model is 
being run two times during each simulation. In the first time it generates dynamic TFP levels 
for each region and after estimating national level changes in the TFP sub-model the effects 
on macro variables are calculated in the MACRO block (steps 3 and 4 in Fig 3.1). However, 
since aggregate changes in employment and investment are not explained in the SCGE sub-
model these should come from outside of it. To ensure internal consistency of the model it is 
decided to apply changes in the two variables in SCGE as they are estimated in the MACRO 
sub-model. It caused some technical problems to resolve, however at the end it appeared to be 
a fully viable solution. As a result, after the second run of the SCGE sub-model (step 5 in Fig 
3.1) there is a full consistency between the MACRO and SCGE model parts with respect to 
employment and investment changes. These changes resulted from changes in TFP (generated 
in the TFP and SCGE sub-models) and being related to several other variables in the MACRO 
sub-model on the one hand whereas spatial distribution of the change in employment and 
investment is calculated in the SCGE sub-model on the other.  
 
Even the treatment of labor market in the the full neoclassical regional model and the macro 
model  (that  incorporates  Keynesian  demand  side  elements  as  well)  do  not  show   65 
inconsistencies  anymore  in  the  complex  model.  The  function  of  the  SCGE  model  is  to 
calculate the spatial distribution of employment that is estimated in the MACRO. This does 
not mean that full employment is assumed in the regional model. Its function is to provide the 
geographic counterpart of any levels of aggregate employment no matter how high the rate of 
unemployment in the economy is.  
 
Despite that the linkages among TFP-SCGE-MACRO-SCGE represent a logical construct for 
employment  and  investment  one  issue  still  remained  that  could  potentially  harm  internal 
consistency in this respect. This is related to the fact that TFP level is partly determined by 
agglomeration (Equation 2-b in Appendix 3). Is it not a realistic possibility that the resulting 
change in employment increases aggregate TFP levels significantly in the SCGE-TFP sub-
models  after  running  SCGE  for  the  second  time?  In  other  words:  should  not  we  run  the 
MACRO  model  again  after  the  second  run  of  SCGE?  This  way  we  would  introduce  a 
potentially  long  iterative  process  among  TFP-SCGE-MACRO  that  was  not  expected 
originally.  
 
It  has  been  emphasized  earlier  that  the  SCGE  sub-model  is  a  static  construction  and 
dynamisms in employment and investment are brought into the system from the MACRO 
sub-model. The model has a “short memory” meaning that in any simulation during the first 
run of the SCGE model changes in employment and investment from one year to the other are 
the ones calculated earlier in the simulation that was run last time before. In the second run of 
the SCGE sub-model these changes are corrected by the respective values from the MACRO 
sub-model. However in extreme situations this technique might be the source of incorrect 
results. This is illustrated below. 
 
In order to learn the properties of the complex model with respect to the effect of employment 
change on TFP growth rate we run several simulations and calculated elasticities for different 
geographical distributions of CSF instruments




                                                 
21  The  same  amount  of  CSF  expenditures  were  used  in  the  simulations  as  presented  in  the  next  chapter. 
Aggregate values as well as their distribution between infrastructure and human resources support are taken as 
fixed and only geographic distributions are changed.   66 
  EQ  BP conc  NFH  Bp 25%  Bp 10%  Bp 15% 
EQ  0,00  18,55  -0,09  0,38  0,01  0,07 
BP conc  -7,67  0,00  -7,71  -7,51  -7,66  -7,64 
NFH  0,09  18,77  0,00  0,48  0,10  0,17 
Bp 25%  -0,37  17,65  -0,46  0,00  -0,37  -0,30 
Bp 10%  -0,01  18,53  -0,10  0,38  0,00  0,06 
Bp 15%  -0,07  18,38  -0,16  0,31  -0,06  0,00 
 
 
EQ  stands  for  equal  spatial  distribution  of  funds,  NFH  is  the  structure  suggested  by  the 
National Development Office (more details are given in the next chapter in this respect), BP 
conc is the scenario when all the expenditures are concentrated in Budapest (a not realistic, 
but analytically interesting situation), Bp 10%, 15% and 25% are the respective shares spent 




The matrix should be read from the first column. To have an example: the elasticity of 18.55 
means  that  a  one  percent  change  in  employment  at  the  national  level  (generated  by  the 
MACRO sub-model) results in an 18.55 percent increase in national level TFP if a scenario of 
equal distribution of funds across regions is followed by Budapest concentration. It is clear 
from the matrix that as spatial concentration of funds increases the effect of employment 
change  on  TFP  level  increases  as  well.  However  this  effect  becomes  strong  only  in  the 
extreme scenario when Budapest gets all the CSF support. Even for the case of a 25 percent 
Budapest support (which does not seem to be realistic either) the elasticity value remains 
significantly below 1.  
 
The message of the above simulations is clear. The TFP effect of employment change is 
severe only if concentration patterns change drastically: from even distribution to Budapest 
concentration or to a 25 percent concentration in the capital. In realistic analyses changes in 
national level employment does not change the spatial distribution of labor so drastically 
considering the relatively low level of migration across counties. Even a large increase in 
employment does not change the spatial pattern of labor drastically because of the relative 
stickiness of labor in space. Additionally, employment effects of CSF interventions are not 
strong  as  will  be  shown  in  the  next  chapter.  Consequently  we  should  not  expect  such   67 
significant changes in TFP at the national level that require the calculation of new results for 
the macro variables.  
 
3. The remaining issue to resolve is the consistency of output estimates between the SCGE 
and MACRO model parts. Given that both sub-models employ a Cobb-Douglas production 
function and also both of them are built on the principle of cost minimization together with 
the  facts that TFP, investment and employment grow at the same aggregate rate in each 
model parts consistency in this respect seems to be a likely feature. However, for a more 
precise knowledge of model properties we get into this issue in much more details.   
 
Tab. 6.1: Comparison of CSF effects on GDP: MACRO and SCGE model results  
(in 1995 HUF) 
GDP  GDP Predicted: MACRO  GDP Predicted: SCGE  MACRO GDP in SCGE 
Units 
Year 
MACRO  SCGE  Value  % 
Predicted 
Value  % 
Predicted 
Value  % of 
SCGE 
GDP 
2008  9 722 645  15 652 027  9 258 690  95  15 467 422  99  16 242 498  104 
2009  10 141 090  16 939 266  9 727 182  96  16 176 763  95  16 865 112  100 
2010  10 558 940  18 374 617  10 145 129  96  17 406 437  95  18 116 431  99 
2011  10 966 070  19 753 408  10 562 274  96  18 760 297  95  19 477 502  99 
2012  11 360 030  21 149 205  10 968 509  97  20 035 492  95  20 750 659  98 
2013  11 750 510  22 623 236  11 361 576  97  21 328 036  94  22 058 146  97 
Mean        96    95    99 
Note: The table follows the structure of CSF expenditures presented in details in chapter 7 in this report.  
 
 
The main difficulty in comparing SCGE and MACRO results for output is that the two sub-
models measure output (and also employment and investment) in different units.
22 The first 
two columns of Tab. 6.1 list estimated national level output values (resulted from the scenario 
that is detailed in the next chapter) at MACRO and SCGE. Because of different units used the 
two  columns  are  incomparable.  However  to  relate  the  two  to  each  other  we  calculated 
predicted MACRO and SCGE values of output using the vintage capital production function 
originally applied only in the MACRO sub-model. The same change in labor and capital at 
the aggregate level, combined with the same level of TFP for both models resulted in two 
predictions for changes in GDP at MACRO and SCGE. By adding these changes to previous 
year GDP the new levels of output are calculated.  
 
                                                 
22 The reason for this is that RAEM-Light calculates inputs in monetary terms: the portion of income to labor 
measures labor and the rest of output measures capital. Scarcely available capital data provides the rationale for 
this solution. This decision influences the size of output as it will be the result of labor and capital inputs defined 
above and this value will be definitely higher than its observed counterpart.    68 
Both GDP predictions show some errors of similar size. The error in MACRO comes from the 
fact that output is generated by a separate output function that incorporates both supply and 
demand effects (equation 5.13) and not by the vintage capital production function directly. On 
the other hand error in the SCGE model is explained by the bias in estimating aggregate TFP 
level from regional productivity by way of averaging it. The error increases as inequalities in 
TFP  levels  increases  (resulting  from  wider  spatial  inequaities  of  the  distribution  of  CSF 
support).  
 
Results in Tab. 6.1 suggest the following solution. Given that the ratios between SCGE and 
MACRO investment and employment are the same because of the same growth of labor and 
investment  in  both  sub-models  and  also  the  same  TFP  level  is  used  in  both  calculations 
correcting for the error occuring in MACRO in the respective SCGE calculation results in the 
„true” MACRO GDP in SCGE units.
23 As shown in the last column the resulting average 
percentage of predicting output in SCGE units in MACRO is almost 100. This is an evidence 
for the consistency between the two sub-models as to the estimation of aggregate output.  
 
However, there is an increasing distortion between SCGE and MACRO outputs as the spatial 
inequality  in  TFP  increases.  This  is  because  of  the  bias  in  the  averaging  process  to  get 
national TFP from regional values already detailed above. However, after a closer look at this 
issue distortion does not appear serious in real-word simulations. To show it some simulations 
were run with different spatial distributions of support. The size of distortion is measured by 
the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) of predicting SCGE output by MACRO. This 
value is 1.90 if CSF funds are distributed according to the scenario suggested by the National 
Development Office (and treated in details in the next chapter). MAPE is 2.93 if Budapest 
gets 10 percent of total CSF funding whereas the respective values are 3.57 and 4.23 in case 
the share of the capital is 15 and 20 percents and the rest of the support is equally distributed 
among  the  19  remaining  counties.  Thus  even  the  quite  unrealistic  15  and  20  percent 
distributions to Budapest result in a less than 5 percent MAPE that is not considered serious 




                                                 
23 This practically means that for each year SCGE predicted values are divided by the percent of prediction in the 
MACRO model (and divided by 100).    69 
6.3.2 Model sensitivity: Exogenous changes in technology, CSF support and parameters 
 
In this section the behaviour of the model system to three types of exogenous changes are 
studied: changes related to Total Factor Productivity; the potential effects of expectations; the 
likely effects of changes in parameter values of some additional equations besides the ones 
covered in the previous two points. Additional to these issues the linearity of the system is 
examined.  Results are reported in Tab. 6.2. 
 
Regarding the first types of analyses results suggests that neither a change in the long run TFP 
growth rate nor changes in the coefficients of the policy variables in the TFP function exert 
major inpacts on any of the main endogenous variables. This is indicated by the low elasticity 
values in the table.  
 
The second issue is the potential role of expectations. Although modeling the likely effects of 
changing expectations of economic actors is a difficult task first because formulating it alone 
requires specific approaches not necessary part of the toolbox of macroeconomic modeling 
and second because endogenizing expectations need long time series (much longer than this 
project is capable to build on) it is an interesting exercise. After searching through all the 
equations  potentially  related  to  expectations  we  ended  up  with  the  private  consumption 
function as the most likely object of such an analysis. We focused on two variables such as 
the future change of disposable income (YDRH/YDRH(-1)) and the future interest rate (IRL). 
As detailed above it is found in the macro model that consumption increase remains below the 
increase of disposable income (as indicated by the negative sign of the change of disposable 
income  variable)  and  substitution  effects  dominate  in  the  intertemporal  distribution  of 
consumption as suggested by the negative sign of the interest rate variable.  
 
To play  around with the potential role of expectations a bit two potential effects of CSF 
interventions  are  formulated.  First  one  possible  outcome  could  be  that  consumers  expect 
increasing burden in the future as increasing government expenditures could potentially result 
in higher tax rates. This might decrease the propensity to consume. It is indicated in our 
model  with  a  higher  negative  value  of  the  coefficient  of  the  disposable  income  change 
variable. The other likely  effect is increasing interest rates in the future that increase the 
substitution effect resulting in a higher negative value of the coefficient of IRL.  
   70 
Tab. 6.2: Sensitivity analyses results: elasticity of main endogenous variables with respect to exogenous changes  
 
Note: GDPV: percentage difference to baseline gross domestic product level; DGDPV: percentage point difference to baseline GDPV growth rate; CPV: percentage difference to baseline private consumption; ITV: percentage difference to baseline 
investment; ET: percentage difference to baseline employment; UNR: percentage point difference to baseline unemployment rate; LFPR: percentage point difference to baseline labor force participation rate; DWSSE: percentage point difference to 
baseline growth in wages; DPDTY: percentage point difference to baseline productivity growth, PROD: percentage difference to baseline productivity level; CKL: percentage difference to baseline unit capital-labor cost; ULCB: percentage 
difference to baseline unit labor cost, business sector; DPGDP: percentage point difference to baseline inflation rate; NLGQ: percentage point difference to baseline net government lending as percentage of GDP 
  GDPV  DGDPV  CPV  ITV  ET  UNR  LFPR  DWSSE  DPDTY  PROD  CKL  ULCB  DPGDP  NLGQ 
 
 
1. TFP related analyses 
 
Long run TFP growth rate  -0,07  -0,06  -0,08  -0,04  -0,05  -0,06  -0,04  -0,06  -0,09  -0,10  -0,07  -0,15  -0,08  -0,05 
 
TFP: D(INFRAV(-1))  0,33  0,73  0,37  0,24  0,30  0,49  0,26  0,24  0,46  0,46  0,35  0,85  0,43  0,27 
 




2. Potential role of expectations: 
 
Private consumption: 
log(YDRH/YDRH(-1))  -0,12  -0,27  -0,39  -0,05  -0,18  -0,19  -0,21  0,00  0,00  0,01  0,01  -0,02  0,00  -0,22 
 




3. Further coefficients 
 
Output:  
LOG(WSSE  / PGDPB  / ELEFFU)    -0,21  0,71  0,10  2,37  -0,81  -4,84  -3,29  0,00  0,32  0,89  1,62  -1,97  -0,46  -0,65 
 
Output :  
LOG(FDDV  + XGSV  - MGSV)  3,79  -2,85  1,89  -5,44  7,28  15,50  14,06  -0,05  -1,16  -2,90  -5,15  9,61  1,16  1,39 
 
Wages: log(PCP)  0,21  0,25  0,14  0,04  0,71  0,17  0,27  -1,10  -0,04  -0,12  0,32  1,05  0,55  0,21 
 
Wages: log(ELEFFU)  -0,32  -0,98  0,14  -0,05  -0,95  -0,94  -0,79  1,01  0,18  0,21  -1,48  -3,59  -2,59  -0,19 
 
Labor Force: log(ETB/ETB(-1))  0,04  0,10  0,11  0,02  0,07  0,02  0,09  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  -0,05 
 




4. Linearity of the system  -0,47  -0,48  -0,52  -0,44  -0,48  -0,50  -0,47  -0,50  -0,51  -0,51  -0,49  -0,51  -0,51  -0,43   71 
We run two scenarios where coefficients of the variables (YDRH/YDRH(-1)) and IRL are 
increased. The effects on the main variables are presented in the form of elasticities in Tab. 
6.2. It is suggested by the results that no significant effects could be resulted from changing 
expectations as we formulated them. 
 
The table also exhibits sensitivity indicators of additional coefficient changes. It is seen that 
the the sensitivity is highest for the two coefficients of the output equation and for the rest of 
the estimated parameters the effects are basically negligible. However, the larger values in the 
output equation are observed for ratios such as unemployment rate (UNR) and labor force 
participation rate (LFPR) and for these the actual, percentage point changes are small (for the 
demand variable coefficient the respective percentage point changes are -0.24 and 0.24). 
 
Although the model is not linear it might behave like a linear one. In case the system behaves 
in  a  linear  manner  the  impacts  of  CSF  interventions  on  macroeconomic  variables  do  not 
depend on their baseline forecasted values. Thus the last experiment is about the linearity of 
the system. We experimented with decreasing the CSF expenditures with the same structure 
to half of it and studied the likely effects of this change. As shown in the last row of the table 
for all the variables the decrease of the effect is very close to 50 percent that is taken as an 















                                                 
24 A simple example of a liner model is y = ax. If x is 50 in the baseline then if this is increased by 100 percent (a 
support of 50 let’s call it scenario 1) the effect is a 100 percent higher y (i.e., ((100a-50a)/50a)) = 1). Similarly if 
support is decreased by 50 percent to 75 (scenario 2) the effect will be 0.5 (i.e., ((75a – 50a)/50a) = 0.5) that is a 
50 percent smaller effect than that of scenario 1. This is very much the way the complex model system behaves. 
Furthermore  in  linear  models  changes  in  the  model  itself  do  not  affect  scenario  predictions.  In  our  simple 
example the increase of the parameter to 2a does not alter scenario results. This is 1 in scenario 1 (i.e., ((200a-
100a)/100a) = 1) and 0.5 in scenario 2 (i.e., ((150a – 100a)/100a)= 0.5.)    72 
7.  Economic  impacts  of  CSF  development  policy  interventions  on  the  Hungarian 
economy: A scenario analysis 
 
 
7.1 The baseline scenario for the Hungarian economy, 2007-2017 
 
Although we try to generate the baseline forecast under a set of realistic assumptions about 
the  prospective  future  development  of  exogenous  variables  and  policy  parameters,  to  be 
realistic with regards to the forecasted values for each endogenous variable it is not so much 
an important thing than to create a projection that simply makes economic sense. The baseline 
scenario serves as basis for the ex-ante analyses of CSF. However, since the model behaves 
like a linear one, the results of these analyses are nearly not affected by the levels of the 
endogenous variables and are therefore also independent of how good they were forecasted. 
 
The main assumptions regarding the projections of the exogenous variables and some policy 
parameters can be summarized as follows: 
 
-  The decline in total population, POPT, in the second half of the nineties seems to have 
come to a halt at the beginning of the century. We kept it, therefore, at its 2001 level. 
 
-  Also government employment, EG, is kept constant, because a more likely reduction, 
which would occur, if Hungary followed the corresponding guidelines of the European 
Commission, is hard to predict. 
 
-  Policy determined rates, such as direct and indirect taxes or social transfer rates are 
also kept at their 2001 values. In the same way some other policy variables of minor 
magnitude  were  treated,  such  as  the  property  incomes  paid  and  received  by 
government, YPEPG and YPERG. 
 
-  In  comparison  to  other  accession  and  transformation  countries  the  government 
investment ratio, IGV/GDPV, was in Hungary rather low in the nineties, but increased 
from 2.5 percent in 1995 continuously up to 3 percent in 2001. We assumed that this 
trend will continue and in 2010 a ratio of 4 percent be reached. 






























































































Fig. 7.1: The baseline scenario for main economic variables, 2003-2017 
 
 
-  The  real  interest  rate  remains  constant,  which  means  that  a  one-percentage  point 
increase in the inflation rate increases the nominal interest rate also by one percent. 
Empirical  research  work  corroborates  this  assumption  for  the  long  run  (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2001). 
 
-  As for world output, FGDPBV, which is in the model identical with the German gross 
domestic  product  of  the  business  sector,  an  annual  growth  rate  of  2  percent  is 
assumed. Compared to the growth rates attained in the second half of the nineties in 
Germany, this is not a too pessimistic forecast. 
 
Fig 7.1 exhibits the baseline scenario for main economic variables. For GDP (GDPV), labor 
productivity  (PDTY)  unit  capital-labor  cost  (CKL)  in  the  business  sector  and  investment   74 
(IPV)  a  continuous  increase  is  assumed  with  an  almost  constant  rate  whereas  for  total 
employment the growth rate is decreasing. The optimistic feature of the baseline is completed 
by the decreasing trend of the unemployment rate (UNR). After 2004 a brake occurs in the 
decline of inflation rate (DGDPV). Unit labor cost (ULCB) seems to reach its highest level in 
the planning period.  
 
 
7.2 Analyses of a scenario for the planning period 2007-2013  
 
Table  7.1  lists  the  allocation  of  CSF  support  from  EU  sources  according  to  the  scenario 
provided by the National Development Office of the Hungarian government
25.  
 
Table 7.1: CSF expenditures spent over the period of 2007 and 2015 (EU support) 
Note: All figures are in millions of 2004 Hungarian Forints 
 
 
                                                 
25 Note that in the followings we analyse the macro and regional effects generated by support from EU funds. 
This means that Hungarian co-finance is being subtracted from the total of NDP II expenditures. The procedure 
to  subtract  Hungarian  co-financing  was  governed  by  the  principle  of  additionality.  According  to  this  the 
government should not spend less in the areas where the EU supports the country than she spent during the 
2004-2006 period on average. This basically means that Hungarian co-financing (which is on average 15 percent 
of the total support of the projects) covers government spending that would have been done without support 
from the EU. Since these expenditures have already been taken care of in the model baseline this amount is 
subtracted  from  total  NDP  expenditures.  With  respect  to  investment  support  we  relied  on  a  government 
document that summarises the experience of NDP I in Hungary (GVOP 2006). According to this on average 68 
percent of the support generates investment. 
  Infrastructure  Education  R&D  Total TFP-related  Investment  Demand side only  Total CSF 
2007  144 930,96  84 161,73  31 487,96  260 580,64  50 874,26  72 017,26  383 472,17 
2008  283 926,99  128 165,62  35 535,31  447 627,92  90 581,69  142 138,24  680 347,85 
2009  302 313,38  135 196,93  35 535,31  473 045,61  97 436,95  145 487,48  715 970,05 
2010  302 313,38  135 227,25  35 535,31  473 075,94  97 436,95  145 487,48  716 000,37 
2011  302 313,38  135 227,25  35 535,31  473 075,94  97 436,95  145 487,48  716 000,37 
2012  302 313,38  135 227,25  35 535,31  473 075,94  96 604,52  145 487,19  715 167,65 
2013  301 466,06  129 116,26  33 997,40  464 579,72  90 011,38  145 404,05  699 995,14 
2014  276 195,18  103 748,84  22 032,62  401 976,64  72 872,25  140 542,95  615 391,84 
2015  138 046,47  65 825,61  19 523,18  223 395,27  39 757,96  70 505,11  333 658,34 

















































































































































































































































Infrastructure Education R&D Investment Demand side only
 
Figure 7.2: The planned distribution of CSF expenditures according to the classification used 
in the model (EU support) 
 
 
Spatial and temporal features of the expenditures are presented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The 
scenario  favors  the  Budapest  agglomeration  as  more  than  20  percent  of  expenditures  are 
concentrated in Pest county (14 percent) and in Budapest. With our modeling approach the 
likely  (static  and  dynamic)  agglomeration  effects  can  be  accounted  for  as  in  GMR  what 
matters is not only the size of expenditures but also their spatial distribution. These effects are 
assumed significant at this level of concentration of CSF funds. The remaining part of the 
expenditures  are  planned  to  be  spent  almost  equally  among  the  18  counties  with  some   76 
variation in it as two developing counties (Nógrád and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg) receive the 
same share (6 percent) as the capital and two well-performing counties (Komárom-Esztergom 
and Gyır-Moson-Sopron) are provided with about 2.5 percent of the total spending. As to the 
temporal characteristics of planned CSF expenditures after a steep increase from 2007 to 2008 
the level of expenditures in all categories remains unchanged until 2014 when a sharp decline 
to 2015 starts.  
 
The size of expenditures is considerable as it is compared to Hungarian GDP. Total CSF 
expenditures (including both EU resources and Hungarian cofinancing) account for about 4 
percent which is a relatively high percentage compared to international experiences. Perhaps 
Germany in the period of 1994-2000 could come closest as the respective share was about 5 
percent there (Schalk and Varga 2004).  
 
The  structure  of  expenditures  especially  taking  into  account  the  TFP-related  ones  is  also 
worth  detailing.  Compared  to  2003  spendings  (the  last  year  with  no  CSF  intervention  in 
Hungary) expenditures in infrastructure are 36 percent higher annually on average during the 
period of 2007-2015 whereas the corresponding figures for education and R&D are 11 and 25 
percents. On  average  with CSF support Hungary  spends 22 percent more on TFP-related 
instruments than without the planned interventions.  
 
 
We focus on the aggregate national level impacts in this section. Space constraints do not 
allow us to present national sectoral and county level aggregate and sectoral results. These can 
be studied in details by using the complex model software. Table 7.2 and figure 7.3 exhibit 
the results of the scenario on main macroeconomic variables. In the table the total CSF effects 
are communicated either in the form of percentage changes compared to the baseline (i.e., the 
situation without CSF interventions) or in the form of percentage point changes relative to the 
baseline. Variable acronyms are explained in the note of the table as well as the type of 
measure applied (i.e., percentage or percentage point differences). The figures provide further 
information with respect to the supply and demand effects on the main macro variables.   77 
 
 
Table 7.2: Estimated effects of CSF interventions on main macroeconomic variables relative to baseline (EU support) 
 
 
Note:  GDPV:  percentage  difference  to  baseline  gross  domestic  product  level;  DGDPV:  percentage  point  difference  to  baseline  GDPV  growth  rate;  CPV:  percentage 
difference to baseline private consumption; ITV: percentage difference to baseline investment; ET: percentage difference to baseline employment; UNR: percentage point 
difference to baseline unemployment rate; LFPR: percentage point difference to baseline labor force participation rate; DWSSE: percentage point difference to baseline 
growth in  wages; DPDTY: percentage point difference  to baseline productivity growth, PROD: percentage difference to baseline productivity  level;  CKL: percentage 
difference to baseline unit capital-labor cost; ULCB: percentage difference to baseline unit labor cost, business sector; DPGDP: percentage point difference to baseline 





  GDPV  DGDPV  CPV  ITV  ET  UNR  LFPR  DWSSE  DPDTY  PROD  CKL  ULCB  DPGDP  NLGQ 
2007  1,89  1,87  0,70  8,06  1,63  -0,95  0,38  0,00  0,25  0,03  -0,40  -0,09  -0,38  0,71 
2008  3,33  1,40  1,41  13,07  2,81  -1,37  0,83  0,43  0,26  0,13  -0,88  0,10  -0,35  1,32 
2009  4,69  1,31  2,41  15,00  3,73  -1,60  1,24  1,64  0,42  0,44  -1,67  1,19  -0,34  1,92 
2010  6,07  1,31  3,59  16,34  4,47  -1,75  1,60  1,85  0,60  0,97  -2,60  2,17  -0,47  2,48 
2011  7,15  1,01  4,70  17,00  4,81  -1,71  1,85  1,52  0,68  1,65  -3,50  2,58  -0,58  2,86 
2012  8,32  1,08  5,81  18,31  5,13  -1,73  2,03  1,41  0,79  2,45  -4,42  2,70  -0,69  3,20 
2013  9,29  0,90  6,86  18,73  5,17  -1,63  2,13  1,45  0,85  3,37  -5,37  2,69  -0,72  3,43 
2014  9,01  -0,26  7,63  13,89  4,08  -0,92  1,93  1,43  0,79  4,40  -6,31  2,52  -0,59  3,21 
2015  9,14  0,12  8,33  11,42  3,29  -0,62  1,65  1,23  0,87  5,49  -7,12  2,10  -0,67  2,99 
2016  8,71  -0,39  8,58  8,45  2,10  -0,12  1,24  0,55  0,77  6,55  -7,66  1,08  -0,59  2,53 








2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017











2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017









2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017







2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017










2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017








2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017









2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Labor Force Participation Rate, LFPR, no TFP supply side effect







2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Growth of Real Compensation Rate, no TFP supply side effect
Growth of Real Compensation Rate, total effect
 










2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017









2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Labor Productivity growth, DPDTY, no TFP supply side effect












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017










2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017









2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017










2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Government Lending in percentage of GDP, NLG, no TFP supply side effect
Government Lending in percentage of GDP, NLG, total effect
 
 
Figure 7.3: Demand and supply side impacts on main economic variables relative to the 
baseline (EU support, continued from previous page) 
 
 
Demand  side  effects  are  formulated  in  the  model  as  increased  government  investment 
(infrastructure investments), increased transfer payments (expenditures on human resources) 
and increased investments (investment support). The supply side is affected by TFP changes 
(resulting from infrastructure investments and supports for education, training and R&D) on   80 
the one hand and by less costly investments (i.e., support for productive structures decreases 
costs and potentially increase production).   
 
The remaining part of this section is devoted to analyzing the results presented in Table 7.2 
and Figure 7.3.  
 
To measure the effects on output impacts on GDP level and GDP growth rate are presented in 
the Table and in the Figure. The difference to baseline GDP level constantly increases until 
2015 then it seems to be stabilized at the value of nearly 9 percent. On average the increase in 
GDP level is about 7 percent. This is a two times higher effect than was calculated in the first 
planning period (2004-2006) for Hungary (Schalk and Varga 2004) which is understandable 
as the share of expenditures in GDP is about doubled in the second period. The 7 percent 
average impact figure comes also quite close to the German 1996-2000 experience when the 5 
percent GDP share of CSF support resulted in a 6.5 percent average output effect.  
 
It becomes clear from the Figure that most of the output effects come from the supply side. 
The  demand  side  effect  is  strong  in  the  beginning  of  the  period  than  it  stays  at  about  3 
percents until the expenditures decrease in 2014 and 2015. In contrast to the demand side 
effect from the supply side a more prevalent and lasting impact is experienced. Productivity 
growth  resulting  from  TFP  increase  and  investment  support  exerts  significant  effects  on 
output. The impact increases with a constant rate until 2014 (mainly due to the constant level 
of spendings on productivity-related policy instruments as shown in Figure 7.2) then it seems 
to reach a stable level of nearly 9 percent. Figure 7.3 also shows that while demand side 
effects decrease and almost vanish after the support is stopped supply side impacts prevail as 
the influence on productivity stays for longer time.  
 
The effect on GDP growth rate reflects the same pattern as what we learned while studying 
the level impacts. The sharp increase of GDP growth rate change to 1.87 percentage point in 
2007  is  due  to  the  demand  schock.  The  demand  effect  on  the  growth  rate  then  strongly 
decreases after 2008 and becomes even negative after 2010. This pattern perfectly repeats the 
one detailed when the demand side effect is explained. The same is true for the total effect on 
GDP growth rate. It remains around 1 percent during most of the planning period then it tends 
to fade away after 2015. Thus the almost zero growth effect from the supply side after the end   81 
of CSF support is in accordance with the stable level effect. The average total effect on GDP 
growth rate is 0.75 percentage point. 
 
The pattern of private consumption change is pretty similar to the GDP level effect. Most of it 
is a result of supply side interventions. With respect to investment the “no TFP supply side 
effect”  does  mean  that  both  demand  side  and  supply  side  (in  the  form  of  cheaper  and 
increased  investments)  impacts  are  in  force.  There  is  a  technical  reason  why  we  cannot 
separate them from each other in simulations. The supply-demand side impact shows a strong 
increase  in  2007  and  2008  then  it  further  increase  until  2014  and  with  the  end  of  CSF 
internventions it shows a sharp decline to the long lasting effect of about 8 percent.  
 
The  employment  effect  of  CSF  interventions  according  to  the  scenario  analysed  here  is 
meqaningful (about 5 percent at the peak in 2014 and about 3.5 percent on average). This is 
due to the particular mixture of output, substitution and productivity effects working behind 
the scene. The output effect is partly due to the supply side (i.e., increasing productivity might 
increase  output  since  unit  cost  is  lower  –  this  effect  comes  from  both  TFP  increase  and 
investment  support)  and  partly  resulted  from  the  demand  side  (in  the  form  of  increased 
demand). Taken together of these effects they result in an increase in employment. Contrary 
to the output effects the substitution and the productivity impacts are counter-employment 
boosting. This is first because investment support decreases the cost of capital motivating 
firms to replace labor with productive structures and second because increased productivity 
via TFP support reduces costs of the same level of output that could motivate firms to produce 
less with less labor employed. As shown in the figure most of the impacts come from the 
demand side (output effect) and this vanishes after support is no longer available. The similar 
pattern can be observed for labor force participation rate as well. 
 
As to unemployment the supply and demand side effects are quite close to each other but it is 
clear that the higher-than baseline unemployment rate is dominantly caused by supply side 
impacts. After taking into account that the decline in labor force participation is less dramatic 
than  the  decrease  in  employment  it  becomes  clear  that  higher  unemployment  when 
interventions  are  no  longer  in  effect  is  a  result  of  these  patterns.  Increase  in  wages  is 
significant in most part of the intervention period and after its end wage growth declines close 
to zero. Most of these effects are caused by productivity increase. 
   82 
After a sharp increase in the beginning of the period the impact on labor productivity grows 
with a constant rate as a result of the supply side effects mainly.  Demand and supply side 
influence labor productivity growth differently. While the demand side effect stays and then 
vanishes after the support is stopped the supply side impact increases for most of the period 
and seems to approach a longer term constant effect after 2014. These patterns repeat the one 
studied in more detail while the impacts on the GDP growth rate are examined. 
 
The increase in unit labor cost compared to baseline is mainly due to increased productivity. It 
appears that higher than-baseline inflation rate after 2013 is the result of this demand side 
effect coming from increasing wages and consumption. The total effect on net government 
lending  is  positive  during  the  whole  period  which  means  that  CSF  support  decreases 
government deficit mainly due to the supply side effects.  
 
Appendix  7  presents  the  results  when  the  total  amount  of  NDP  support  (i.e.,  EU  and 
Hungarian co-financing together) is used for impact analysis. Due to the quasy-linear nature 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
 
This  report  presented  a  detailed  description  of  GMR-Hungary  the  complex  macro-  and 
regional  model  built  for  development  policy  impact  analysis  for  the  Hungarian  National 
Development Agency. The main distinguishing features of the model can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
- strong supply side orientation 
- direct modeling of technological change 
- incorporating geography (agglomeration) effects in the analysis 
- the capacity of providing both macro and regional level analyses  
- a four sector approach (industry, agriculture, services and government) 
- the model is packaged in a user-friendly software environment. 
 
GMR-Hungary  has  been  developed  by  an  international  consortium  that  was  necessary  to 
establish given the extremely complex nature of the knowledge inherent in the system. The 
model is built on four strands of recent economic literatures: the new economic geography, 
the  endogenous  growth  theory,  the  systems  of  innovation  school  and  the  geography  of 
innovation field. According to the complex nature of the problem GMR is a coherently built 
system  of  three  sub-models:  the  TFP  sub-model  (responsible  for  calculating  static 
productivity  effects)  the  SCGE  sub-model  (with  the  task  of  simulating  long  run  dynamic 
effects on the spatial distribution of technology, labor, capital, wages and output) and the 
MACRO sub-model (which is incorporated into the system to generate likely macroeconomic 
effects of development policy interventions).  
 
Additional to describing GMR-Hungary this report provided a detailed analysis of the likely 
effects of a scenario worked out by the Hungarian government for spending funds during the 
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Besides  that  GMR-Hungary  extends  the  limits  of  development  policy  impact  analyis 
significantly the model has several limitations directing towards further developments of its 
system. These include  
 
-  the crude account for agglomeration with a simple employment size measure; 
-  the limitations of TFP as the index of the development  of technology (Hulten 2000); 
-  the  limits  of  the  knowledge  production  function  approach  in  capturing  knowledge 
spillover effects (Feldman 2000); 
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name  Variable description 
Endogenous variable 
Equation 
     
   
I. The supply side 
    1. Business sector and government 
     
ETB  Employment of the business 
sector 
ETB  = ETB(-1)  * EXP(  - 0.6462765982  + LOG(GDPBV  
/ GDPBV(-1))  - 0.1  * (LOG(ETB(-1)  / GDPBV(-1))  + (1  
- XTAU)  * LOG((WSSE  / XTAU)  / (UCC  / (1  - 
XTAU)))  + XTAU  * LOG(ELEFFU))  + 0.01838048857  
* (DUMMY_95_96  + DUMMY_99_02)  - 0.0346201138  
* DUMMY_92_94  - 0.01127018745  * DUMMY_93) 
IPV  Private total fixed capital 
formation, volume 
IPV  = IPV(-1)  * EXP(-0.4640446414  - 0.1313832514  * 
(LOG(IPV(-1)  / GDPBV(-1))  - (1.  / 0.1)  * LOG(GDPBV  
/ GDPBV(-1))  - XTAU  * LOG((WSSE  / XTAU)  / (UCC  
/ (1.  - XTAU)))  + XTAU  * LOG(ELEFFU))  + 
0.0565779131  * (DUMMY_94_96_98_99)  - 
0.03849758663  * DUMMY_95_01_02  - 0.02338901205  
* DUMMY_97_98) 
GDPBV  Gross domestic product, 
business sector, volume,  
factor cost 
GDPBV  = EXP(7.153939065  - XTAU  * LOG(WSSE  / 
PGDPB  / ELEFFU)  + 0.8096641143  * 
LOG(FDDV  + XGSV  - MGSV)  + 
0.02891037751  * DUMMY_98_00_01) 
WSSE  Compensation rate of the 
business sector 
WSSE  = EXP(6.79515674  + XTAU  * LOG(ELEFFU)  + 
LOG(PCP)  - 0.09506299279  * 
(DUMMY_99_00)) 
UCC  User cost of capital  UCC=PIT*(IRL-DPGDP+10) 
CKL  Unit capital-labor costs  CKL=EXP(XTAU*(LOG(WSSE/XTAU) 
  -LOG(ELEFFU)) 
  +(1.-XTAU)*LOG(UCC/(1.-XTAU))) 
PROD  Labor productivity of the 
business economy 
PROD=GDPBV/ETB 
ULCB  Unit labor costs in the  
business sector 
ULCB=(WSSE*ETB)/GDPBV 
GDPV  Gross domestic product, 
volume, market prices 
GDPV=GDPBV+CGW/PCGW+NITV+CFKG/PIT 
CGW  Government final wage con-
sumption expenditure, value 
CGW=WRG*EG 
WRG  Compensation rate of 
government employees 
WRG=WRGQ*WSSE 
NITV  Net indirect taxes, volume  NITV=XNITV*(GDPV-CGW/PCGW) 
GVAV  Gross value added, volume  GVAV= GDPV-NITV+FISIMV 
GVABV  Gross value added of 
business sector, volume 
GVABV=GVAV-CGW/PCGW-CFKG/PIT 
                                                 
26 On the basis of Schalk and Varga (2004) compiled by Onno Hoffmeister. 
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GDPB  Gross domestic product of 
business sector, value, factor 
costs 
GDPB=PGDPB*GDPBV 
GDP  Gross domestic product, 
value, market prices 
GDP=GDPB+CGW+NIT+CFKG 
NIT  Net indirect taxes, value  NIT=TIND-TSUB 
TSUB  Subsidies  TSUB=TSUBQ*GDP 
TIND  Indirect taxes, value  TIND=TINDQ*FDD 
CFKG  Government consumption  
of fixed capital, value 
CFKG= 0.043557 *GDP 
     
     
     
    2.Sectoral wages 
WSSE1  Compensation rate in 
agriculture 
WSSE1  = EXP(1.125048364  + 0.8114342375  * 
LOG(WSSE) 
WSSE2  Compensation rate in 
industry 
WSSE2  = EXP(0.5603170035  + 0.9138255462  * 
LOG(WSSE)) 
WSSE3  Compensation rate in 
services 
WSSE3  = EXP(-0.4716353644  + 1.077508674  * 
LOG(WSSE)) 
     
     
    3. Labor market 
     
ET  Total employment  ET=ETB+EG 
EEP  Dependent employment of  
the business sector 
EEP=ET-ES-EG 
ES  Self-employed  ES=ESQ*ETB 
EE  Dependent employment  EE=EEP+EG 
LF  Labor force  LF  = POPT  * (0.1254955234  + 0.8184106563  * (LF(-1)  
/ POPT(-1))  + 0.1884826701  * LOG(ETB  / ETB(-1))  
- 0.00263766064  * UNR(-1)) 
UN  Unemployment  UN=LF-ET 
UNR  Unemployment rate  UNR=UN*100./LF 
LFPR  Labor force participation  
rate 
LFPR=LF/POPT*100.0 
PDTY  Labor productivity of the 
total economy 
PDTY=XPDTY*(GDPV/ET) 
     
   
II. The demand side 
    1. Volumes 
     
FDDV  Final domestic expenditure, 
volume 
FDDV=CPV+CGV+ITV 
CPV  Private final consumption 
expenditure, volume 
  CPV  = YDRH  * EXP(0.067187  + 0.745648  * 
LOG(CPV(-1)  / YDRH(-1))  - 0.588445  * 
LOG(YDRH  / YDRH(-1))  - 0.005051  * IRL  + 
0.02838  * DUMMY94) 
CGV  Government final 
consumption expenditure, 
volume 
CGV=CG/PCG   93 
ITV  Gross total fixed capital 
formation, volume 
ITV=IPV+IGV 
IGV  Government fixed capital 
formation, volume 
IGV=IG/PIT 
TDDV  Total domestic expenditure, 
volume 
TDDV=FDDV+ISKV 
ISKV  Increase in stocks, volume  ISKV=ISK/((TDD-FDD)/(TDDV-FDDV)) 
FBGSV  Net exports of goods and 
services, volume 
FBGSV=GDPV-TDDV 
XGSV  Exports, volume  XGSV  = xgsvqr  * GDPV 
Where xgsvqr =0.856 
MGSV  Imports, volume  MGSV  = mgsvqr_1  * GDPV 
    Where mgsvqr_1 =mgsv/gdpv for the 1995-2003 period 
     
    2. Values 
     
FDD  Final domestic expenditure, 
value 
FDD=CP+CG+IT 
CP  Private final consumption 
expenditure, value 
CP=CPV*PCP 




IT  Gross total fixed capital 
formation, value 
IT=IP+IG 
IP  Private total fixed capital 
formation, value 
IP=IPV*PIT 
TDD  Total domestic expenditure, 
value 
TDD=FDD+ISK 
FBGS  Net exports of goods and 
services, value 
FBGS=GDP-TDD 
     
    3. Deflators 
     
LLRPCP  Domestic expenditure excl. 
government wages, deflator, 
log 
LLRPCP=(1/(GDPBV+NITV))*(GDPBV 
  *LOG(PGDPB/PGDPB(-1))+NITV 
  *LOG((NIT/NITV)/(NIT(-1)/NITV(-1)))) 
PGDPB  Gross domestic product, 
business sector, deflator 
PGDPB  = EXP(-2.184324816  + 0.3752619755  * 
LOG(CKL)  +  
(1-0.3752619755)*LOG(PGDPB(-1)) + 0.05440570567* 
DUMMY_96_97  - 0.05222860349  * 
DUMMY_99) 
DPGDPB  Inflation rate of GDPB  DPGDPB=LOG(PGDPB/PGDPB(-1))*100 




PCP  Private final consumption 
expenditure, deflator 
PCP  = EXP(0.06613158286  + 0.4083546987  * 
LOG(PGDPB)  + 0.2302822653  * LOG(PMGS)  
+ (1  - 0.4083546987  - 0.2302822653)  * 
LOG(PCP(-1))  + 0.01583059211  * 
DUMMY_95_96) 
DPCP  Inflation rate of PCP  DPCP=LOG(PCP/PCP(-1))*100 
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PIT  Gross total fixed capital 
formation, deflator 
PIT  = EXP(-0.006428406909  + 0.6508908841  * 
LOG(PGDPB)  + 0.3718922778  * LOG(PMGS)  
+ (1  - 0.6508908841  - 0.3718922778)  * 
LOG(PIT(-1))  - 0.02929867509  * 
(DUMMY_00_01  + DUMMY_94)) 








  +LOG(PCG/PCG(-1))) 
PFDD  Final domestic expenditure, 
deflator 
PFDD=(CP+CG+IT)/(CPV+CGV+ITV) 
PTDD  Total domestic expenditure, 
deflator 
PTDD=TDD/TDDV 
PGDP  Gross domestic product,  
market prices, deflator 
PGDP=GDP/GDPV 
DPGDP  Inflation rate of GDP  DPGDP=LOG(PGDP/PGDP(-1))*100 




     
   
III. Income distribution 
     
YDH  Household disposable 
income, value 
YDH=YRH-TYH-TRPH 
YRH  Current receipts of house- 
holds, value 
YRH=WSSS+YOTH+TRRH 
WSSS  Compensation of employees, 
value 
WSSS=WSSE*EEP+CGW 
YOTH  Self-employment & property 
income received by house-
holds, value 
YOTH=YSE+YPE 
YSE  Self-employment income 
received by households, 
value 
YSE=YSEQ*ES*WSSE 
YPE  Property income received by 
households, value 
YPE=YPEQ*PROF 
PROF  Profits and other non-wage 
income, value 
PROF=GDP-WSSS-YSE-NIT 
TRRH  Current transfers received by 
households, value 
TRRH=SSPG+TRPG+ZCS001 
SSPG  Social security benefits paid 
by government 
SSPG=0.476907*WSSE*UN+SSPG(-1) 
TYH  Direct taxes on households, 
value 
TYH=TYHQ*YRH 
TRPH  Total transfers paid by 
households, value 
TRPH=TROPH+TRSSH 
TROPH  Non-social security transfers 
paid by households, value 
TROPH=TROPHQ*YRH 
TRSSH  Social security contributions 
by households, value 
TRSSH=TRPBTH+TRPESH+TRPGSH   95 
TRPBTH  Private employers social 
security contributions 
TRPBTH=TRPBTHQ*(WAGE-WAGEG) 
TRPGSH  Government employers 
contributions to social 
security, value 
TRPGSH=TRPGSHQ*WAGEG 
TRPESH  Employees & self-employed 
contributions to social 
security, value 
TRPESH=TRPESHQ*(WAGE-WAGEG+YSE) 
WAGE  Wages, value  WAGE=WSSS-TRPBTH-TRPGSH 
WAGEG  Wages of the government 
sector, value 
WAGEG=CGW-TRPGSH 
YPH  Current disbursements of 
households, value 
YPH=TYH+TRPH+CP 
SAVH  Household saving, value  SAVH=YRH-YPH 
SRATIO  Household saving ratio  SRATIO=SAVH*100/YDH 
YDRH  Household disposable  
income, real 
YDRH=YDH/PCP 
TYB  Direct taxes on business,  
value 
TYB=TYBQ*PROF 
TY  Total direct taxes, value  TY=TYH+TYB 
YRG  Government current receipts, 
value 
YRG=TY+TRSSH+TRRG+TIND+YPERG 
YPG  Government current 
disbursements, value 
YPG=CG+YPEPG+SSPG+TRPG+TSUB 
SAVG  Government saving, value  SAVG=YRG-YPG 
CAPOG  Net capital outlays of the 
government, value 
CAPOG=IG-KTRRG-CFKG 
NLG  Government net lending, 
value 
NLG=SAVG-CAPOG 
YPGT  Government total 
disbursements, value 
YPGT=YPG+CAPOG 
NLGQ  Government net lending,  
percentage of GDP 
NLGQ=NLG/GDP*100 
YPGTQ  Government total 
disbursements, percentage of 
GDP 
YPGTQ=YPGT/GDP*100 
YRGQ  Government current receipts,  
percentage of GDP 
YRGQ=YRG/GDP*100 
    IV. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
     
ELEFFU  Labor efficiency of the  
business sector 
ELEFFU=EXP((1./XTAU)* 0.017441*TIME) 
CTFPGR  County TFP growth  DTFP2 = -1.038934975 - 0.2587264068*DTFP2(-2) + 
8.836649401e-005*PAT(-2) + 0.08263333562*(FDISH(-
3)) + 2.112574087e-006*D(INFRAV(-1)) + 5.630818475e-
006*D(EDRDXV(-2)) - 0.06097097103*DUM99 
 
DNTFPGR Change of national TFP 
growth due to CSF policy 
DNTFPGR=∑iCEMPi*d(CTFPGRi) 
 
TFP  Total factor productivity  TFP=ELEFFU
XTAU 
CSFTFP  Total factor productivity, 
CSF policy effects included 
CSFTFP=TFP*EXP(DNTFPGR)   96 
Appendix 2:  Variables – Macro and TFP sub-models
27 
 





CGNW   Government final non-wage consumption expenditure, value 
EG   Government employment 
ESQ   Self-employment share in business economy 
EUGDPV   Gross domestic product in the EU15, volume 
FGDPBV   Foreign gross domestic product, business sector, volume, factor cost 
FISIMV   FISIM, volume 
IG   Government fixed capital formation, value 
IRL   Long term interest rate on government bonds 
ISK   Increase in stocks, value 
KTRRG   Net government capital transfers received 
PCGQ   Ratio of government final consumption expenditure deflator to GDP deflator 
POPT   Working-age population 
SHET1   Share of agriculture in total business employment 
TIME   Time trend (0 in 1995) 
TINDQ   Total tax ratio of indirect taxes 
TPCOST   Transport costs 
TROPHQ   Share of non-social security transfers, paid by households, in their income 
TRPBTHQ   Share of private employers’ contribution to social security and pension fonds in 
 private sector wages 
TRPESHQ   Share of employees & self-empl. social security contributions in market income 
TRPG   Other current transfers paid by government 
TRPGSHQ   Share of government employers social security contributions in public sector 
 wages 
TRRG   Other current transfers received by government, value 
TSUBQ   Share of subsidies in GDP 
TYBQ   Total tax ratio of direct taxes on profits 
TYHQ   Total tax ratio of direct taxes on households 
WRGQ   Compensation rate of government employees relative to total economy 
XNITV   Coefficient 
XPDTY   Coefficient 
XTAU   Coefficient 
YPEQ   Share of property income in profits 
YPEPG   Property income paid by government, value 
YPERG   Property income received by government, value 
YSEQ   Share of income from self-employment in total income 







                                                 
27 On the basis of Schalk and Varga (2004) compiled by Onno Hoffmeister.   97 





CAPOG   Net capital outlays of the government, value 
CFKG   Government consumption of fixed capital, value 
CG   Government final consumption expenditure, value 
CGV   Government final consumption expenditure, volume 
CGW   Government final wage consumption expenditure, value 
CKL   Unit capital-labor costs 
CP   Private final consumption expenditure, value 
CPV   Private final consumption expenditure, volume 
DPCP   Inflation rate of PCP 
DPGDP   Inflation rate of GDP 
DPGDPB   Inflation rate of GDPB 
EE   Dependent employment 
EEP   Dependent employment of the business sector 
ELEFFU   Labor efficiency of the business sector 
ES   Self-employed 
ET   Total employment 
ETB   Employment of the business sector 
ET1   Employment in agriculture 
ET2   Employment in industry 
ET3   Employment in services 
FBGS   Net exports of goods & services, value 
FBGSV   Net exports of goods & services, volume 
FDD   Final domestic expenditure, value 
FDDV   Final domestic expenditure, volume 
GDP   Gross domestic product, value, market prices 
GDPB   Gross domestic product of the business sector, value, factor costs 
GDPBV   Gross domestic product, business sector, volume, factor cost 
GDPV   Gross domestic product, volume, market prices 
GVAV   Gross value added, volume 
GVABV   Gross value added of the business sector, volume 
GVAV1   Gross value added in agriculture, volume 
GVAV2   Gross value added in industry, volume 
GVAV3   Gross value added in services, volume 
IGV   Government fixed capital formation, volume 
IP   Private total fixed capital formation, value 
IPV   Private total fixed capital formation, volume 
IPV1   Private total fixed capital formation in agriculture, volume 
IPV2   Private total fixed capital formation in industry, volume 
IPV3   Private total fixed capital formation in services, volume 
ISKV   Increase in stocks, volume 
IT   Gross total fixed capital formation, value 
ITV   Gross total fixed capital formation, volume 
LF   Labor force 
LFPR   Labor force participation rate 
LLRPCP   Domestic expenditure excl. government wages, deflator, log 
NIT   Net indirect taxes, value 
NITV   Net indirect taxes, volume 
NLG   Government net lending, value 
NLGQ   Government net lending, as a percentage of GDP   98 
NPROD3   Labor productivity in services relative to the total economy 
PCG   Government final consumption expenditure, deflator 
PCGNW   Government final non-wage consumption expenditure, deflator 
PCGW   Government final wage consumption expenditure, deflator 
PCP   Private final consumption expenditure, deflator 
PDTY   Labor productivity of the total economy 
PFDD   Final domestic expenditure, deflator 
PGDP   Gross domestic product, market prices, deflator 
PGDPB   Gross domestic product, business sector, deflator 
PIT   Gross total fixed capital formation, deflator 
PROD   Labor productivity of the business economy 
PROD1   Labor productivity in agriculture 
PROD2   Labor productivity in industry 
PROD3   Labor productivity in services 
PROF   Profits and other non-wage income, value 
PTDD   Total domestic expenditure, deflator 
PTE   Total expenditure excl. government wage consumption, deflator 
RPROD2   Labor productivity ratio between industry and services 
RWAGQ2   Wage quota in industry relative to services 
RWSSE2   Compensation rate in industry relative to agriculture and services 
SAVG   Government saving, value 
SAVH   Household saving, value 
SHEE1   Share of agriculture in all business sector employees 
SHEE2   Share of industry in all business sector employees 
SHEE3   Share of services in all business sector employees 
SHETX2   Share of industry in total non-agricultural business employment 
SHET2   Share of industry in total business employment 
SHET3   Share of services in total business employment 
SHGVAV1   Share of agriculture in business gross value added, volume 
SHGVAV2   Share of industry in business gross value added, volume 
SHGVAV3   Share of services in business gross value added, volume 
SHIPV2   Share of industry in private total fixed capital formation, volume 
SHIPV3   Share of services in private total fixed capital formation, volume 
SHIPV1   Share of agriculture in private total fixed capital formation, volume 
SRATIO   Household saving ratio 
SSPG   Social security benefits paid by government 
TDD   Total domestic expenditure, value 
TDDV   Total domestic expenditure, volume 
TROPH   Non-social security transfers paid by households, value 
TRPESH   Employees & self-employed contributions to social security, value 
TRPGSH   Government employers contributions to social security, value 
TRPH   Total transfers paid by households, value 
TRRH   Current transfers received by households, value 
TRSSH   Social security contributions by households, value 
TY   Total direct taxes, value 
TYB   Direct taxes on business, value 
TYH   Direct taxes on households, value 
UCC   User costs of capital 
ULCB   Unit labor costs in the business sector 
UN   Unemployment 
UNR   Unemployment rate 
WAGE   Wages, value 
WAGEG   Wages of the government sector, value 
WRG   Compensation rate of government employees   99 
WSSE   Compensation rate of the business sector 
WSSE1   Compensation rate in agriculture 
WSSE2   Compensation rate in industry 
WSSE3   Compensation rate in services 
WSSS   Compensation of employees, value 
XGSV   Exports, volume 
YDH   Household disposable income, value 
YDRH   Household disposable income, real 
YOTH   Self-employment & property income received by households, value 
YPE   Property income received by households, value 
YPG   Government current disbursements, value 
YPGT   Government total disbursements, value 
YPGTQ   Government total disbursements, as a percentage of GDP 
YPH   Current disbursements of households, value 
YRG   Government current receipts, value 
YRGQ   Government current receipts, as a percentage of GDP 
YRH   Current receipts of households, value 








Variable description  Variable status  Geographic 
aggregation 
CEMP  Weights, calculated by county 
employment shares 
Exogenous  County 
CSFTFP  Total factor productivity, CSF policy 
effects included    Endogenous    National 
CTFPGR  County TFP growth    Endogenous  County 
DNTFPGR  Change of national TFP growth due to 
CSF policy 
  Endogenous    National 
DUM99  Dummy variable: year 1999  Exogenous  County 
BPDUM  Dummy variable: Budapest  Exogenous  County 
HUMRES  Human resources expenditures 
(education, training and R&D) 
Exogenous  County 
INFRA  Investment in physical infrastructure  Exogenous  County 
KIMP  Imported technologies   Exogenous  County 
KNAT  Domestically available technological 
knowledge   Exogenous    National 
RD  Private and public R&D expenditures  Exogenous  County 
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The output by the Cobb-Douglas production function
29: 
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where in case of starting point t = 0 come true: 
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Since ai,m = aj,m in case of ∀ i,j and m, it follows that we can leave out the i index of ai,m from 
the (1) equation: 
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where ζi,m,t is a flavour factor for the given TFP is defined as follows
30: 
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j,n and γm = γn in case of ∀ i,j,m,n so we can leave these indexes:   
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The F.O.B. prices
31 of region i in sector m 
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The input factor demand functions
32: 
 
(4)    t m i t m i
t i
m
t m i y q
w
a
' , , , ,
,
, , ' = L  
 
                                                 
28 On the basis of Koike and Thissen (2005) compiled by Péter Járosi. 
29 See the formula of cell equilibrium!DB18  
30 See the formulas of cells equilibrium!D166 and D167  
31 F.O.B. = „free on board”, See the formula of cell equilibrium!DB13  
32 See the formulas of cells equilibrium!DB270 and DB271    101 
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The utility functions of the households
33: 
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The budget constraints of the households: 
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We can derive the following demand functions
34: 
 





























The probability of buying good m in region i when living in region j is defined as follows
35 in 
case of m=1 and m=2: 
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in case of m=3 and m=4: 
 
(10)    1 , , = t m ij s  if i = j, or rather  0 , , = t m ij s  if i ≠ j 
 
The interregional trade volume: 
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The cost of transportation is also included in the C.I.F. price: 
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The market equilibrium conditions: 
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33 See the formula of cell equilibrium!D207  
34 See the formula of cell equilibrium!DB168  
35 See the formula of cell equilibrium!DB68    102 
 
•  capital market: 
(14)  0 '
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•  goods market (supply): 
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The labor migration model
37: 
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where i=1..I the index of regions, t=0..T the index of year, consequently Li,t means the labor of 
region i int he year t. To take into consideration  t
I i
t i L L = ∑
∈
, , and to perform the parentheses: 
 










































The (17-a) equations well exemplifies, that if value of 
) ( , i t i c u e
+ θ  in the given region is exactly 
the average of the 
) ( , i t i c u e
+ θ  value of the all regions: 
 

















θ   
So if the utility function gives the value of ui,t according to (17-b) equation, then there is no 
migration in the given region. In case of t=0 this condition is true in each regions. To replace 
(17-b) into (17-a): 
 
(17-c)    G L L t i t i , 1 , = +    
 
Simply equation is true in each region according to (17-b). 
 
 
                                                 
36 Equation (15) automatically follows from equations (9), (10) and (11). 
37 This equation is executed by the „longrun” subroutine.   103 
To use notation σm as the share of investment in sector m, and ιi,m,t: investment goods: 
 
(18)    t m i t i m t m i x N , , , , , σ ι =  
 
So the (1- σm) part of outputs are consumed in the households, accordingly the equation (6) is 
explainable. 
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The investment increases total capital as follows: 
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Appendix 4: Variable sources – Macro sub-model
38 
 
1. Raw Variables 
 
Variable Description  Name  Source variables  Database 
Government  consumption  of  fixed  capital, 
value 




Government  final  consumption  expenditure, 
value 
CG  HUN.1.0.0.0.UCTG  AMECO 
Government  final  wage  consumption 
expenditure, value 
CGW  HUN.1.0.0.0.UWCG  AMECO 
Private final consumption expenditure, value  CP  HUN.1.0.0.0.UCPH  AMECO 
Private final consumption expenditure, volume  CPV  HUN.1.1.0.0.OCPH  AMECO 
Employees in agriculture  EE1  HUN.1.0.0.0.NWT1  AMECO 
Employees in industry  EE2  HUN.1.0.0.0.NWT2 
+HUN.1.0.0.0.NWT4 
AMECO 
Employees in services  EE3  HUN.1.0.0.0.NWT5  AMECO 
Government employment  EG  Imputed  / 
Self-employed  ES  HUN.1.0.0.0.NSTD  AMECO 
Total employment  ET  HUN.1.0.0.0.NETN  AMECO 
Employment in agriculture  ET1  HUN.1.0.0.0.NET1  AMECO 
Employment in industry  ET2  HUN.1.0.0.0.NET2 
+HUN.1.0.0.0.NET4 
AMECO 
Employment in services  ET3  HUN.1.0.0.0.NET5  AMECO 
Gross domestic product in the EU15, volume, 
Euro 
EUGDP  E15.1.0.0.0.UVGD  AMECO 
Foreign  gross  domestic  product,  business 
sector, volume, factor cost 
FGDPBV  Imputed  / 
FISIM, volume  FISIMV  HUN.1.1.0.0.OVG0 
-HUN.1.0.0.0.OVGE 
AMECO 
Gross domestic product, value, market prices  GDP  HUN.1.0.0.0.UVGD  AMECO 
Gross domestic product, volume, market prices  GDPV  HUN.1.1.0.0.OVGD  AMECO 
Gross value added in agriculture, volume  GVAV1  HUN.1.1.0.0.OVG1  AMECO 
Gross value added in industry, volume  GVAV2  HUN.1.1.0.0.OVG2 
+HUN.1.1.0.0.OVG4 
AMECO 
Gross value added in services, volume  GVAV3  HUN.1.1.0.0.OVG5  AMECO 
Government fixed capital formation, value  IG  HUN.1.0.0.0.UIGG  AMECO 
Private total fixed capital formation in industry, 
value 
IP2     
Private total fixed capital formation in services, 
value 
IP3     
Long term interest rate on government bonds  IRL  HUN.1.1.0.0.ILN  AMECO 
Increase in stocks, value  ISK  HUN.1.0.0.0.UIST  AMECO 
Gross total fixed capital formation, value  IT  HUN.1.0.0.0.UIGT  AMECO 
Gross total fixed capital formation, volume  ITV  HUN.1.1.0.0.OIGT  AMECO 
Net government capital transfers received  KTRRG  HUN.1.0.0.0.UKTTG 
- HUN.1.0.0.0.UKTGT 
AMECO 
Labor force  LF  HUN.1.0.0.0.NLTN  AMECO 
Net indirect taxes, value  NIT  HUN.1.0.0.0.UTVN  AMECO 
Government  final  consumption  expenditure, 
deflator 
PCG  HUN.3.1.0.0.PCTG  AMECO 
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Working-age population  POPT  HUN.1.0.0.0.NPAN  AMECO 
Social security benefits paid by government  SSPG  S.14_D.62 (RES)  S-Statistic 
Time (year-1995)  TIME  -2; -1; 0; 1; 2; ...; 18  / 
Indirect taxes, value  TIND  HUN.1.0.0.0.UTVT  AMECO 
Total direct taxes, value  TY  S1_D.5(RES)  S-Statistic 
Direct taxes on households, value  TYH  S14_D.5 (USES)  S-Statistic 
Transport costs  TPCOST  Transman Kft.   
Non-social  security  transfers  paid  by 
households, value 
TROPH  S14_D.7(USES) 
+ S15_D.7(USES) 
S-Statistic 
Private employers social security contributions  TRPBTH  S1_D.12(RES) 
- S13_D12(USES) 
S-Statistic 
Employees  &  self-employed  contributions  to 
social security, value 
TRPESH  S14_D.61(USES) 
-S1_D.12(RES) 
S-Statistic 
Other current transfers paid by government  TRPG  S13_D.7 (USES)  S-Statistic 
 Government employers contributions to social 
security, value 
TRPGSH  S13_D12(USES)  S-Statistic 
Other current transfers received by government, 
value 
TRRG  S13_D7(RES)  S-Statistic 
Compensation of employees, value  WSSS  HUN.1.0.0.0.UWCD  AMECO 
Compensation of employees in agriculture  WSS1  HUN.1.1.0.0.UWC1  AMECO 
Compensation of employees in industry  WSS2  HUN.1.1.0.0.UWC2 
+HUN.1.1.0.0.UWC4 
AMECO 
Compensation of employees in services  WSS3  HUN.1.1.0.0.UWC5  AMECO 
Exports, volume  XGSV  HUN.1.1.0.0.OXGS  AMECO 
Exchange rate to the Euro  XR  HUN.1.0.99.0.XNE  AMECO 
Coefficient  XTAU  0.67   





Property income paid by government, value  YPEPG  HUN.1.0.0.0.UYIG  AMECO 
Property income received by government, value  YPERG  S13_D.4(RES)  S-Statistic 
Self-employment  income  received  by 
households, value 




Non-social  security  transfers  received  by 
households 
ZCS001  S14_D.7 (RES) 






2. Generated Variables 
 
Variable Description  Name  Source variables 
Government final non-wage consumption 
expenditure, value 
CGNW  CG-CGW 
Self-employment share in business economy  ESQ  ES/ETB 
Employment of the business sector  ETB  ET-EG 
Gross domestic product in the EU15, volume  EUGDPV  EUGDP*XR/PGDP 
Gross domestic product of the business sector, 
value, factor costs 
GDPB  GDP-GDPG 
Gross domestic product, business sector, volume, 
factor cost 
GDPBV  GDPV-GDPGV   106 
Gross domestic product of the government 
sector, value 
GDPG  CGW+TIND-TSUB+CFKG 
Gross domestic product of the government 
sector, volume 





Private total fixed capital formation, volume  IPV  ITV-IG/PIT 
Private total fixed capital formation in industry, 
volume 
IPV2  IP2/PIT 
Private total fixed capital formation in services, 
volume 
IPV3  IP3/PIT 
Government final non-wage consumption 
expenditure, deflator 
PCGNW  CGNW/(CG/PCG-CGW/PCGW) 
Government final wage consumption 
expenditure, deflator 
PCGW  WRG/WRG(1995) 
Ratio of government final consumption 
expenditure deflator to GDP deflator 
PCGQ  PCG/PGDPB 
Private final consumption expenditure, deflator  PCP  CP/CPV 
Gross domestic product, business sector, deflator  PGDPB  GDPB/GDPBV 
Gross total fixed capital formation, deflator  PIT  IT/ITV 
Labor productivity in agriculture  PROD1  GVAV1/ET1 
Profits and other non-wage income, value  PROF  GDP-WSSS-YSE-NIT 
Labor productivity ratio between industry and 
services 
RPROD2  GVAV2/ET2*ET3/GVAV3 
Share of industry in all business sector 
employees 
SHEE2  EE2/(ET-ES-EG) 
Share of services in all business sector employees  SHEE3  EE3/(ET-ES-EG) 
Share of agriculture in total business employment  SHET1  ET1/ETB 
Share of industry in total non-agricultural 
business employment 
SHETX2  ET2/(ET2+ET3) 
Share of industry in private total fixed capital 
formation, volume 
SHIPV2  IPV2/IPV 
Share of services in private total fixed capital 
formation, volume 
SHIPV3  IPV3/IPV 
Total tax ratio of indirect taxes  TINDQ  TIND/FDD 
Share of non-social security transfers, paid by 
households, in their income 
TROPHQ  TROPH/YRH 
Share of private employers’ contribution to social 
security and pension fonds in private sector 
wages 
TRPBTHQ  TRPBTH/(WAGE-WAGEG) 
Share of employees & self-empl. social security 
contributions in market income 
TRPESHQ  TRPESH/(WAGE-WAGEG+YSE) 
Share of government employers social security 
contributions in public sector wages 
TRPGSHQ  TRPGSH/WAGEG 
Subsidies  TSUB  TIND-NIT 
Share of subsidies in GDP  TSUBQ  TSUB/GDP 
Direct taxes on business, value  TYB  TY-TYH 
Total tax ratio of direct taxes on profits  TYBQ  TYB/PROF 
Total tax ratio of direct taxes on households  TYHQ  TYH/YRH 
Compensation rate of government employees  WRG  CGW/EG 
Compensation rate of government employees 
relative to total economy 
WRGQ  CGW/EG/WSSE   107 
Compensation rate of the business sector  WSSE  (WSSS-CGW)/(ETB-EG-ES) 
Compensation rate in agriculture  WSSE1  WSS1/EE1 
Compensation rate in industry  WSSE2  WSS2/EE2 
Compensation rate in services  WSSE3  WSS3/EE3 
Coefficient  XNITV  (TIND(1995)-TSUB(1995)) 
/(GDP(1995)-CGW(1995)) 
Coefficient  XPDTY  1/GDPV(1995)/ET(1995) 
Share of property income in profits  YPEQ  YPE/PROF 
Share of income from self-employment in total 
income 
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Appendix 4: Transportation cost calculation
39 
 
The transport infrastructure and the transport connections have a decisive role in the operation 
of national economy and in the provision of the interregional connections. 
The calculation and accounting of the interregional accessibilities can be made on the basis of 
“general transport costs (impedances)” characteristic for good transport: 
TCij = x⋅road transport costs + y⋅rail transport costs 
 
) RT b RC a ( y ) HT b HC a ( x TC ij 2 ij 2 ij 1 ij 1 ij ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ =  
The transport costs consist of road and rail transport costs (HC, RC) and time (HT, RT) 
among counties. These costs should be expressed in generalized, monetary terms (HUF) of 
which an average is derived (x+y=1) (the transport time could be omitted, b1=b2=0). 
The coefficients (a, b) and the weighting factors (x, y) were determined by expert estimations, 
since there is no way in this framework to conduct surveys. 
The time and cost values among regions (counties) are calculated by deriving an average of 
route impedances provided by road and rail traffic model. These models calculate impedances 
at each county pairs for several node pairs (p, q) along the length (Lpq) of the possible routes 
(Rpq), which is a set of individual links (s), by considering the road and rail line characteristics 





k s k pq l L , ,  ; average distance between counties:  ∑∑ =
p q






The transport costs among counties are supplied in a matrix having 20x20 cells for the 
‘present’ and the dates (t - year) according to the operation horizon (2010 and 2020) of the 
models, supplemented with a set of matrices containing values for cells among border 
sections and counties. 
The cost matrices (TCij,v,t) can be calculated for several scenarios taking into account the key 
infrastructure elements (motorway, highway and rail line investments) according to the 
governmental plans. These matrices are inputs to the economic model parts. 
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1. Figure Hungarian road network model 
 
 
2. Figure Hungarian rail network model 
Calculation of generalised transport costs: (forwarding costs+time costs) 
 
in road transport: (the explanations of the formulas see in Table 1)   110 
 
for industrial goods:   GIVHij = FIVHij · (DHij · CIVH + THij · KIVH)    [EUR] 
 
for agricultural goods: GAVHij = FAVHij · (DHij · CAVH + THij · KAVH)  [EUR] 
 
      DH = distance on road; TH = transport time on road 
 
in rail transport: 
 
for industrial goods   GIVRij = FIVRij · (DRij · CIVR + TRij · KIVR)    [EUR] 
 
for agricultural goods: GAVRij = FAVRij · (DRij · CAVR + TRij · KAVR)  [EUR] 
 
      DR = distance on rail; TR = transport time on rail 
 
in transport general 
 
for industrial goods      GIVij =a*GIVHij + b*GIVRij        [EUR] 
      where: a+b=1.0;  a=0.74 and b=0.26 proportion by KSH data* 
for agricultural goods:   GAVij = c*GAVHij +d* GAVRij        [EUR] 
      where c+d=1.0;  c=0.67 and d=0.33 proportion by KSH data*
40 
Transported good values 
 
for industrial goods value:     FIVij = (FIVHij + FIVRij)      [kEUR] 
 
for agricultural goods value:   FAVij = (FAVHij + FAVRij)      [kEUR] 
 
Transport cost ratios: (generalised transport costs/good value): 
the generalised cost ratio for industrial goods:   RIVij = GIVij/FIVij       [-] 
 
the generalised cost ratio for agricultural goods:  RAVij = GAVij/FAVij     [-] 
 
Input data Industry(I) Agriculture(A) Comments Volumes Dimension
Flows (F) in tons                                   on road (H) FITH FATH from ETIS 291 896 440 [tons]
                in tons                                   on rail   (R ) FITR FATR         ETIS 24 682 299 [tons]
Flows (F) in kEUR                                 on road FIVR FAVH         ETIS* 48 43 288  [kEUR]
                                                               on rail FIVR FAUR         ETIS* 866 032 [kEUR]
Unit forwarding costs (C )/ton · km          on road CITH CATH fom TNO 0.06 [EUR/ton km]
                                                             on rail CITR CATR        TNO 0.03 [EUR/ton km]
Unit forwarding costs (C )/ kEUR ·   on road CIVH CAVH TRANSMAN* 3,6**     [EUR/kEUR·km]
                                                              on rail CIVR CAVR TRANSMAN* 0,72 **   [EUR/kEUR·km]
Unit time costs (K)/ton · hour                    on road KITH KATH fom TNO 3 [EUR/ton · hour]
                                                            on rail KITR KATR        TNO 1 [EUR/ton · hour]
Unit time cost EUR/kEUR · hour             on road KIVH KAVH TRANSMAN* 180,00 **   [EUR/kEUR· hour]
                                                  on rail  KIVR KAVR TRANSMAN*   27,00 **   [EUR/kEUR· hour]
*after transformation of ETIS and TNO data
**at the HU forwarding cost 67% and the time cost 33% of the NL levels had been considered  
1.Table Transport cost calculation for SCGE (Hungary) 
Differentiation of average unit costs 
The real transport fees are degressive by distance and time. To avoid getting over-
proportional cost on the longer distance and time a modification had been made. 
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For the calculation of degressive transport fees we took into consideration a factor (f) to 
modify the average unit transport fees, which was calculated as follows: 
) 50 X (
1 e f
− α − =  
Where: 
X:   distance in km on road (DH) and on rail (DR) 
α  constant parameter is 0.0015 
 
The formula and figure says that it had been assumed the average unit cost is until 50 km, 
further there is a decrease, which results degressive total transportation cost ratio by distance. 
For the time cost calculation we also used a similar equation: 
) 1 Y (
2 e f
− β − =  
Where: 
Y:  is the time in hours on road (TH) and on rail (TR) 
β:  constant parameter 
    0.05 for road time cost and 
    0.01 for rail time cost 
The average unit forwarding cost and time cost (see Table 1) had been multiplied by the 
factors f1 and f2 at the calculation of the distance and time depending transportation costs. 
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The results of the calculations for industrial and agricultural goods by rail and road transport 
as well for the whole transport can be seen in the attached Tables 2-9. 
The last two Tables 10 and 11 contain the transport cost/transported good flow values ratios 
are input data for the SGE model. 
In this results there are included beside times also “technological times” on the road +2hours 
and on the rail +24 hours. That is the explanation, that the ratios are relatively high. 
Therefore calculations had been done also without these technological times, the results can 
be seen in Tables 12 and 13, the ratios are substantially lower then in the previous case. 
The changes of the accessibilities because of developments of the road and rail infrastructure 
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kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 10688010 4464318 7239560 8120312 14931082 9134878 6295654 7224648 8327320 4628160 4196960 2378337 7043540 3076692 8191818 4034463 2273208 4562129 8534862 4338148
2 Baranya 5559757 4432228 1733947 2403367 810403 2391626 1803458 3504763 467817 389461 1824135 209346 1590150 8274465 452116 308409 5748764 1654002 1556079 1234199
3 Bács-Kiskun 7625237 1533923 5034451 9755988 1226683 7465145 992906 1355587 2911954 484983 1053405 307760 1671754 1678536 3080771 1224520 768426 741522 1159548 654872
4 Békés 8695110 2126380 9776281 2180555 778657 5455898 1319927 1192216 1090580 380800 1032833 233587 2150904 1867380 1563997 730206 1319855 641683 1168860 605199
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 14854482 695056 1185562 752113 9316337 1106374 1138695 2355438 3943589 8835883 804114 7309006 4008346 543219 2881589 3849068 442063 1289633 979105 1250124
6 Csongrád 9764918 2115003 7471347 5456933 1144115 3460921 1336183 1416652 2305579 497641 1184048 310395 2311501 2009375 2539803 1137629 1243563 735661 1288365 682029
7 Fejér 6283527 1526652 1006055 1328926 1144400 1357373 5768828 3444189 497624 464101 6834997 241800 1987636 761115 476947 284454 597363 2205940 7288136 2013766
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 7668731 3864435 1579470 1383709 2432946 1650812 4138236 6877739 1761835 1138346 2161218 584254 2306618 2451584 1603980 1208901 2261395 5742518 2294429 9449208
9 Hajdú-Bihar 8189103 571631 2819424 1055866 4520289 2232220 803945 1269488 4834091 2804252 581717 2053513 2123507 476993 7354577 9611099 371275 687872 682996 665452
10 Heves 4570868 336649 469877 368270 8846577 480947 456690 1097053 2506910 3113010 309597 2886356 1028629 253058 2656281 1400673 198842 632937 437696 607196
11 Komárom-Esztergom 4198298 1551326 1065030 1037068 808048 1196874 6823882 1785456 360937 315026 1868471 149362 1308013 957075 342431 209099 780044 1614900 7853527 1692995
12 Nógrád 2355289 180983 298985 225848 7323033 300314 240203 566495 1836013 2890659 147749 643259 588242 134356 1775231 1142701 107036 332697 231380 323334
13 Pest 7056800 1275833 1582974 2025314 4052919 2177873 1991321 2175148 2160075 1042332 1309489 595134 2219940 929518 2205813 772610 663756 1323969 2566753 1269103
14 Somogy 3834264 8266322 1894993 2103107 626104 2268778 898469 2221586 389621 292970 1116999 155201 1152032 3567458 361726 250433 5059500 957609 704056 519267
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 8059405 550287 2981416 1514161 3223899 2458951 769616 1156235 7354442 2967256 552766 1979047 2170607 442372 4375147 12904132 362890 620163 626468 603021
16 Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 3988647 377614 1187869 707041 4306932 1101666 463481 875526 9610553 1566683 339420 1278363 761243 310649 12904147 3262402 220717 490234 444043 469120
17 Tolna 2836200 5748659 868395 1485396 518535 1405753 705517 2051120 304373 231114 919994 124125 828272 5075529 300158 179650 2216597 1105593 830742 861839
18 Vas 4842499 1824219 866208 743349 1332719 859114 2656069 5743028 953972 656447 1945850 344377 1404716 1056355 860210 677267 1219446 1489773 1106392 2712960
19 Veszprém 8548361 1316991 1178060 1177722 980672 1304105 7298038 1905654 421659 441479 7862721 232453 2564113 596828 387055 272271 703233 918963 2804055 719531
20 Zala 4595406 1356991 763593 704299 1290936 794266 2426154 9450225 921764 629199 2038666 334447 1342110 572663 836206 645221 946307 2713317 866447 1406110
Sum 134 214 912 44 115 501 51 003 498 44 529 342 69 615 285 48 603 888 48 327 272 57 668 248 52 960 707 33 769 801 38 085 147 22 350 121 40 561 871 35 035 219 55 150 005 44 105 209 27 504 281 30 461 115 43 423 940 32 077 473 
2. Table Forwarding costs for industrial goods on road [Euro] (GIVH forwarding cost part) 
 
kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 57906650 3260723 6466318 5910271 10595908 6624512 7625198 5489839 5672512 4615927 5553168 2478769 17926750 2289639 5272942 3734820 1929891 3239145 7136841 3132746
2 Baranya 4066206 8106689 1545796 1646145 521837 1732961 1441129 2483411 311977 261083 1282730 141832 1138429 8486008 298511 212302 6765217 1176912 1211433 979466
3 Bács-Kiskun 6859510 1369013 7753796 8137504 838801 8207087 926953 931887 2092512 382760 812372 225387 1714600 1305035 2106506 1187233 838914 513470 885088 465844
4 Békés 6262570 1454312 8131690 3741929 564337 5837853 933637 776542 1042699 289365 712275 168122 1629854 1255054 1194358 777993 930724 429378 800797 407513
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 10414432 451212 811759 546116 16877980 757232 750104 1503825 3630473 10681844 545220 6801331 2886092 340979 2970500 3144285 289869 830287 628480 806268
6 Csongrád 7068119 1531611 8214722 5836800 782517 5975358 1029802 916853 1721119 373020 825737 217445 1856092 1388130 1778601 1077052 976059 502509 920873 460655
7 Fejér 7598177 1220874 937830 935705 747992 1036580 10251737 2920705 326618 348515 8597476 189266 2183939 793047 302676 220838 663145 1707950 9044738 1628065
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 5770128 2737604 1088169 904056 1551112 1061218 3522008 11043598 1132341 759754 2235089 411348 1694145 1893739 1029241 813691 1664102 6635467 2314196 8022194
9 Hajdú-Bihar 5597540 381569 2025958 1009624 4060589 1666840 531326 818848 8646211 2355700 388866 1500866 1506712 304959 8971989 9260583 250165 448788 441142 434882
10 Heves 4509282 225361 369905 279818 10676709 360706 348359 734614 2105125 5100470 251895 3265921 1160018 166234 2017566 1460183 139888 416702 302461 403487
11 Komárom-Esztergom 5499850 1084723 815355 711168 543093 814031 8606378 1851237 237999 251793 5054686 131424 1551367 733379 220152 163556 624408 1243833 7592151 1267900
12 Nógrád 2432536 122638 217311 162584 6803595 209581 188668 396310 1340800 3264771 131176 1400720 649237 89731 1235411 939571 76236 224960 163388 217641
13 Pest 17930741 913187 1617794 1537770 2925162 1725263 2187786 1599953 1527613 1177561 1561893 659855 4855541 670179 1454371 858241 540522 928217 2067460 900679
14 Somogy 2874453 8481305 1474742 1421187 395259 1570196 941780 1714866 249731 193609 872555 104388 847448 5777399 229182 174162 5685534 794747 751635 615024
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 5206320 365049 2038259 1156382 3322907 1722363 493692 745187 8971671 2256958 359641 1382027 1435006 280095 6831263 10007325 239312 406220 401518 394579
16 Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 3670702 259556 1147884 753616 3514671 1043428 356771 584173 9259703 1633892 265737 1051286 844571 209965 10006442 5592484 160930 327053 311284 316411
17 Tolna 2395189 6782503 948497 1054042 333950 1104125 783377 1508493 204623 161159 737607 87686 672808 5689407 195300 131892 3948884 808431 733372 690781
18 Vas 3419860 1298249 598279 499135 857768 584367 2054838 6635302 621398 431691 1499158 233196 983424 877098 561869 454688 890520 2740997 1155384 3196072
19 Veszprém 7100179 1015989 893929 805672 630054 927606 9032995 1922342 272261 304438 7589651 164356 2064585 637952 247255 193142 615242 959421 5709019 887771
20 Zala 3324664 1081056 543755 476145 835262 537970 1959287 8019488 603368 419586 1526829 226108 959744 678833 546969 441103 761747 3195818 1068209 2658974
Sum 169 907 111 42 143 223 47 641 745 37 525 670 67 379 503 43 499 278 53 965 824 52 597 475 49 970 752 35 263 896 40 803 761 20 841 332 48 560 363 33 866 862 47 471 104 40 845 145 27 991 308 27 530 305 43 639 469 27 886 952 
3. Table Time costs for industrial goods on road [Euro] (GIVH time costs part) 
  
  101 
kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 112806 47140 76444 85744 157661 96458 66478 74753 87925 48870 44317 25113 74341 32488 86495 42599 24003 47204 90122 44887
2 Baranya 58619 46801 18310 25378 8558 25254 19043 36745 4940 4113 19262 2211 16766 87373 4774 3257 60703 17341 16431 12940
3 Bács-Kiskun 80456 16197 53160 103017 12953 78827 10485 14001 30748 5121 11124 3250 17639 17724 32531 12930 8114 7659 12244 6764
4 Békés 91745 22453 103231 23025 8222 57611 13938 12314 11516 4021 10906 2467 22695 19718 16515 7710 13936 6628 12343 6251
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 156398 7340 12519 7942 98374 11683 12023 24048 41641 93301 8490 77178 42202 5736 30427 40643 4668 13167 10338 12763
6 Csongrád 103032 22332 78892 57622 12081 36545 14110 14632 24345 5255 12503 3278 24389 21217 26818 12012 13131 7598 13605 7044
7 Fejér 66215 16121 10623 14033 12085 14333 60915 35875 5252 4901 72173 2553 20946 8037 5034 3002 6308 22977 76958 20976
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 76386 40203 16003 14020 24787 16726 42954 72126 17371 11597 22433 5952 22976 25505 15814 11919 23526 60221 23816 99092
9 Hajdú-Bihar 85888 5943 29728 11133 47668 23537 8390 12884 51026 29572 6070 21655 22272 4959 77632 101450 3860 6981 7127 6753
10 Heves 48125 3555 4962 3889 93414 5079 4822 11201 26471 32871 3269 30478 10830 2672 28048 14790 2100 6462 4622 6199
11 Komárom-Esztergom 44241 16382 11246 10951 8533 12638 72055 18597 3810 3327 19730 1577 13784 10106 3614 2207 8237 16821 82928 17634
12 Nógrád 24798 1911 3157 2385 77326 3171 2536 5784 19387 30523 1560 6792 6193 1419 18745 12066 1130 3397 2443 3301
13 Pest 74481 13472 16715 21386 42796 22997 21027 22506 22808 11006 13827 6284 23430 9815 23290 8158 7009 13699 27103 13131
14 Somogy 40426 87287 20010 22208 6612 23957 9487 23292 4114 3094 11795 1639 12146 37670 3820 2644 53425 10040 7434 5444
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 84528 5721 31436 15965 33997 25927 8031 11734 77630 31291 5768 20870 22766 4599 46182 136210 3773 6294 6537 6120
16 Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 41833 3926 12525 7455 45418 11616 4837 8885 101445 16521 3542 13481 7984 3230 136210 34436 2295 4975 4634 4761
17 Tolna 29903 60702 9170 15685 5476 14844 7450 21504 3214 2441 9715 1311 8733 53594 3169 1897 23406 11591 8772 9036
18 Vas 48235 18978 8776 7532 13578 8705 27569 60226 9406 6688 20197 3509 13992 10990 8481 6678 12686 15623 11484 28450
19 Veszprém 90082 13907 12440 12436 10356 13770 77062 19849 4451 4662 83025 2455 27020 6302 4085 2874 7426 9572 29609 7495
20 Zala 45774 14117 7737 7136 13152 8048 25183 99103 9088 6410 21161 3407 13368 5958 8245 6362 9845 28454 8993 14746
Sum 1 403 972 464 487 537 086 468 941 733 048 511 725 508 395 600 058 556 587 355 585 400 867 235 460 424 472 369 111 579 930 463 844 289 581 316 703 457 544 333 787 
4. Table Forwarding costs for agricultural goods on road [Euro] (GAVH forwarding costs part) 
 
 
kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 611172 34431 68280 62408 111885 69950 80517 56803 59894 48741 58638 26174 189207 24177 55675 39435 20378 33515 75360 32414
2 Baranya 42872 85601 16323 17382 5511 18299 15217 26037 3294 2757 13545 1498 12003 89606 3152 2242 71436 12339 12792 10269
3 Bács-Kiskun 72377 14456 81875 85927 8857 86661 9788 9625 22095 4042 8578 2380 18091 13780 22243 12536 8858 5303 9346 4811
4 Békés 66078 15356 85865 39512 5959 61644 9859 8020 11010 3056 7521 1775 17197 13252 12611 8215 9828 4435 8456 4209
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 109650 4765 8572 5767 178220 7996 7920 15354 38335 112793 5757 71817 30387 3601 31366 33201 3061 8477 6636 8232
6 Csongrád 74578 16172 86742 61633 8263 63096 10874 9470 18174 3939 8719 2296 19584 14657 18781 11373 10306 5190 9724 4758
7 Fejér 80069 12892 9903 9880 7899 10946 108251 30422 3447 3680 90783 1999 23014 8374 3195 2331 7003 17790 95506 16958
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 57475 28480 11025 9160 15803 10752 36557 115812 11164 7740 23200 4191 16875 19701 10148 8023 17312 69585 24021 84127
9 Hajdú-Bihar 58708 3967 21362 10646 42821 17575 5545 8310 91265 24842 4058 15827 15803 3170 94704 97751 2601 4555 4604 4413
10 Heves 47477 2380 3906 2955 112739 3809 3678 7500 22228 53857 2660 34486 12213 1755 21304 15418 1477 4254 3194 4119
11 Komárom-Esztergom 57957 11454 8610 7509 5735 8596 90877 19283 2512 2659 53374 1388 16348 7744 2324 1726 6594 12956 80168 13207
12 Nógrád 25611 1295 2295 1717 71841 2213 1992 4046 14158 34474 1385 14791 6836 948 13045 9921 805 2297 1725 2222
13 Pest 189249 9643 17083 16238 30888 18218 23102 16555 16130 12434 16493 6968 51248 7077 15356 9062 5707 9604 21831 9319
14 Somogy 30307 89557 15572 15007 4174 16580 9945 17979 2637 2045 9214 1102 8935 61005 2420 1839 60035 8332 7937 6448
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 54605 3795 21492 12193 35041 18161 5152 7563 94701 23801 3753 14574 15051 2912 72108 105633 2488 4123 4190 4004
16 Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 38499 2698 12103 7946 37064 11002 3723 5929 97741 17230 2773 11086 8858 2183 105623 59032 1673 3319 3248 3211
17 Tolna 25254 71619 10016 11130 3527 11659 8272 15815 2161 1702 7789 926 7094 60076 2062 1393 41697 8476 7744 7242
18 Vas 34064 13506 6062 5057 8739 5921 21329 69583 6127 4398 15561 2376 9796 9125 5540 4483 9264 28744 11993 33517
19 Veszprém 74821 10729 9439 8507 6653 9795 95382 20023 2874 3215 80141 1736 21756 6737 2610 2039 6497 9993 60283 9247
20 Zala 33116 11247 5509 4824 8510 5451 20337 84099 5949 4275 15848 2304 9560 7062 5393 4349 7925 33514 11088 27884
Sum 1 783 937 444 042 502 033 395 399 710 127 458 323 568 317 548 228 525 896 371 678 429 789 219 693 509 854 356 943 499 660 430 000 294 946 286 802 459 845 290 613 
5. Table Time costs for agricultural goods on road [Euro] (GAVH time costs part) 
 
kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 140848 338636 147088 251837 719281 249059 137488 323990 502145 177955 124217 119247 96121 188245 567007 172477 129015 224242 234762 216200
2 Baranya 274584 26385 20115 31212 30988 20370 36541 98214 116447 12221 39264 7956 69158 52284 178431 51531 27924 52345 38145 26360
3 Bács-Kiskun 88596 30770 21987 100604 403369 44155 153081 116103 146396 133193 106051 84859 13650 45302 181657 34007 6574 84466 112467 51318
4 Békés 111095 47932 65914 11327 326241 24553 176009 89531 45580 115438 105441 57905 29117 43575 89490 29606 37772 52595 99566 49057
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 523365 218965 159613 131421 663969 270761 371575 256078 189457 622106 387792 890587 200099 154646 69225 284088 132562 145324 293432 145462
6 Csongrád 101233 48722 45499 31973 446978 13721 218000 107605 123879 137667 117609 80274 28943 51458 150270 28353 37266 69289 118883 59276
7 Fejér 121020 126350 50945 56453 673584 57199 123092 164317 361346 234091 140558 192686 21241 38926 422163 132659 25898 112580 176325 105688
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 314306 95581 62464 56942 186032 61082 79594 86136 128897 79552 35250 69564 99803 52034 102018 44499 43478 90060 34595 221455
9 Hajdú-Bihar 623296 134225 121965 53658 136825 161708 164333 179639 47076 67599 140721 51914 138846 112538 68559 99022 106697 99951 111992 98201
10 Heves 129185 110551 65319 59750 622106 103138 151177 129211 91661 130046 150738 125560 27558 79481 147346 47006 62836 71076 134420 71567
11 Komárom-Esztergom 77242 148741 35380 39799 487541 41235 140558 46652 287024 176613 63363 139568 20826 94846 249352 98526 64102 64850 278766 90670
12 Nógrád 97131 60128 39490 36281 945509 51951 83153 70133 100931 125560 79991 38593 16705 43371 108794 45864 31841 38343 73632 38548
13 Pest 96121 99269 24262 66666 198297 55720 24132 125881 114154 27622 23659 16744 13454 64456 140374 25375 43510 67529 74111 66653
14 Somogy 150063 59106 25539 24358 20924 22299 10116 66637 106190 8227 26519 5903 47642 16778 144757 45485 25171 28787 9355 6682
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 832758 136050 118006 95757 42409 212934 156708 169028 68559 105385 134146 50732 157772 104979 31672 225277 95530 88918 108776 88245
16 Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 159701 91768 33083 37148 142635 34297 106495 129392 69979 28783 79072 26327 31758 84752 153624 29648 66854 70649 76454 69405
17 Tolna 100741 27924 3875 23489 18299 14628 10123 64690 81027 6944 22526 4834 34025 25171 111959 36582 7859 35354 17312 20369
18 Vas 244410 38323 39863 33043 106938 34501 51025 99786 73875 44634 40279 36255 59281 20484 62961 25077 21036 19489 18192 49345
19 Veszprém 257119 116753 48629 48545 568302 49297 176325 45786 372376 222132 247596 177116 64296 24575 381953 127424 43003 24076 64891 20587
20 Zala 279911 25453 36308 35056 105377 33060 48024 189056 65640 44055 48936 33732 58702 6325 75555 24420 14561 41465 15555 15783
Sum 4 722 726 1 981 632 1 165 344 1 225 319 6 845 605 1 555 668 2 417 550 2 557 865 3 092 639 2 499 822 2 113 732 2 210 356 1 228 995 1 304 225 3 437 167 1 606 927 1 023 489 1 481 387 2 091 632 1 510 874 
6. Table Forwarding costs for industrial goods on railway [Euro] (GIVR forwarding costs part)  
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kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 4877426 805843 982135 744643 2482348 914360 1467553 1190272 1428902 1263451 1085741 681708 1380357 631019 1307662 1071178 532134 646931 1175257 633478
2 Baranya 865116 521377 79363 63503 67045 75930 161751 223362 257821 35093 126455 18962 242701 446400 238309 195936 368499 112696 126519 104889
3 Bács-Kiskun 552546 134635 420984 329778 964781 387193 504185 281726 508375 497811 373098 272756 147012 116705 463673 366369 87568 149486 394927 142098
4 Békés 418934 107728 329778 210788 676785 269987 379726 207423 332766 353964 277274 194938 114372 89347 319338 261196 74433 111134 296470 109092
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 2476598 394756 556944 390691 11768300 497162 1132450 604575 1154753 6561302 826567 3870905 683126 313018 958563 949405 265018 325473 881941 319841
6 Csongrád 514416 128810 387193 269987 861223 323157 466953 254921 448794 447285 340602 245028 139016 109025 413299 321525 89272 136971 364072 133903
7 Fejér 1291771 413824 188652 142083 1942049 174721 2881660 668332 793040 1002535 2134708 544617 352076 314126 721190 597679 265161 356723 2204987 348351
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 1355462 211425 182249 134183 493442 164909 504984 1413288 201749 260192 349799 140909 388978 164342 182992 154820 142305 760301 358096 786572
9 Hajdú-Bihar 1788336 266272 497090 325380 595544 438832 420400 408270 842067 319990 306536 186311 487250 217340 752211 703244 182506 218546 327636 214779
10 Heves 1260524 206624 287374 204335 6561302 258207 584599 318793 620457 3489480 428874 1912539 335653 163250 578329 482246 138011 170050 458684 167260
11 Komárom-Esztergom 955692 323522 139603 103748 1417487 127444 2134708 462949 578249 735479 1541599 397204 260221 254284 526415 437708 216026 260199 1690068 262466
12 Nógrád 680129 111647 157455 112533 3870905 141448 317577 172645 361256 1912539 231618 1017113 181946 88384 326601 272137 74742 91915 248278 90360
13 Pest 1380357 226073 261309 203293 684712 247098 399985 341573 389319 336432 295632 182368 375373 178664 358272 280658 148874 181820 330952 178943
14 Somogy 677433 446400 68794 52667 53163 64267 122782 173621 210442 27726 99392 15011 191805 348618 191348 160777 302446 87409 92155 77925
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár- 1636599 246121 453380 312249 494362 404125 382311 370312 752211 298263 279059 168439 448394 197620 646776 666264 165791 196477 297836 193631
16 Jász-Nagykun- 1340628 202359 358237 255398 489639 314388 316836 313302 703244 248710 232034 140350 351256 166048 666264 545103 139111 166732 249676 163870
17 Tolna 571275 368499 51619 43876 45011 52623 103643 150339 176713 23440 84438 12694 159824 302446 160529 134695 250708 77793 83515 73008
18 Vas 736715 106673 96703 71893 265644 88607 269536 760301 107996 138791 196604 75019 207053 82738 97090 82392 73636 375476 185109 382122
19 Veszprém 1034486 323687 147771 110931 1512450 136226 2204987 473930 618052 786602 1690068 425775 291311 235770 561836 470988 213665 244986 1619801 239612
20 Zala 721394 99283 91923 70572 261047 86622 263210 786572 106134 136514 198317 73750 203777 73761 95684 80977 69106 382122 181048 361291
Sum 25 135 836 5 645 558 5 738 557 4 152 532 35 507 238 5 167 305 15 019 837 9 576 505 10 592 339 18 875 599 11 098 412 10 576 397 6 941 503 4 492 904 9 566 382 8 235 296 3 799 011 5 053 240 11 567 029 4 983 490 
7. Table Time costs for industrial goods on railway [Euro] (GIVR time costs part) 
 
kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 31 42 49 61 1230 71 27 228 99 365 26 195 21 26 103 49 21 162 53 156
2 Baranya 50 479 315 428 144 466 1039 1137 17 71 1077 39 15 1198 16 12 507 538 992 399
3 Bács-Kiskun 3 20 392 1490 5477 1047 87 159 1336 2269 69 1332 0 24 1377 390 4 90 83 79
4 Békés 4 27 1490 202 3754 585 85 128 541 1655 62 993 1 23 875 314 18 72 73 70
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 229 90 334 229 489 310 114 57 511 458 83 754 62 69 213 487 58 32 97 32
6 Csongrád 5 29 1047 585 5090 245 102 154 1204 2257 73 1305 1 27 1272 338 19 88 87 85
7 Fejér 66 278 66 65 54 77 362 511 17 22 414 12 12 97 16 10 67 341 519 321
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 23 623 10 8 269 10 260 1684 27 131 85 71 8 412 25 19 380 2219 84 3753
9 Hajdú-Bihar 189 60 195 79 4988 176 154 133 55 2277 111 2160 48 49 80 111 40 74 129 73
10 Heves 68 44 138 101 458 138 47 28 233 96 35 92 9 32 330 113 27 16 44 16
11 Komárom-Esztergom 63 288 52 47 39 56 414 168 12 17 186 9 11 195 12 7 164 244 900 281
12 Nógrád 36 24 81 61 754 80 26 15 221 92 19 28 5 18 222 112 15 9 24 8
13 Pest 21 12 7 16 332 17 5 80 25 47 5 29 3 8 27 6 6 48 17 48
14 Somogy 32 1198 381 364 110 430 361 752 14 52 730 28 10 305 13 10 457 335 273 94
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár- 197 58 201 128 2073 185 150 125 80 3223 109 2164 52 46 37 211 38 67 123 66
16 Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 93 41 57 46 4747 49 92 93 111 1100 67 1093 11 34 211 34 27 53 87 52
17 Tolna 25 507 70 290 92 310 251 692 11 43 613 23 7 457 11 8 143 360 494 276
18 Vas 16 295 6 5 153 6 173 2219 15 75 124 41 5 184 14 11 197 381 44 944
19 Veszprém 128 265 63 55 46 66 519 165 14 21 900 11 40 73 13 10 132 87 191 74
20 Zala 16 219 5 5 150 6 163 3753 15 74 143 40 5 52 14 11 151 944 38 309
Sum 1 296 4 599 4 959 4 263 30 449 4 328 4 431 12 281 4 560 14 343 4 930 10 419 327 3 328 4 883 2 261 2 471 6 158 4 351 7 135 
8. Table Forwarding costs for agricultural goods on railway [Euro] (GAVR forwarding costs part) 
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kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 1070 134 275 208 4226 256 292 960 316 2151 216 1161 303 105 289 237 88 522 234 511
2 Baranya 161 9466 1437 1150 360 1375 4011 3143 43 188 3135 102 45 8105 40 33 6691 1586 3137 1476
3 Bács-Kiskun 18 89 7512 5885 15597 6909 327 452 4267 8048 242 4409 5 78 3892 3075 58 240 256 228
4 Békés 14 72 5885 3761 10941 4818 246 333 2793 5722 180 3151 4 59 2680 2192 49 178 192 175
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 788 224 951 667 8665 849 329 149 2297 4831 240 2850 217 178 1907 1889 150 80 257 79
6 Csongrád 17 86 6909 4818 13923 5767 303 409 3767 7231 221 3961 5 72 3469 2699 59 220 236 215
7 Fejér 709 1072 248 187 157 230 8481 2404 47 81 6283 44 193 814 43 35 687 1283 6490 1253
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 97 1723 29 22 705 27 1221 27629 69 372 846 201 28 1339 63 53 1160 14864 866 15377
9 Hajdú-Bihar 602 153 622 407 22403 549 430 342 977 12037 314 7009 164 125 873 816 105 183 335 180
10 Heves 401 117 490 349 4831 441 170 79 1234 2569 125 1408 107 93 1150 959 78 42 133 41
11 Komárom-Esztergom 524 838 184 136 114 168 6283 1665 34 59 4537 32 143 659 31 26 560 936 4974 944
12 Nógrád 216 63 269 192 2850 241 92 43 719 1408 67 749 58 50 650 541 42 23 72 22
13 Pest 303 37 73 57 1166 69 80 276 86 573 59 310 82 30 79 62 25 147 66 144
14 Somogy 126 8105 1246 954 285 1164 3044 2443 35 149 2464 81 36 6330 32 27 5491 1230 2285 1096
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár- 551 141 567 391 18597 506 391 310 873 11220 286 6336 151 113 751 773 95 164 305 162
16 Jász-Nagykun- 452 116 448 320 18419 393 324 262 816 9356 237 5280 118 95 773 633 80 139 255 137
17 Tolna 106 6691 935 795 242 953 2570 2115 29 126 2094 68 30 5491 27 22 4552 1094 2071 1027
18 Vas 53 869 16 12 380 14 652 14864 37 198 475 107 15 674 33 28 600 7340 448 7470
19 Veszprém 568 839 194 146 122 179 6490 1704 37 63 4974 34 160 611 33 28 554 881 4767 862
20 Zala 52 809 15 11 373 14 636 15377 37 195 480 105 15 601 33 28 563 7470 438 7063
Sum 6 828 31 646 28 305 20 466 124 356 24 920 36 372 74 957 18 514 66 579 27 474 37 400 1 877 25 622 16 848 14 157 21 688 38 622 27 816 38 463 
9. Table Time costs for agricultural goods on railway [Euro] (GAVR time costs part) 
 
 
kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 11.55 40.92 30.19 43.53 37.58 39.42 22.74 36.89 41.56 25.12 21.83 24.52 15.11 34.80 45.54 28.86 32.04 43.69 33.83 42.59
2 Baranya 41.72 16.53 32.03 55.78 59.80 45.77 35.93 51.17 37.56 53.33 46.90 53.40 42.66 26.87 42.11 31.12 23.57 46.89 40.83 37.31
3 Bács-Kiskun 31.58 31.11 18.60 36.66 28.80 25.90 24.64 43.39 41.96 22.51 31.84 25.22 26.69 39.05 49.42 25.42 24.73 46.26 33.94 41.83
4 Békés 45.96 54.00 36.66 17.23 27.11 26.37 39.66 52.39 25.68 24.40 41.60 26.55 42.00 57.54 37.45 22.67 48.81 55.20 45.52 53.14
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 37.53 38.07 33.97 31.64 13.63 36.70 25.90 46.61 26.91 17.96 26.00 23.82 37.10 35.82 23.67 30.86 34.96 49.53 28.85 48.94
6 Csongrád 41.68 44.38 25.92 26.38 30.74 17.81 34.00 50.10 38.60 25.33 38.70 27.99 37.32 50.51 46.96 26.51 38.87 51.64 41.36 48.51
7 Fejér 23.00 31.46 28.71 46.72 20.79 39.91 15.41 30.99 22.54 16.85 20.02 17.27 24.86 21.97 24.66 17.35 20.94 36.74 20.65 34.83
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 36.36 51.71 47.64 57.60 49.18 55.00 32.55 17.97 57.69 42.93 25.63 42.16 39.07 41.65 59.66 49.83 44.13 23.90 26.18 34.19
9 Hajdú-Bihar 39.75 40.06 41.83 25.68 29.95 38.67 34.73 45.52 16.95 32.79 34.74 41.73 37.78 40.19 23.26 29.25 37.99 47.93 38.42 47.26
10 Heves 24.92 34.39 26.60 28.91 17.96 30.44 20.82 40.70 29.72 14.12 20.47 18.94 21.79 31.50 34.31 23.13 29.99 44.92 24.75 44.09
11 Komárom-Esztergom 21.99 41.02 37.57 49.20 20.42 45.62 20.02 24.27 22.62 16.38 12.62 16.06 23.36 32.44 23.83 17.46 31.57 36.60 26.52 38.63
12 Nógrád 24.42 34.43 29.93 31.85 23.88 33.64 20.66 39.73 37.80 18.95 19.25 12.34 22.79 31.26 40.79 30.86 29.96 44.27 24.54 43.75
13 Pest 15.12 41.89 25.53 40.00 37.12 35.32 24.54 39.63 39.52 21.85 23.12 22.84 15.45 37.46 44.67 22.09 33.19 45.55 36.10 44.67
14 Somogy 35.60 26.86 40.20 59.31 56.01 52.05 25.00 41.22 37.81 48.78 36.83 48.32 38.28 18.37 40.68 31.11 24.72 35.57 26.34 23.49
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár- 43.73 43.78 49.12 37.43 25.99 47.13 37.30 47.24 23.26 37.84 37.11 44.91 42.67 42.25 18.25 40.39 41.53 49.26 40.06 48.77
16 Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 27.63 33.69 25.39 22.69 33.86 26.51 27.14 39.81 29.23 25.37 27.35 34.03 21.22 33.85 40.35 17.18 29.64 42.96 32.47 42.09
17 Tolna 32.65 23.60 25.46 50.25 54.91 40.01 23.78 43.74 35.45 46.22 36.04 46.31 33.84 24.77 39.82 27.31 16.72 45.50 33.16 37.55
18 Vas 43.18 47.33 50.64 60.56 52.32 56.69 38.63 23.91 60.80 47.47 38.62 47.04 44.97 35.91 62.44 53.90 45.87 15.94 24.90 22.49
19 Veszprém 34.33 35.52 40.40 54.40 23.08 49.36 20.65 24.88 25.45 19.81 26.52 20.30 36.60 23.14 26.87 20.51 28.85 23.69 14.60 20.74
20 Zala 42.21 37.65 46.06 58.62 51.70 53.30 36.62 34.16 59.81 46.59 40.66 46.43 44.13 23.73 62.01 52.65 37.82 22.48 21.76 15.85 
10. Table Generalised cost/goods flow value ratios for industrial goods [-] (RIV) 
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kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 10.73 44.76 30.18 43.66 39.13 39.51 22.93 38.86 45.52 25.96 21.95 25.28 14.10 38.01 49.86 31.40 34.95 46.13 34.40 44.94
2 Baranya 44.72 14.84 28.53 49.47 57.66 40.69 30.21 45.52 58.90 51.49 39.19 51.49 45.78 23.98 64.57 48.89 21.04 41.71 34.25 33.32
3 Bács-Kiskun 30.22 29.91 16.69 32.71 24.06 23.18 28.65 47.95 39.99 19.45 37.97 21.40 25.52 37.57 46.99 24.28 23.76 50.90 40.58 46.26
4 Békés 44.12 52.13 32.73 15.49 22.64 23.58 47.40 58.26 24.58 20.68 50.14 22.47 40.29 55.56 35.76 21.68 47.02 61.33 55.18 59.01
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 40.11 58.31 44.09 40.60 15.34 46.81 47.34 58.28 28.36 20.81 46.23 27.85 39.53 54.99 24.94 32.49 53.45 61.95 53.66 61.13
6 Csongrád 40.00 42.78 23.20 23.58 25.29 15.99 40.13 55.64 36.83 21.57 46.53 23.53 35.77 48.71 44.72 25.32 37.36 57.16 49.89 53.69
7 Fejér 22.85 33.44 28.81 47.34 48.12 40.34 15.19 30.99 52.05 37.78 19.88 37.13 24.80 23.22 56.06 39.67 22.12 36.81 20.52 34.86
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 39.22 47.70 49.73 60.29 56.25 57.57 31.87 15.87 61.46 49.01 25.02 47.65 42.18 38.46 63.68 53.37 40.76 20.97 25.57 29.73
9 Hajdú-Bihar 45.33 57.46 45.23 27.34 23.40 41.48 49.26 59.39 15.96 25.27 48.94 31.99 43.12 57.61 21.99 27.72 53.77 62.55 55.22 61.60
10 Heves 26.35 52.27 34.04 37.04 20.81 38.74 36.92 50.55 31.48 16.04 35.22 22.17 22.94 47.68 36.33 24.32 45.25 56.05 45.18 54.90
11 Komárom-Esztergom 21.82 43.72 38.02 49.93 46.96 46.28 19.88 24.25 51.69 36.03 12.33 33.08 23.23 34.39 55.29 39.98 33.55 36.74 26.46 38.71
12 Nógrád 25.74 52.31 38.64 41.05 27.88 43.36 36.45 49.23 40.12 22.18 32.45 13.73 24.03 47.22 43.29 32.70 45.35 55.17 44.65 54.44
13 Pest 14.11 45.81 25.46 40.06 38.64 35.35 24.86 41.68 43.31 22.53 23.35 23.58 14.43 40.92 48.96 23.81 36.17 48.10 36.74 47.14
14 Somogy 38.09 23.97 35.74 52.59 54.05 46.23 21.21 36.73 59.03 47.10 31.01 46.56 41.01 16.46 62.13 48.72 22.06 31.76 22.27 21.06
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár- 49.67 62.82 53.33 40.19 20.30 50.62 53.06 61.59 21.99 29.13 52.38 34.38 48.77 60.62 17.20 38.31 59.31 64.33 57.51 63.61
16 Jász-Nagykun- 31.31 47.77 27.15 24.04 26.25 28.38 37.72 51.61 27.72 19.87 38.03 26.22 23.72 47.71 38.31 16.18 41.12 55.91 46.18 54.67
17 Tolna 34.87 21.07 22.69 44.59 52.97 35.62 20.18 38.95 55.17 44.61 30.37 44.63 36.14 22.10 61.15 41.99 15.00 40.48 27.95 33.52
18 Vas 46.67 43.69 52.83 63.36 59.85 59.30 37.90 20.97 64.74 54.34 37.87 53.45 48.72 33.18 66.56 57.80 42.37 14.15 24.30 19.75
19 Veszprém 34.31 37.81 40.85 55.23 54.57 50.08 20.52 24.88 58.39 46.19 26.47 45.52 36.66 24.55 60.79 48.67 30.73 23.65 14.35 20.65
20 Zala 45.50 34.78 47.97 61.24 59.10 55.67 35.90 29.73 63.75 53.29 39.87 52.77 47.77 21.92 65.85 56.42 34.96 19.75 21.17 14.06 
11. Table Generalised cost/goods flowvalue ratios for agricultural goods [-] (RAV) 
 
kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 2.92 33.65 22.08 35.95 29.96 31.62 14.47 29.29 34.23 17.10 13.56 16.49 6.48 27.20 38.37 21.13 24.42 36.40 25.94 35.26
2 Baranya 34.39 7.87 23.67 48.44 53.08 37.94 27.93 43.87 31.55 46.30 39.35 46.39 35.36 18.32 36.37 24.74 14.91 39.34 33.07 29.36
3 Bács-Kiskun 23.31 22.86 9.93 28.46 22.48 17.31 17.13 36.40 34.74 15.91 24.61 18.73 18.25 31.10 42.58 17.51 16.26 39.45 26.83 34.80
4 Békés 38.25 46.73 28.46 8.56 20.72 17.80 32.78 45.88 17.79 17.87 34.81 20.14 34.14 50.45 30.06 14.67 41.29 48.94 38.99 46.76
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 29.91 32.12 27.33 24.91 5.88 30.19 19.73 40.12 19.08 10.21 19.83 16.29 29.49 29.68 15.71 23.15 28.80 43.26 22.88 42.64
6 Csongrád 33.74 36.65 17.34 17.80 24.53 9.14 26.89 43.43 31.24 18.87 31.76 21.65 29.27 43.06 40.01 18.66 30.93 45.17 34.64 41.84
7 Fejér 14.68 23.89 20.67 39.41 14.91 32.32 7.14 23.12 16.75 10.77 11.75 11.20 16.60 14.03 18.98 11.31 12.98 29.11 12.38 27.14
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 28.77 44.38 40.42 50.89 42.58 48.10 24.52 9.45 51.09 36.02 17.34 35.26 31.62 33.86 53.20 42.84 36.42 15.44 17.91 26.08
9 Hajdú-Bihar 32.55 33.97 34.62 17.79 21.79 31.32 28.35 39.32 8.37 24.73 28.35 34.02 30.51 34.04 14.70 20.88 31.75 41.93 32.27 41.21
10 Heves 16.89 28.21 19.63 22.03 10.22 23.64 14.41 33.91 21.96 6.37 14.05 11.20 13.65 25.10 26.73 15.15 23.57 38.38 18.54 37.51
11 Komárom-Esztergom 13.66 33.85 29.84 41.99 14.53 38.19 11.74 16.16 16.82 10.30 4.35 9.95 15.05 24.89 18.14 11.43 24.01 28.96 18.44 31.08
12 Nógrád 16.39 28.27 23.09 25.11 16.34 26.98 14.26 32.94 30.38 11.21 12.80 4.58 14.69 24.88 33.48 23.15 23.56 37.72 18.35 37.16
13 Pest 6.49 34.65 17.24 32.27 29.50 27.38 16.33 32.15 32.13 13.70 14.87 14.74 6.82 29.98 37.48 14.06 25.59 38.35 28.31 37.44
14 Somogy 27.95 18.30 32.15 52.15 49.02 44.51 16.60 33.46 31.76 41.45 28.85 40.99 30.76 9.72 34.76 24.74 16.10 27.57 18.03 15.06
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár- 36.67 37.96 42.28 30.04 17.71 40.19 31.06 41.16 14.70 29.96 30.86 37.32 35.60 36.25 9.66 32.44 35.52 43.38 34.04 42.85
16 Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 20.02 27.21 17.48 14.69 25.84 18.66 20.41 33.27 20.86 17.06 20.64 26.02 13.32 27.35 32.40 8.60 22.96 36.63 26.02 35.72
17 Tolna 24.95 14.94 16.88 42.64 47.90 31.96 15.34 36.06 29.31 38.83 28.04 38.94 26.18 16.15 33.88 20.75 8.06 37.91 25.10 29.63
18 Vas 35.91 39.75 43.61 54.12 45.95 50.02 30.84 15.45 54.44 40.82 30.82 40.40 37.80 27.88 56.22 47.17 38.24 7.42 16.58 13.98
19 Veszprém 26.39 28.15 32.82 47.51 17.37 42.23 12.38 16.79 19.83 13.91 18.43 14.40 28.77 15.29 21.36 14.67 21.21 15.55 6.32 12.53
20 Zala 34.91 29.67 38.80 52.07 45.30 46.41 28.76 26.06 53.41 39.91 32.95 39.74 36.94 15.26 55.75 45.88 29.86 13.97 13.35 7.33 
12. Table Generalised cost/goods flow value ratios for industrial goods
41 [-] (RIV) 
 
                                                 
41,
3 Without technological times  
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kód megyék 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Budapest 2.77 37.69 22.50 36.52 31.78 32.13 15.05 31.53 38.39 18.19 14.06 17.50 6.14 30.58 42.88 23.83 27.50 39.12 26.90 37.89
2 Baranya 37.64 6.94 20.89 42.74 51.33 33.54 22.84 38.74 52.55 44.86 32.22 44.88 38.74 16.18 58.57 41.99 13.14 34.71 27.10 25.96
3 Bács-Kiskun 22.55 22.22 8.79 25.23 17.32 15.35 20.97 41.08 33.03 12.45 30.63 14.49 17.68 30.17 40.39 16.66 15.87 44.22 33.38 39.35
4 Békés 36.98 45.39 25.25 7.58 15.83 15.76 40.49 51.91 16.97 13.74 43.35 15.63 33.00 48.99 28.63 13.97 40.03 55.26 48.68 52.80
5 Borsod-AbaŁj-Zem 32.73 51.98 37.14 33.53 7.41 40.02 40.35 51.78 20.70 12.88 39.22 20.13 32.16 48.38 17.16 24.95 46.83 55.70 46.99 54.83
6 Csongrád 32.64 35.58 15.38 15.76 18.64 8.08 32.92 49.12 29.74 14.69 39.55 16.75 28.30 41.78 38.02 17.75 29.97 50.85 43.14 47.14
7 Fejér 14.97 25.99 21.13 40.40 41.10 33.12 7.27 23.44 45.25 30.39 11.97 29.75 16.97 15.39 49.43 32.41 14.26 29.50 12.60 27.49
8 Gyır-Moson-Sopron 31.87 40.90 42.84 53.94 49.74 51.02 24.30 8.04 55.16 42.16 17.21 40.80 34.96 31.24 57.53 46.67 33.61 13.20 17.77 22.27
9 Hajdú-Bihar 38.21 51.11 38.22 19.62 15.95 34.32 42.49 53.09 8.00 17.88 42.16 24.90 35.93 51.17 14.06 19.97 47.21 56.50 48.76 55.49
10 Heves 18.54 45.62 26.68 29.82 12.88 31.60 29.55 43.69 23.91 8.11 27.82 14.25 15.02 40.74 28.93 16.51 38.27 49.48 38.15 48.28
11 Komárom-Esztergom 13.93 36.69 30.66 43.09 39.92 39.22 11.97 16.47 44.87 28.61 4.42 25.59 15.37 26.95 48.64 32.75 26.11 29.42 18.72 31.47
12 Nógrád 17.93 45.69 31.45 33.98 20.16 36.39 29.09 42.36 32.89 14.26 24.98 5.80 16.16 40.27 36.17 25.18 38.40 48.60 37.62 47.82
13 Pest 6.15 38.77 17.61 32.77 31.28 27.85 17.04 34.47 36.11 14.63 15.48 15.74 6.47 33.62 41.97 15.93 28.74 41.19 29.33 40.19
14 Somogy 30.68 16.16 28.39 46.02 47.46 39.33 13.50 29.54 52.60 40.18 23.68 39.64 33.73 8.56 55.87 41.83 14.19 24.36 14.64 13.26
15 Szabolcs-Szatmár- 42.70 56.82 46.72 32.98 12.73 43.89 46.46 55.44 14.06 21.91 45.77 27.39 41.79 54.35 9.25 30.96 53.06 58.41 51.19 57.64
16 Jász-Nagykun- 23.74 40.88 19.42 16.19 18.91 20.71 30.49 44.91 19.97 12.28 30.83 18.87 15.85 40.79 30.96 8.23 33.94 49.46 39.32 48.17
17 Tolna 27.41 13.17 14.86 37.63 46.35 28.28 12.44 31.83 48.60 37.63 23.02 37.67 28.71 14.23 54.89 34.79 7.10 33.44 20.54 26.18
18 Vas 39.65 36.67 46.14 57.29 53.59 52.98 30.57 13.20 58.69 47.78 30.53 46.89 41.81 25.73 60.65 51.37 35.31 6.32 16.45 11.93
19 Veszprém 26.81 30.57 33.65 48.72 47.89 43.32 12.60 17.11 51.93 39.15 18.73 38.49 29.26 16.82 54.46 41.81 23.21 15.84 6.44 12.75
20 Zala 38.45 27.38 41.04 55.03 52.80 49.12 28.50 22.27 57.65 46.69 32.61 46.17 40.83 14.08 59.89 49.95 27.58 11.93 13.24 6.23 
13. Table Generalised cost/goods flow value ratios for agricultural goods
42 [-] (RAV) 
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Appendix 5: The transportation cost matrices
43 
 
Three transport cost matrices are included in the software. These matrices represent road 
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4. figure Road network model for 2006 
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Appendix 6: Generalised cost indicator calculation
44 
 
For  the  Hungarian  economy  the  export-import  relations  are  very  important.  The  main 
direction  of  the  foreign  trade  is  toward  the  EU-countries,  so  an  important  ”gate”  is  the 
Austrian border, where Hegyeshalom is the main border station. Therefore it is necessary to 
know the accessibility of Hegyeshalom board from the 20 different counties in order to plan 
the export-import activity toward the EU countries. The changes of the accessibilities because 
of developments of the road infrastructure in the future will influence also the transportation 
costs and further the results of the economic models. 
 
The nationwide road network model TRANSWAY is applicable to calculate these indicators. 
 
 
6. figure Road network model for 2003 
For the time period between 2003 and 2034 TRANSMAN developed four different road 
network models. One for 2003, 2006, 2013 and one for 2034. 
                                                 
44 Written by János Monigl and Zoltán Újhelyi  
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7. figure Road network model for 2006 
The transportation time between Hegyeshalom and any other point of Hungary is influenced 
by two contradictory factors. Developing the transport infrastructure, building new 
motorways and roads decreases the transportation time. But on the same time the developing 
economy generates new transport demands, causing increasing transportation time.  
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8. figure Road network model for 2013 
 
After the assignment of the traffic flows on the transport network (with different demand 
matrices) the model calculates four different transportation time matrices. For our purposes 
we need only one row of the matrices, which contains the transportation times to 















Nagykun- Tolna Vas Veszprém Zala
2003    time( min) 184 244 255 357 325 322 155 26 367 273 122 272 198 164 391 298 216 33 119 104
2006    time( min) 185 242 245 348 321 305 152 26 354 270 122 267 198 157 374 292 210 33 118 104
2013    time( min) 183 243 244 351 320 302 151 26 361 271 122 270 196 157 361 296 210 34 118 103
2034    time( min) 168 252 237 327 331 294 154 22 344 265 125 261 186 155 383 261 215 33 128 106 
14. table Transportation time for different network variants [min] 
 












Nagykun- Tolna Vas Veszprém Zala
time cost for 1000€ 295       391      409            573             521           517       249      41     588        438      195       436       317       263       627         478          346          53            191          166         
weighted time cost 96         13        17              17               23             19         10        2       24          11        6           13         4           24         17           17            8              1              6              4               
15. table Time cost calculation for 2003 [€] 
The 15. table shows the time cost calculation for 2003. The time costs are in the first row of 
the table. In the second row are the weighted time costs for every county. Summing up these 
values we can get a so called “generalised cost indicator” (GCIH, Generalised Cost Indicator 
for Hungary) for the whole country , for each network variants. For 2003 the indicator 




∗ ∗ α =
20 i
1 i
i i VOG KH * TH GDPW * GCIH ; 
Where: 
i:    number of counties (from 1 to 20) 
TH:    Transport time on road (Highways) [hour]  
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KH:    Unit time cost (K) on road (Highway)   60.00
45 [€/k€h] 
VOG:    Value Of Goods transported [1000 €] 


































9. figure The weighted time cost of counties by GDP for 2003 [€] 
The figure shows that Budapest has a big weight because of its high ratio of GDP. 
Calculating these indicators for every network variant we get an indicator set representing the 





16. table Accessibility indicators for four different years [€] 
 
 
                                                 
45 At the HU time cost 33% of the NL level had been considered 




2003 332            330
2006 326            328
2013 325            324 
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10. figure Diagram and trendline of accessibility indicator (GCIH) (first year is 1991) 
As one can see on this figure the accessibility of Hegyeshalom is slightly getting better, 
because the access time is decreasing. This is because developing of the road transport 
infrastructure is faster then the forcasted transport demand. You also can see the function of 
the trendline of GCIH in the following line. 
09 . 338 t * 6013 . 0 y + − =     1 t =     for 1991 year 
Using this function you can easily calculate the indicators (GCIH) for different time, as you 
can see in the 16. table the indicators before and after regression. But of course you have to 
take into consideration that the valid time interval is limited. You must not use this function 




















  108 
Appendix  7:  The  effect  of  CSF  support:  both  EU  and  Hungarian  co-
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Unemployment Rate, UNR, no TFP supply side effect Unemployment Rate, UNR, total effect
  









2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Labor Force Participation Rate, LFPR, no TFP supply side effect
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Growth of Real Compensation Rate, no TFP supply side effect
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Labor Productivity growth, DPDTY, no TFP supply side effect
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Government Lending in percentage of GDP, NLG, no TFP supply side effect
Government Lending in percentage of GDP, NLG, total effect
 